tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-83928049557864636122024-03-14T15:42:35.707+00:00Ian Wardell: Philosophical ThoughtsMostly philosophical topics, especially pertaining to the philosophy of mind and whether an afterlife makes sense.Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.comBlogger150125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-26535736100290666832023-11-13T11:16:00.003+00:002023-11-13T11:16:40.253+00:00A Review of "Threshold: terminal lucidity and the border between life and death" by Alexander Batthyány<h4><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Threshold-Terminal-Lucidity-Border-Death/dp/1250782287/ref=sr_1_1?crid=14E35BI13LFK4&keywords=Threshold%3A+terminal+lucidity+and+the+border+between+life+and+death&qid=1699785827&sprefix=threshold+terminal+lucidity+and+the+border+between+life+and+death%2Caps%2C544&sr=8-1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;" target="_blank"><img border="0" data-original-height="425" data-original-width="280" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiGxLmGBxT1isOILcaRwrpst_gile9U9e518lFwKAP7c-Rt6kGaIvBLMr6slcDCgxclWaf3aYSXHnoDsz4jDkedBi78DMFVNw5HYPniJR89GXwWmxZ2VfnAhl5ZqX3-OFUHWhP07nSoH7u83FrRjJmMaeUUDALEba3NKETnx61i3rjtb-MUJqnP6xQbzBZy/s320/Threshold.jpg" width="211" /></a></div>Preamble</h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><br />The rally, or the last hurrah, which in recent years has been termed <a href="https://www.freethink.com/health/terminal-lucidity" target="_blank">terminal lucidity</a>, refers to where a person, typically suffering from dementia or some other neurological disorder, suddenly and seemingly miraculously reverts to their pre-dementia original selves. This usually occurs shortly before death. I recently read a book on this topic called <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Threshold-Terminal-Lucidity-Border-Death-ebook/dp/B0BQGGL3Y8/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1DPYWRLFZ31C2&keywords=Threshold%3A+terminal+lucidity+and+the+border+between+life+and+death&qid=1696348919&sprefix=threshold+terminal+lucidity+and+the+border+between+life+and+death%2Caps%2C306&sr=8-1" target="_blank">Threshold: Terminal lucidity and the Border between Life and Death</a> by <a href="https://www.viktorfranklinstitute.org/personnel/alexander-batthyany/" target="_blank">Alexander Batthyány</a>. I'll provide a summary of the salient points of this book followed by a few of my thoughts.</span><p></p><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">A summary of the book</span></h4><p><span style="font-family: arial;">According to Alexander Batthyány, states of intoxication and other induced exceptional psychological states pose a relatively weak argument against an enduring self or soul. This is for the simple reason that such conditions are temporary, and the original self soon returns. So, here, it cannot be the case that the original self was ever destroyed. The original self was there all along, but temporarily hidden.<br /><br />It is seemingly very different with dementia. The progression of dementia appears to actually <i>destroy</i> a person's beliefs, interests, memories, and very character. This, in turn, also implies that normal brains cause our usual standard personality and character. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">If these suppositions are correct</span><span style="font-family: arial;">, what can be left of any eternal, immutable soul?</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">However, </span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">terminal lucidity has now demonstrated </span></span><span style="font-family: arial;">that the original self <i>can</i> return. This is, <i>to say the least</i>, perplexing since, at least with dementia, the damage to the brain is <i>still there</i>. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">H</span><span style="font-family: arial;">ow is it possible to have a normal, clear, lucid mind with a severely diseased brain if the brain produces consciousness? Indeed, it doesn't seem possible.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">The author draws parallels between terminal lucidity and Near-Death Experiences (NDEs). In NDEs, we also have </span><span style="font-family: arial;">self-consciousness and personhood when these ought to be highly unlikely given the impaired brain states. So </span><span style="font-family: arial;">despite compromised brain activity </span><span style="font-family: arial;">during </span><span style="font-family: arial;">both</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span><span style="font-family: arial;">terminal lucidity and NDEs, individuals have normal if not <i>enhanced</i> mental alertness, vision, and memories. As an aside, w</span><span style="font-family: arial;">hilst the author doesn't mention this, one might wonder about a potential connection to </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://www.popsci.com/science/article/2013-02/when-brain-damage-unlocks-genius-within/" target="_blank">savant syndrome</a> here<span>?</span></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">The author posits that both terminal lucidity and NDE's strongly imply that it cannot be the brain, or indeed the whole body, that somehow produces consciousness. And yet, on the other hand, the author also feels this is strongly contradicted by all the other overwhelming evidence that appears to show that consciousness, or the mind, is very much dependent on the proper functioning of one's brain.<br /><br />The author tries to reconcile what terminal lucidity and NDE's seem to imply with this contrary evidence, by employing two analogies. The first one is that the mind-brain relationship resembles a total solar eclipse. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">During such an eclipse, we cannot see the sun, we can only see the </span><span style="font-family: arial;">coronal filaments peeping out from behind the moon. If we did not know better, we would fallaciously infer the moon somehow produces these filaments. Similarly, we fallaciously infer the brain produces consciousness. The other analogy is the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2009/08/mind-at-large/197259/" target="_blank">mind at large</a> idea.</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> This holds that the brain functions similarly to a “reducing valve”, which filters out a much greater and expanded consciousness to prevent us from being overwhelmed and confused by a </span><span style="font-family: arial;">vast ocean of conscious experiences.</span></p><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">My Thoughts<br /><br /></span></h4><div><span style="font-family: arial;">The idea that we simply cease to exist when we die derives much of its plausibility from the supposition that as someone approaches death, their consciousness will gradually diminish until finally reaching zero. However, episodes of terminal lucidity and NDEs show that this does not always occur. Indeed, NDErs, despite being on the threshold of death, frequently report that they felt more conscious than they had ever felt when alive. So it seems to me that</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> both terminal lucidity and NDEs </span>—<span style="font-family: arial;"> as well as other anomalous phenomena near death such as deathbed visions, crisis apparitions, and shared death experiences</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span>—<span style="font-family: arial;"> </span><span style="font-family: arial;">strongly challenge the idea that consciousness is solely produced by the brain.</span><span><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br />On the other hand, apparently contradicting this evidence is the undeniable fact that a damaged brain usually leads to a damaged mind. Do the</span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> total solar eclipse and the </span><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2009/08/mind-at-large/197259/" target="_blank">mind at large</a> analogies explain how a soul could exist in the face of all this contrary evidence?</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">To address the full solar eclipse analogy first. To reiterate, the message is that in a total solar eclipse, just as one might erroneously suppose the moon somehow produces the coronal filaments peeping out from behind the moon, so we erroneously assume the brain is producing consciousness. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">We need to remind ourselves, though, that</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span><span style="font-family: arial;">brain damage </span><span style="font-family: arial;">adversely impacts our </span><span style="font-family: arial;">actual </span><i style="font-family: arial;">minds </i><span style="font-family: arial;">as experienced by that person himself</span><span style="font-family: arial;">. It's not clear to me how t</span><span style="font-family: arial;">he analogy actually addresses this</span><span style="font-family: arial;">. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><span><span>What about the <i>mind at large</i> hypothesis where the brain functions as something akin to a </span><span>reducing valve</span><span>? I think this is a better analogy, and indeed I have a lot of sympathy for it. However, this has concerns too. For example, </span><a href="https://philpeople.org/profiles/keith-augustine" style="background-color: white; color: #7e1d9e; font-size: 15.4px; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">Keith Augustine</a><span style="background-color: white; font-size: 15.4px;"> and </span><a href="https://einsteinmed.org/faculty/2307/yonatan-fishman/" style="background-color: white; color: #da23ff; font-size: 15.4px;" target="_blank">Yonatan I. Fishman</a> i<span style="background-color: white; font-size: 15.4px;">n </span></span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Myth-Afterlife-against-After-Death/dp/0810886774/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=the+Myth+of+an+Afterlife&qid=1613133755&sr=8-1" style="background-color: white; color: #da23ff; font-size: 15.4px;" target="_blank">The Myth of an Afterlife</a> in <span style="background-color: white; font-size: 15.4px;">a chapter called, <i>The Dualist's</i> <i>Dilemma,</i></span><span> argue against this “filter” hypothesis when they say:</span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /><blockquote>[W]e would expect the progressive destruction of more and more of the brain’s “filter” by Alzheimer’s disease to progressively “free” more and more of consciousness, and thus increase Alzheimer’s patients’ mental proficiency as the disease progresses.</blockquote><br />Of course, with terminal lucidity, some </span><span style="font-family: arial;">Alzheimer’s </span><span style="font-family: arial;">patients' mental proficiency is indeed increased<i> </i>(which they do not mention), but this is the exception rather than the norm. So the <i>mind at large</i> hypothesis needs to be fleshed out a bit to address this criticism.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">I have thought of a simpler analogy, one that avoids such criticisms. Consider the fact that whilst a person has on a pair of eyeglasses their vision will be influenced by the state of the lenses, mostly (but not always) for the worse. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">For example, the</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> lenses might fog up, or acquire scratches over time, both of which will compromise that person's vision. Yet if they were to take off their eyeglasses, then their vision would be restored to what it was originally.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">So whilst wearing eyeglasses, the more badly damaged the lenses are, the worse our vision will get. Notwithstanding this, neither the lenses nor the eyeglasses as a whole, produce our vision. Moreover, </span><span style="font-family: arial;">there is no conceivable mechanism whereby the lenses, or the eyeglasses as a whole, <i>could</i> actually produce our vision. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">The same pertains to the mind and brain. We have a correlation between damage to the brain and how much the mind is impaired, yet there is no conceivable mechanism whereby the brain could </span><i style="font-family: arial;">produce</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> consciousness. Indeed</span><span style="font-family: arial;">, this is why we have </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jan/21/-sp-why-cant-worlds-greatest-minds-solve-mystery-consciousness" style="font-family: arial;" target="_blank">the hard problem</a><span style="font-family: arial;">*. So, just as eyeglasses merely affect vision, it seems reasonable <i>from just philosophical grounds alone</i> to suppose brains merely </span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: arial; font-size: 15.4px;">affect (not produce) our mind states. </span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: arial; font-size: 15.4px;">So while the mind, or self/soul is embodied, it will operate through the brain and therefore will be subject to any damage that the brain may acquire. Yet the soul, which is the analogical equivalent to unaided sight in the eyeglasses analogy, remains the same throughout. </span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: arial; font-size: 15.4px;">And this interpretation is bolstered when we take into account all the evidence suggesting an afterlife.</span></div><div><span style="background-color: white; font-family: arial; font-size: 15.4px;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="background-color: white; font-family: arial; font-size: 15.4px;">But what about terminal lucidity? I think the eyeglasses analogy covers this too. Consider </span><span style="font-family: arial;">if both lenses of a pair of eyeglasses get cracked and badly splintered, and </span><span style="font-family: arial;">a hole develops in one of the lenses through which a person wearing the eyeglasses can see. Perhaps something analogically akin is happening in terminal lucidity</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span>—<span style="font-family: arial;"> namely, a damaged brain allows the soul to partially bypass it and attain the state of consciousness and cognitive abilities that it would have when disembodied.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">In conclusion, I appreciate this book for its potential to both bring terminal lucidity to the wider public's attention and to convey that it is very difficult, if not </span><i style="font-family: arial;">impossible</i><span style="font-family: arial;">, to square this phenomenon with the notion that the brain somehow produces the mind. I'm not sure, though, that the author has made it sufficiently clear that the brain merely affecting consciousness is not only a viable alternative but is actually somewhat more plausible than the mainstream position that the brain produces the mind. However, notwithstanding the book's detractions, it's certainly well worth reading. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">*This, incidentally, is why many academics prefer to hypothesize that the mind is quite</span><i style="font-family: arial;"> literally</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> the same as brain processes, or it's <i>literally</i> what the brain <i>does</i> i.e. they favour some type of reductive materialism. However, physical processes and conscious experiences are wholly unlike each other, even if the former somehow causes or elicits the latter. So it seems to me that reductive materialism is definitively ruled out. </span></div><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></p><p><br /></p>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-44542189173431533302023-08-31T16:37:00.022+01:002023-08-31T16:58:15.694+01:00What's the point of all things?<span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;">People ask what's the point of life, what's the point of the Universe, and even if there's an afterlife, what would be the point of it? Inevitably, they always seem to be depressed, or give off that impression.</span><div><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;">What's the point of life, what's the point of the Universe, indeed what's the point of the whole shebang? What's the point of ourselves existing at all? Why wasn't there just eternal nothingness? Why wasn't there no Universe, no consciousness at all? Nothing at all, forever? All similar questions.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;">We do not know what we are, why we're here, where we're going. Life, our existence, all things, are wholly mysterious.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;">However, my reaction to this is <i>very</i> different to all these other people. Rather than it depressing me, it intrigues me. It makes our lives, all things, ultimately mysterious. And <i>very</i> interesting.
Maybe deep inside they think that life and the Universe is absurd? I definitely don't even though I think such questions are beyond our ken.</span></div>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com10tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-65934739627121440192023-08-24T13:42:00.000+01:002023-08-24T13:42:20.397+01:00Do colours, sounds and odours as we experience them exist out there in the external world? I think so.<h3 style="text-align: left;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjwXN9Qnl2l2AcDzg7idrudbQIM2tvzXlLPUP-CjK-MEzEbsfcL6w8Ke0EbZ47jcvvvKIwXGiGWuDlG5ax9CK5EU9oVUkTUTfyH8pQ8SKIYZLCfiJfTHYPxR29OQ0Kr_0auwpQrC22mBnLvHiUJ-EnwuhvbHn8SJgcyOCa4YRvA0ZoIqFXpafbH6OOlJ6fP/s728/colorful.jpg" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="455" data-original-width="728" height="348" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjwXN9Qnl2l2AcDzg7idrudbQIM2tvzXlLPUP-CjK-MEzEbsfcL6w8Ke0EbZ47jcvvvKIwXGiGWuDlG5ax9CK5EU9oVUkTUTfyH8pQ8SKIYZLCfiJfTHYPxR29OQ0Kr_0auwpQrC22mBnLvHiUJ-EnwuhvbHn8SJgcyOCa4YRvA0ZoIqFXpafbH6OOlJ6fP/w555-h348/colorful.jpg" width="555" /></a></div></h3><h3 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></h3><h3 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">1. Introduction</span></h3><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Common sense holds that what has been labelled the </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primary%E2%80%93secondary_quality_distinction" target="_blank">secondary qualities</a>, </span><span style="font-family: arial;">such as </span><span style="font-family: arial;">colours, sounds and odours, exist out there in the world independently of us.</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> For example, </span><span style="font-family: arial;">grass <i>really is</i> green regardless of whether anyone is looking at it or not – that is, it is an objective feature of the world.</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span><span style="font-family: arial;">In stark contrast<i>, </i></span><span style="font-family: arial;">academics and the scientifically educated overwhelmingly reject this view. They hold that </span><span style="font-family: arial;">colours, sounds, odours and the other secondary qualities <i>do not exist out there in the world at all</i>, rather they only exist as an experience produced by the brain. This is in contrast to their position on the </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primary%E2%80%93secondary_quality_distinction" style="font-family: arial;" target="_blank">primary qualities</a>, <span style="font-family: arial;">such as shape and size, which, like common sense, they regard as</span> <span style="font-family: arial;">existing out there.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">To explicate this </span><span style="font-family: arial;">academic </span><span style="font-family: arial;">view regarding the secondary qualities</span><span style="font-family: arial;">, l</span><span style="font-family: arial;">et's consider the example of colours. Briefly, the story goes like this:</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> objects reflect particular wavelengths of light</span><span style="font-family: arial;">, this light then enters the eyes and precipitates a chain of physical processes in the brain, finally, the brain somehow crafts the experience of a colour from these signals it receives. In this story, it should be stressed that the light <i>itself </i>is not considered to be coloured at all, the colour only comes into existence at the end of the causal chain. W</span><span style="font-family: arial;">atch <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fQczp0wtZQQ" target="_blank">this video</a> for a simplified scientific story of what happens.<br /> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><br />I find it hard to convey how utterly radical this conception of the world is. A world that is entirely bereft of any colours, sounds or odours is a deeply alien one, and arguably unimaginable. It is a bare skeletal outline of reality denuded of the flesh of the qualitative. Roses are not really red, violets are not really blue. And an unpleasant odour is not literally out there in the world, rather allegedly it's a fabrication created by our own brains! </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">So given the radical nature of the claim, one would expect a lot of pushback. But, curiously, it seems almost entirely absent. Even those who typically believe in psi and an afterlife and constantly question mainstream academic positions, accept the arguments advanced for this conception of reality. Indeed, these very same people have, at times, been quite trenchant and dismissive of my own belief that the world is more or less as we perceive it to be. On this issue, I seem to be virtually a lone voice. So I thought I would set the record straight and explain why I remain intransigent on this matter.<br /><br />Here's how I intend to proceed. The next part, part 2, will be devoted to advancing arguments for this thesis that the secondary qualities do not exist out there. Part 3 will be devoted to questioning these arguments with part 3(i) mostly addressing the perceptual illusion argument and part 3(ii) addressing the causal story argument. Part 4 will be devoted to articulating an alternative to this causal story. In Part 5 I will give my concluding thoughts.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Throughout this essay, I will largely be focussing on colours. However, it can be assumed that, in the main, similar arguments are equally applicable to the other secondary qualities. I will also, contrary to my own views, follow the standard practice of referring to the brain rather than the mind as playing a pivotal role in shaping the contents of our sensory perceptions.<br /><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><h3 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">2. The arguments for the claim that colours, sounds and smells as we experience them do not exist out there<br /><br /></span></h3><h3 style="text-align: left;"></h3><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">To recapitulate, the commonsensical view is that colours, sounds, smells and the other secondary qualities exist out there, and we just passively perceive them as they are in themselves. But such a view is rejected by the vast majority of scientists and philosophers, and indeed has been labelled <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%C3%AFve_realism" target="_blank">naïve realism</a>. Why </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><i>naïve?</i></span><span style="font-family: arial;"> In the main, it's because perceptual illusions seemingly demonstrate that such a view is untenable.<br /> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><br />Let's first of all consider illusions involving vision. The two most impressive ones I've ever encountered are the <a href="https://michaelbach.de/ot/lum-adelsonCheckShadow/">shadow-checker illusion</a> and that <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_dress" target="_blank">famous dress</a>. In the former, the squares A and B appear to have very different colours. However, if we remove most of the picture leaving just the squares A and B, then, much to our astonishment, we will see that they are actually <i>the very same colour</i>.<br /> <br />With the dress, it is either perceived </span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">as being white and gold, or alternatively as being black and blue</span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">. If that were not astonishing enough, the very same individual might initially see it as being coloured </span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">one way</span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">, but then at a later date are only able to see it as being</span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"> coloured the other way. Indeed, this actually happened to me. Initially, I could only see the dress as being </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">white and gold</span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">, but ever since that first day I can now only see it as being black and blue. It now seems baffling to me that I <i>ever</i> saw it as being white and gold!</span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"> </span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">Perceptual illusions also apply to our other senses. Take a look at <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w40XcUP5KrI&list=RDQMtoHMila11Bk&index=2" target="_blank">this video</a> that demonstrates that what we see can quite <i>literally</i> shape and change what we <i>hear</i>. And, contrary to what most of us might suppose, perceptual illusions even apply to what we smell and taste. For example, we might naïvely
suppose that the taste of our food and drink won't <i>literally</i> be affected by its appearance. A tasteless colour additive will surely just make it look more pleasing to the eye. So any perceived difference in the taste of the food or drink might just be assumed to be imaginary. But, apparently, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TTIVgJDD0w4&list=PL0391AE12F323727F" target="_blank">it does quite <i>literally</i> change the taste</a>. A fact that should be borne in mind should anyone ever <a href="https://www.apa.org/monitor/sep04/toilet.html" target="_blank">offer you apple juice in a clean bedpan</a>! (3rd paragraph under the subheading "the power of disgust"). We should also bear in mind that smell is closely related to taste. Hence, since the appearance of food changes the taste, we can be confident it changes the smell too.<br /><br />It is of vital importance to understand that perceptual illusions are not outliers in how we perceive the world. They are not tricks. Rather they <i>underscore</i> the way that we <i>always</i> sense the world. Indeed, everything <i>we ever perceive</i> could, in a sense, be considered to be an illusion. <br /> </span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">Let's illustrate this fact by considering vision. </span></span><span style="font-family: arial;">W</span><span style="font-family: arial;">e typically see objects under a variety of different lighting conditions. </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">Sometimes objects are in shadow, sometimes they're not. </span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">Sometimes we see objects in the sunlight, sometimes under artificial
lighting. Even when we see an object outside on a cloudless day the lighting conditions constantly change. For example, when
the Sun is low in the sky the sunlight has to travel through a greater quantity of air, which affects the lighting conditions.</span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></span></span><div style="text-align: left;"><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"> </span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span><span style="font-family: arial;">These lighting conditions in turn play a role in determining which wavelengths of light are reflected off objects. But, in physics, colours are <i>defined</i> by wavelengths of light. Hence, since</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span><span style="font-family: arial;">one and the same object frequently reflects differing wavelengths of light, we should expect a specific object to be constantly seeming to change its colour. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">Yet
remarkably, under a wide variety of lighting
conditions, specific objects more or less appear to be of the same
colour. This phenomenon is referred to as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_constancy" target="_blank">colour constancy</a>.
For example, regardless of whether or not an object is in shadow, it looks
more or less the same colour. And something like a rose will look more
or less the same shade of red throughout the daylight hours, despite the
different wavelengths of light being reflected off it as the day
progresses.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><br />We can infer then that we do not simply
passively perceive what is out there. In the case of our vision, it's
not as if we are looking out of a
transparent window onto the external world just simply
seeing what is out there. Rather, seeing is an <i>active</i> process. That is, the brain plays an <i>active</i> role in
shaping the colours we see. What seems to
be happening here is that the brain holds an unconscious implicit
hypothesis about the nature of the external world. This hypothesis includes the
idea that objects have intrinsic unchanging colours. </span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">So the brain adjusts accordingly</span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">, shaping and moulding visual experiences to try and ensure that
specific objects appear to retain more or less the same colour
irrespective of all the differing lighting conditions and the actual wavelengths of light entering our eyes.</span></span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></span></span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">Furthermore, consider also that our sensory experiences will not be the
same for all individuals. For example, some individuals have varying
degrees of colour blindness or colour vision deficiency. It also seems
that animals differ from humans in what they can sense. Some see <i>fewer</i> colours than we humans do, but other animals, most notably many insects, see <i>more</i> colours. And animals also differ significantly in their other senses too.<br /><br /></span></span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">So naïve realism does not seem to be tenable. The secondary qualities that we experience are not just determined by objective features of the world
such as wavelengths of light, they are also influenced by a perceiver's <i>expectations and beliefs</i>, as well as, of course, the nature and structure of a perceiver's sensory organs and brain. But if what we perceptually experience differs from what the world is like <i>in and of itself</i>, then how do we know colours and the other secondary qualities exist out there at all? <br /><br />None of the foregoing in this section makes it conclusive that colours and the other secondary qualities do not exist out there. But the case is arguably considerably strengthened if we also take into account the alleged fact that we have a complete scientific story for how we perceive. Crucially, this story involves <i>only</i> the </span></span><span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: arial;">primary qualities as being causally efficacious </span></span>–<span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> the secondary qualities are deemed to be causally impotent.</span></span><span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> So, i</span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">n the case of vision, it is the wavelengths of light <i>only</i>, not the experienced colours associated with those wavelengths, that figure in the scientific story of how we perceive colour. And the same applies to the other secondary qualities.</span></span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><br />I will now summarise the arguments that colours and other secondary qualities do not exist out there.<br /><br /></span></span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">a) We do not passively perceive the world, rather the brain moulds and shapes our perceptions to make them congruent with our implicit expectations about what the world is like. Hence, a colour as perceived might be very different from the <i>actual</i> colour of objects. So why believe there are <i>actual</i> colours out there at all?<br /> <br /></span></span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">b) Secondly, two individuals can perceive a secondary quality <i>very</i> differently. Indeed, this is even the case with unimpaired senses since one's implicit expectations and beliefs play an important role in what we perceive. The dress is an excellent example that illustrates this since two individuals can see radically different colours. Indeed, even the same individual can perceive the dress as having very different colours on two separate occasions.<br /><br /></span></span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">c) The alleged clinching argument is that we have a complete scientific story of how we perceive secondary qualities, and no reference is made to any actual secondary qualities existing out there in the world. Hence, even if they <i>do</i> exist, they play no role in explaining our experience of the secondary qualities.<br /></span></span></h4></div></div></div><h4 style="text-align: left;"></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><br /> </span></span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"></h4><h3 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>3. The Pushback</span></span></h3><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span><br /></span></span></h4><div style="text-align: left;"><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>(i). The argument from perceptual illusions dismantled</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: arial; font-weight: normal;">Let’s consider the <a href="https://michaelbach.de/ot/lum-adelsonCheckShadow/">shadow-checker illusion</a> again. Suppose this was an actual object in front of us with the image on our retinas approximating to the 2D picture presented to us on our computer or mobile screens. Despite the wavelengths of light entering our eyes from squares A and B being identical, the way our vision works we will perceive squares A and B as having very different colours, just as in the 2D illusion. Yet we're not being fooled since if we were to approach this object, and view it from various perspectives, then we would effectively confirm that squares A and B are indeed very different colours and to the same degree as we perceive in the 2D illusion. <br /><br /></span></h4><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-weight: normal;">But what if we were to see reality as it supposedly really is with us experiencing the colours corresponding to the wavelengths of light entering our eyes? Then viewing the checkerboard 3D object from the perspective corresponding to the 2D picture, we would see squares A and B as being the same colour. The problem here is that, in reality, they are <i>not</i> the same colour! Moreover, perceiving them as the same colour will compromise our ability to recognise it as being a checkerboard at all. It is in consideration of these reasons that</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> I have argued elsewhere that, properly speaking, the
shadow-checker illusion shouldn't actually be considered an illusion at
all. See <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2011/03/are-perceptual-illusions-always.html" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2020/09/the-checker-shadow-illusion-part-2.html" target="_blank">here</a>. </span></div><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-weight: normal;"><br />More generally, since differing lighting conditions influence the wavelengths of light reflected from objects, then if we were to simply experience the colours corresponding to the wavelengths of light entering our eyes, the colours of objects would appear to us to be in a constant state of change. In short, we wouldn't be seeing colours as they are in themselves out there in the world. And as with the checkerboard, it would compromise our ability to recognise objects. <br /><br />If colours do exist out there in the world and objects are intrinsically coloured (they retain precisely the same colour over time), then their actual colours correlate poorly with the wavelengths of light that enter our eyes. The fact we do not see the colours corresponding to these wavelengths cannot therefore be used as an argument that we're not seeing the world as it is. <i>On the contrary</i>, the very fact that our brains mould and shape the colours we actually perceive by taking into account the lighting conditions, suggests that we do see the world with its colours more or less as it is in itself. Of course, it also entails that our vision is an active rather than a passive process. That is, the brain moulds and shapes and infers what the world is like. But that doesn't mean to say that what we eventually perceive, what the brain infers, cannot be normally a fairly accurate representation of what the world is like in and of itself.</span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-weight: normal;"> </span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-weight: normal;"></span></h4><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: arial;">It should be noted, though, that often this inference by the brain goes askew. The incorrect perception of the colours of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_dress" target="_blank">the dress</a>
made by those who perceive it as being white and gold is one such
example, although to be fair we are limited to viewing a 2D photograph
of it, so it is easy for the brain to misinterpret the lighting
conditions. Also, colour blindness or colour vision deficiency will
clearly subvert our ability to correctly perceive colours. And even with
unimpaired colour vision, we can only see a fraction of the colours that
some other animals can. However, how is any of this more significant than the
fact </span><span style="font-family: arial;">that
some people have better visual acuity than others? Or that we can only
see a fraction of what is out there in contrast to what we can see
utilizing a telescope or microscope? No one suggests that from the fact
our vision acuity is limited, or from the fact we have poor vision, that there is no
world with a definite character out there at all!</span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></div><h4 style="text-align: left;"></h4><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-weight: normal;"></span><span style="font-family: arial;">The denial that the world has any secondary qualities from the consideration of perceptual illusions faces a further challenge. It </span><span style="font-family: arial;">is that the arguments presented in part 2 equally apply to some of the </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primary%E2%80%93secondary_quality_distinction" target="_blank">primary qualities</a></span><span style="font-family: arial;">, most notably the size and shape of objects. Consider that the perceived <i>size</i> of objects, just like colour, is also to a certain extent moulded and shaped by the brain. The moon, for example, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moon_illusion" target="_blank">looks larger near the horizon than it does when it is high up in the sky</a>. Yet we would not generally claim that size is purely a fabrication produced by the human brain. That is, it is assumed that objects out there, such as the moon, have a <i>real</i> size independent of human perception. And the same applies to the shape of objects. Consider the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shepard_tables" target="_blank">Shepard tabletop illusion</a> for example (I also talk about this illusion <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2020/06/the-tabletop-illusion.html" target="_blank">here</a>). So just like colours and the other secondary qualities, the perceived size and shape of objects also vary depending on how the brain interprets the external world. Hence, to say that due to perceptual illusions colours, sounds and smells are <i>not</i> out there in the external world, yet size and shape <i>are,</i> seems to apply a double standard.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">There's something else to consider, and it's arguably more important. Consider that the visual appearance of an object is distinguished from the background by its colours -- such colours essentially outline its shape. Hence, it seems incongruous to suggest the shape is out there but that its colour is somehow produced by the brain. Both the shape of an object and its colour both seem to be out there at a distance from us. Moreover, and even more importantly, they both come to us as a seemingly undifferentiated whole. Can we really subtract the colour of an object from its shape? It seems peculiar and implausible to me to imagine we can do so. Surely either both are out there, or neither are?</span></div></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">This sub-section has argued that perceptual illusions and what they imply about how we perceive, do not suffice, nor indeed even give any particular reason to doubt that colours exist out there. Similar arguments can be applied to the other secondary qualities. We now turn to the claim that only the primary qualities are required to exist to explain why we perceive the secondary qualities. </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>(ii). The argument from the scientific story called into question<br /><br /></span></span></h4><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>As previously mentioned, the scientific story goes like this. In the case of colours, objects reflect particular wavelengths of light, this light then enters the eyes and precipitates a chain of physical processes in the brain, finally, the brain somehow crafts the experience of a colour from these signals it receives. In this story, it is only the <i>measurable</i> aspects of reality that are deemed to have any causal efficacy. That is to say, it is purely these measurable aspects of reality that provide a full account of how we perceive both the primary and secondary qualities.</span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> </span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>There is a problem here though, and it is this: <i>we do not in fact have any such scientific story!</i> For what we encounter here is the notorious <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jan/21/-sp-why-cant-worlds-greatest-minds-solve-mystery-consciousness" target="_blank">hard problem of consciousness</a>.</span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"> The unreflective view is that consciousness is supposed to come into being as the end consequence of material chains of causes and effects. Such causes and effects are cashed out completely in the form of processes that we can measure; namely particles with physical properties such as charge, momentum, spin and so on. Each link in the chain of causality follows as a direct result of these properties. But, at the end of such causal chains terminating in the brain, we get a sudden abrupt change, a radical disconnect from these measurable processes to subjective experiences such as the greenness of grass, the warmth of love, the smell of roses and so on. These subjective experiences do not have physical properties, so we cannot, <i>seemingly in principle</i>, derive them from the prior physical causal chains. So the scientific story only takes us up to the end of the material chain or chains of causes and effects. We lack a causal story for <i>how</i> this final link in the causal chain </span><span style="font-family: arial;">– the activity in the brain </span><span style="font-family: arial;">–</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span><span style="font-family: arial;">somehow creates, precipitates, or translates into a perceptual experience (or any other mental event). Indeed, this inability to specify a causal mechanism even rules out it being a scientific </span><i style="font-family: arial;">hypothesis</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> least of all a scientific </span><i style="font-family: arial;">story.</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Reductive materialism attempts to negate this problem by holding that </span><span style="font-family: arial;">conscious experiences are either literally <i>identical</i>
to certain brain processes, or alternatively, that conscious experiences
are somehow <i>entailed</i> by brain processes, though there is a great deal of debate about the nature of such "entailment"</span><span style="font-family: arial;">. But in the case of either identity or at least <i>metaphysical</i> entailment, this then meets the challenge of the last paragraph since under this assumption of materialism we now have a causal story of how we perceptually perceive.<br /></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><br />Let's for the sake of argument, and contrary to my own view (see <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2018/06/why-existence-of-consciousness-rules.html" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2016/04/neither-modern-materialism-nor-science.html" target="_blank">here</a>), take for granted that a type of materialism so characterised is unproblematic. It nevertheless wouldn't be purely a <i>scientific</i> story of how we perceive since one would be assuming upfront the type of materialism so defined. A <i>scientific</i> justification for rejecting the existence of secondary qualities in the external world cannot be predicated on a certain metaphysical stance being true. That is, if we are to have a scientific justification for supposing that colours, sounds, smells and tastes are conjured up or created by the mind rather than residing in an external world, then this ought to apply under <i>any</i> metaphysical stance on the mind-body problem, even if it resembles something like <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2014/03/a-very-brief-introduction-to-subjective.html" target="_blank">Berkeley's immaterialism</a> (more on immaterialism/idealism near the end).</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">However, let's for the time being waive this objection aside and see how the assumption of some suitable type of materialism fares in this causal story. With what justification do we hold that colours, sounds and smells are either identical or entailed by processes in the brain rather than being identical or entailed by the <i>original</i> causal triggers in the world, namely the wavelengths of light reflected off objects? For example, why can't, say, the redness we experience when looking at a strawberry be literally identical to the specific wavelength of light reflected off that strawberry under some ideal lighting condition? By this means, we could thereby conclude that colours, and the other secondary qualities, are actually out there in the world.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">One response would be to point out that the role of the light wave ends when it initiates the chain of causation in one's brain. So t</span><span style="font-family: arial;">he causal story implies that it is the </span><i style="font-family: arial;">last</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> physical events in the brain that are somehow wholly responsible for our experience of colours, and indeed all other sensory experiences too (whether primary or secondary). </span><span style="font-family: arial;">This seems to suggest that the identity or entailment should reside in those last physical events. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">Hence, in a suitable sense, we might say a brain state is red, but a strawberry that one is perceiving is </span><i style="font-family: arial;">not</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> literally red.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">On the other hand, the fact that it is the final physical events in the brain
that are supposed to be fully responsible for our perceptions, <i>irrespective</i> of whether they're
primary or secondary qualities, </span><span style="font-family: arial;">appears to introduce a possible inconsistency. For</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> it might be considered to be peculiar that </span><span style="font-family: arial;">our perception of shape and size, despite being immediately caused by brain processes, are nevertheless held to resemble the objects that are actually out there, whereas the perception of colour, odours and sounds allegedly do not. Can such a distinction be justified? One possible response is to point out that, unlike the secondary qualities, we </span><span style="font-family: arial;">have <i>independent</i> means whereby we can ascertain the shape and size of objects. For if objects are within reach, we are able to obtain a tactile confirmation of the shape and size of the object in question.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">I agree that we can be confident in our supposition that shape and size are really out there. Yet this doesn't alter the fact that processes within the brain, which themselves are quite unlike shape or size, can nevertheless convey the visual experience of the correct shape and size of an object. This being so, why can't the same apply to the secondary qualities? Why can't </span><span style="font-family: arial;">processes within the brain, which themselves are quite unlike wavelengths of light, convey the experience of the correct </span><span style="font-family: arial;">wavelengths of light that reflect off the objects we perceive? And if colours are </span><i style="font-family: arial;">identical</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> to, or <i>metaphysically entailed</i>, by specific wavelengths of light, we would then be effectively perceiving colours out there. And a similar point applies to the other secondary qualities. Of course, one might be tempted to point out that wavelengths of light are not colours! But this incredulity should be directed at materialism itself since it is surely no more plausible to declare colours and the other secondary qualities are identical to <i>brain</i> processes. I conclude that, even if we assume materialism is correct, under its logic we have no good reason to reject the idea that colours and the other secondary qualities</span><span style="font-family: arial;">, in a suitable sense, </span><span style="font-family: arial;">exist out in the external world itself. </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> </span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>What of other positions apart from strict materialism, including those that still accept the brain somehow creates the mind? Since here the identification of conscious states with brain processes is being rejected then we no longer have a causal story accounting for how we perceive anything at all. Yes, we can trace the causal story from the light reflecting off an object to the physical activity at the end of the causal chain in the brain, but we are completely lacking an account of how this elicits, or translates, into a specific perceptual experience. This is regardless of whether we have in mind the secondary or primary qualities.</span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> </span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>The fact is, though, that we do nevertheless have sensory experiences and, furthermore, we are here assuming that it is the physical processes in the brain that somehow creates these experiences. So we might be tempted to ask again that if our experience of the shape and size of an object somehow, by some unknown means, corresponds to that which is actually out there, then why not our experience of colours and the other secondary qualities? </span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>The answer that many will give is </span></span><span style="font-family: arial;">that something like colour can't reside in external objects as it doesn't have any causal powers, only the wavelengths of light do. So, since, unlike materialism, we're not identifying colours with wavelengths of light, nor with anything else that has causal powers, then colours cannot exist out there.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">This, though, seems to me to be susceptible to the charge of subtracting the causal power of a thing from the thing itself. The waves on an ocean comprise much of the causal power of that ocean. But obviously, the body of water constituting the ocean exists, and indeed the waves are simply a property of that water. Likewise, it might be that something like the red we experience exists out there, and it has the property associated with a specific wavelength of light with this property being a manifestation of its causal power.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> </span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>I conclude that, in addition to the argument from perceptual illusions, the alleged scientific story also fails to rule out the existence of secondary qualities existing out there in the world.<br /><br /><br /></span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> </span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span></span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span></span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span></span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><h3 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>4. Are we obligated to accept the Causal Story?<br /></span></span></h3><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><span><br /></span></span></div></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>As I have argued, this causal story cannot be regarded as a scientific one. This being so, why should we be obligated to accept it? Let's face it, it is wholly contrary to what <i>seems</i> to be the case. When we see, hear, smell, touch, and taste, </span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>it <i>seems</i> that </span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>we are in <i>direct</i> contact with the external world, that we see it in a <i>direct</i> sense. Yet we are being asked, instead, to believe that </span></span><i style="font-family: arial;">the processes occurring inside our skulls are the proximate cause of </i><span style="font-family: arial;"><span><i>everything we ever perceptually experience, </i>indeed the cause of the <i>entirety</i> of our conscious lives.</span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span><span style="font-family: arial;">This also has the consequence that w</span><span style="font-family: arial;">e could, </span><span style="font-family: arial;">at least in principle</span><span style="font-family: arial;">, all be </span><a href="https://www.insidetherift.net/mind-at-large/2017/6/1/philosophy-portal-brain-in-a-vat" style="font-family: arial;" target="_blank">brains in a VAT</a><span style="font-family: arial;"> (similar to within the film, </span><i style="font-family: arial;">The Matrix</i><span style="font-family: arial;">). Certainly, at the minimum, </span><span style="font-family: arial;">if we accept academics' belief that the secondary qualities do not exist in any manner within the ex</span><span style="font-family: arial;">ternal world, this means our senses are at least being <i>partially</i> deceived about what the external world is really like.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span><br />This is all <i>deeply</i> implausible. So we need compelling reasons to accept this story. Yet it seems to me that we lack any such compelling reasons. Indeed, I question whether we have any reasons <i>at all</i>. But are there any reasonable alternatives? M</span></span><span style="font-family: arial;">y response is a</span><span style="font-family: arial;">n emphatic yes. Let's see how.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span><br /></span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>In part 3(ii) I mentioned two possibilities that can be squared with this causal story; namely either a type of reductive materialism, or alternatively just accepting </span></span><span style="font-family: arial;">as a brute fact that </span><span style="font-family: arial;">where there are appropriate neurons firing, an experience will simply spontaneously occur. </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>But even if we were to grant these positions are intelligible, why believe in either of them? Why believe that brain activity creates our perceptual experiences in the first place? </span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span><br /></span></span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>This last question might elicit exasperation in some readers who might well be thinking that <i>of course</i> brain activity causes or creates our sensory perceptions! That we know this since disruption of particular brain activity adversely affects such perceptions. However, I am not <i>disputing</i> that relevant brain activity needs to occur in order for people to perceive. Compare this to the fact that h</span></span></span><span style="font-family: arial;">aving our eyes open is necessary to see. Yet having our eyes open doesn't play a causal role in </span><i style="font-family: arial;">creating </i><span style="font-family: arial;">our perceptual vision, rather it simply allows perception to take place. Likewise, although i</span><span style="font-family: arial;">t is acknowledged that the physical causal chain of events from the light entering one's eyes until the final activity in the brain, is required to take place before we are able to perceive, we can deny that the final brain state, or indeed any of the preceding causal chain, <i>causes</i> or <i>creates</i> our perceptions.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Note that I am not claiming that the mind or brain <i>cannot</i> conjure up what might seem like perceptual experiences. Clearly it can, as exemplified by dreams and hallucinations. But, in the case of perceiving the external world, I suggest the brain does not proximately create what we perceive, though it does change, mould and shape those perceptual experiences.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Now, if neither brain activity nor any of the other processes along the causal chain <i>cause</i> our perceptual experiences, this seems to suggest that the commonsensical conception of how we perceive might be true after all. In other words, when we perceive something we are in <i>direct</i> contact or <i>directly</i> perceive that object. How, though, does the direct perception of the external world work? For although the causal chain is necessary in order for perception to take place, it nevertheless is not the medium whereby our perceptions are <i>caused.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Perhaps to some people's consternation, it does not seem to me to be problematic to simply suppose that the capacity to perceive is <i>innate</i> to the self or soul. The role of the sensory organs and brain would then be to merely change, modulate, and attenuate our perceptions (this is similar to my belief regarding all of our conscious states. See part 5 of <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2022/06/the-many-fallacies-of-soul-fallacy.html" target="_blank">this blog post</a> of mine where I go into more detail). I should add, though, that this hypothesis need not entail that a disembodied existence is possible. The capacity to perceive might be innate, but with our minds nevertheless dependent on a body. </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">It should be clarified that in claiming we directly see the external world, this is not to claim that we are seeing external objects exactly as they are <i>in and of themselves</i>. For one thing, the acuity of our vision and the other senses will vary from individual to individual and from one species to the next. For another, as I said earlier, our brains mould and shape our perceptual experiences. But our brains – or, as I prefer, our minds – can be directly presented with the external world, and yet <i>interpret</i> what is actually being experienced. In either case, our perceptions will be direct providing the object itself is the immediate cause of our perception rather than any intermediary or intermediaries along the causal chain playing that role.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>Even if one finds this commonsensical hypothesis unconvincing there are other philosophical perspectives that reject the mainstream belief. There is <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2014/03/a-very-brief-introduction-to-subjective.html" target="_blank">Berkeley's immaterialism</a> (otherwise known as <i>subjective idealism)</i>, as well as other types of metaphysical idealism. In addition, there is<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism" target="_blank"> </a></span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism" target="_blank">hylomorphism</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occasionalism">occasionalism</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychophysical_parallelism" target="_blank">p</a></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychophysical_parallelism" target="_blank">sychophysical parallelism</a>,</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> and others, all of which have colours, sounds, and odours populating this external world just as much as the primary qualities do. Of course, it might be objected that many of these metaphysical positions, such as immaterialism, are fanciful and implausible. However, given the extremely implausible nature of the mainstream position, it is not clear to me that this is a decisive objection.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span><span style="font-family: arial;">Note that if science had </span><i>shown</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> that the secondary qualities are fabrications conjured up by the brain and represent nothing out there, then it follows that science would have refuted these metaphysical positions. But informed people do not generally hold this. 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<![endif]--></div><div style="text-align: left;"><h3><span style="font-family: arial;">5. Concluding Remarks</span></h3><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">It is an extraordinary claim to suppose the external world is wholly devoid of any colours, sounds or odours, and that it is our brains that somehow fabricates these experiences. So we need very compelling reasons to suppose it is true. Yet it seems to me that not only do we lack any such compelling reasons, it's difficult to find any reasons at all! Even a more or less commonsensical conception of how we perceive doesn't appear to be overly problematic, although, admittedly, naïve realism is not, strictly speaking, tenable. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">Certainly, there doesn't seem to be any reasons for doubting the secondary qualities exist out there for any metaphysic resembling idealism, or any other position that holds that we perceive directly. Furthermore, <i>even if</i> we subscribe to the causal story of how we perceive, and even subscribe to a type of reductive materialism, it is not at all clear why the external world has to lack secondary qualities.</span></div></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Personally, I think this rejection of the secondary qualities existing out there originates from a conviction that only the quantifiable or measurable aspects of reality exist. After all, this is all that science requires in order to work, and science has been stunningly successful over the past 350 years or so. Of course, the problem here is the existence of conscious experiences, which appear to involve more than mere measurements. Nevertheless, by denying that colours, sounds and odours exist out there in the external world and relegating them as being mere fabrications created by the brain, this at least means that it is only <i>consciousness</i> that is an anomaly, the rest of the material Universe then can be wholly explained by our physics. So somehow consciousness has got to be explained <i>away. </i>Hence, the attraction of deeming<i> </i>consciousnes as being literally identical to brain processes, or <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/online/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/" target="_blank">even that it doesn't literally exist at all</a>! But all such options seem to me to be both desperate and transparently false. I cover the issues addressed in this paragraph in more detail <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2018/06/why-existence-of-consciousness-rules.html" target="_blank">here</a>. </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">What I find significant and very interesting is the complete conviction amongst virtually <i>everyone, </i>including those who subscribe to an afterlife<i>,</i> that the colours, sounds, and smells we sense in the world are not in fact out there at all but are a fabrication created by our brains or minds. This is a truly radical belief that is totally at odds with common-sense, and, as I hope I have demonstrated, contrary to reason too.</span></div>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com9tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-73848718984217426012023-05-07T09:26:00.001+01:002023-05-07T10:01:00.273+01:00Steven Novella slams the Institute Of Noetic Sciences<p><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://medicine.yale.edu/profile/steven-novella/" target="_blank">Steven Novella</a>, an American clinical neurologist, is well-known in the skeptical community and is co-founder of the <a href="https://theness.com/" target="_blank">New England Skeptical Society</a>. He also has a <a href="https://theness.com/neurologicablog/" target="_blank">blog</a> that he regularly contributes to. I occasionally read it, and I usually find him refreshingly level-headed and sober in his assessment of the relevant issue at hand. Indeed, in the majority of his blog posts that I happen to read, I find myself in more or less full agreement with him. I do, however, very much disagree with him both regarding the possibility of an afterlife and on the existence of psi.<br /><br />Recently, Novella published a blog post called <a href="https://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/problems-with-the-institute-for-noetic-sciences/" target="_blank">Problems with the Institute Of Noetic Sciences</a>, and I'd like to comment on a couple of things he says in there.<br /></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Novella references a <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-a-former-columbia-professor-fell-into-psychic-pseudoscience?ref=scroll" target="_blank">Daily Beast article</a>. Novella complains:</span></p><blockquote> <span style="font-family: arial;">The article focuses on neuroscientist Spiro Pantazatos and his collaboration with IONS, looking for brain regions that might correlate with specific paranormal phenomena. My problem with this research is that is assumes various paranormal phenomena are real, when that has not been scientifically established. In fact, as I point out in the article, we have over a century of research which has failed to demonstrate psi phenomena (ESP, clairvoyance, telekenesis, etc.) to point to. This is not some new idea that has never been explored.</span></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: arial;">I take it then that Novella favours further proof-oriented research. I have two issues with this.</span><br /></p><p></p><span style="font-family: arial;">1. It seems to me that further proof-oriented research will achieve nothing.<br /></span><br /><span style="font-family: arial;">2. What <a href="https://noetic.org/science/ions-x/" target="_blank">IONS</a> favours doing instead, namely "process-oriented experiments", might well pay dividends, not least of all on the issue of whether psi exists at all.<br /></span><p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Allow me to elaborate.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">There has been 140 years of parapsychological research which, according to IONS, objectively demonstrates what they label "non-local consciousness effects". Now, without getting into a debate about whether they have or not, I imagine that this is what they truly believe. But this being so, to what avail from <i>their</i> perspective would yet <i>further</i> proof-oriented research achieve? Surely precisely <i>nothing,</i> since they're <i>already</i> convinced of its existence. And the same applies to other believers in psi.<br /><br />So what about skeptics of psi? Well, if 140 years of research hasn't convinced them and considering that they appear to be just as belligerently against the possibility of psi as they have <i>ever</i> been, it then seems scarcely likely that <i>yet more</i> proof-oriented research will convince them otherwise. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Hence, from whichever perspective one looks at it -- whether from a proponent of psi or a skeptic -- further proof-oriented research might well be largely a fruitless endeavour. <br /><br />On the other hand, if psi exists, then </span><span style="font-family: arial;">carrying out process-oriented experiments will hopefully reveal the factors that are most conducive to its manifestation. This in turn is clearly helpful to definitively establishing its existence. In addition, it will furnish us with knowledge about the capacities of consciousness and more general questions of how it relates to the material world.<br /><br />So it seems to me a no-brainer to conclude that </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">process-oriented experiments in parapsychology are far more useful. And if good science connotes research that is the most helpful to promoting understanding and knowledge, it is good science too. This invites the question of why Novella and other skeptics I have read are adamant that process-oriented experiments in parapsychology are in fact "bad science". This is simply not true. <br /></span></span><br /><span style="font-family: arial;">Following on from what Novella said above, he adds:<br /><br /></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;">There is also the not-insignificant factor of a complete lack of scientific plausibility. Sure, it’s always possible there is something going on beyond the known laws of physics. To be philosophically pure one should never say “impossible” in science. But if a claim does violate the known laws of physics at a fundamental level, that should give any proponent significant pause. It does raise the bar for evidence dramatically. We should not accept marginal or subjective evidence in order to overturn centuries of established physical laws. That would never be a good bet (so far skeptics have a really good track record always betting on the laws of physics).</span></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: arial;">This is a very common criticism made by skeptics. If he is referring to the largely <i>metaphysical assumptions</i> typically made by scientists (and I think this is what skeptics tend to have in mind), I comprehensively address these in the following blog post:<br /></span> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2019/08/skeptical-inquirer-attempts-to-explain.html" target="_blank"><br />Skeptical Inquirer attempts to explain why psi could not possibly exist</a></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">I'd also like to add that there is a fundamental misunderstanding that Novella is making here. Namely, the possibility that psi <i>could</i> violate any specific physical laws as we currently know them. Allow me to explain.<br /><br />Physical laws as we currently know them <i>do not include consciousness in their description of reality</i>. Indeed, the issue of how consciousness relates to one's body is known as the Mind-Body problem and has more recently been labelled <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/" target="_blank">the hard problem</a> (alternatively, see this more easily understandable <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jan/21/-sp-why-cant-worlds-greatest-minds-solve-mystery-consciousness" target="_blank">Guardian article</a>). Of course, various solutions have been proposed. There are even those who <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/online/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/" target="_blank">deny the very existence of consciousness</a>! The point being here is that even though there is virtually universal agreement amongst academics that the brain does somehow or other create consciousness, <i>how</i> it does so generates intense disagreement and a great deal of heated debate.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Now, if we do <i>not</i> have a broadly accepted scientific theory explaining the <i>very existence</i> of consciousness, then it <i>necessarily</i> follows that we also do not have any scientific theory or laws explaining the existence of the<i> properties</i> of consciousness. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">But psi is an alleged ability of consciousness, that is, it is a <i>property</i> of consciousness.</span><span style="font-family: arial;"><i> </i>Hence, to claim that psi violates any specific physical law, or laws, fails to grasp this fact.<br /></span></p><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">So what should we make of Novella's dismissive comments?</span><br /></h4><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></div><span style="font-family: arial;">As I understand it, Novella's accusation that IONS are engaging in pseudoscience is due to two considerations. <br /><br />Firstly,
the fact they are engaging in process-oriented experiments rather than
purely proof-oriented research. Secondly, that psi phenomena would
violate or break the laws of physics. But, as I have argued and pointed
out, neither of these accusations have any merit whatsoever.</span><br /><span style="font-family: arial;"><br />Finally, I feel an extract from another blog post of mine -- <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2022/12/often-its-extremely-hard-to-decide-what.html" target="_blank">Often it's extremely hard to decide what is the rational thing to believe</a> -- might be appropriate here:<br /><br /></span><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><span></span></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>There is another worry with
scientists. The very fact they enjoy a high level of prestige and are
respected, means they are listened to and judged by most people to know
what they're talking about, even when they pontificate on topics that
reside outside their area of expertise. For example, when they
derisively dismiss</span><span> psi, an afterlife, "God", an objective
morality, and other contentious issues of a philosophical nature. But,
given that most of them have never studied philosophy, or perhaps even
given these topics much thought, how seriously ought we take their
opinions here?</span></span></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: arial;">The answer to that question, I hope, is obvious.</span></p>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-80250907644675707732023-03-27T11:02:00.001+01:002023-03-27T11:02:53.046+01:00Reincarnation and its Critics, Part 4: No scientific verifiable mechanisms or empirical evidence<h4 style="text-align: left;"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" style="font-family: arial;">Two Alleged Challenges to the Reincarnation Hypothesis</span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"></h4><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" style="font-family: arial;"> </span></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" style="font-family: arial;">The following <a href="https://neuheal.blogspot.com/2023/03/reincarnation.html?fbclid=IwAR32fqULEvHX_ysBq1O0VNxoIHxYjLdThMs9CP0EheThkLq5A9GFKHuFkis" target="_blank">blog post</a> is someone's* summary of the research into reincarnation, which on the whole seems fair and balanced. There are two alleged challenges to the reincarnation hypothesis in there that I'd like to address. These challenges are not confined to this specific writer as I occasionally see them expressed elsewhere too. Regarding the first challenge, the author says:</span></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" style="font-family: arial;"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">One
of the most significant challenges for the theory of reincarnation is
the lack of any scientifically verifiable mechanism by which it could
occur.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" style="font-family: arial;">I do not consider this a challenge, least of all a significant one. We simply need to bear in mind that <i>there
is also no scientifically verifiable mechanism by which even our present bodies come to
be associated with consciousness</i>. Indeed, this is why the issue of how consciousness relates to one's body has
been labelled <span><a href="https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/" target="_blank">the hard problem</a> (also see <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jan/21/-sp-why-cant-worlds-greatest-minds-solve-mystery-consciousness" target="_blank">this Guardian article</a>)</span>. If we have <i>no idea </i>how our everyday embodied consciousness is related to our present bodies, indeed that no such scientific theory even seems <i>possible</i>, then <i>a fortiori</i> we could scarcely be expected to conjure up a mechanism for how reincarnation occurs.</span></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" style="font-family: arial;"> </span></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" style="font-family: arial;"></span></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" style="font-family: arial;"></span></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" style="font-family: arial;"></span></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" style="font-family: arial;"></span></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" style="font-family: arial;">Immediately after mentioning the first challenge the author presents a second challenge. He (or she, or <i>it</i>) says:<br /></span></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" style="font-family: arial;"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">Moreover,
there is no empirical evidence that consciousness or the soul could
survive physical death, as required by the theory of reincarnation.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span style="font-family: arial;">Obviously, there is a great
deal of evidence. There are near-death experiences and the
closely related phenomenon deathbed visions and other peculiar
occurrences near death. There are past life memories, crisis apparitions, mediumship and other more indirect evidence. </span></span><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span style="font-family: arial;">Of course, how persuasive we should consider each strand
of evidence is up for debate. </span></span><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span style="font-family: arial;">One might indeed argue that <i>none</i> of this evidence is
particularly compelling (and there certainly are weaknesses, although I
regard all the evidence as a collective whole to be very compelling).
Nevertheless, evidence it is.<br /><br />But I’m guessing that by <i>empirical</i> evidence the author and skeptics mean <span><i>scientific evidence</i></span>.
More specifically that we have never been able to detect consciousness when it isn't in a body
(i.e. we have never detected disembodied consciousness). That is, leaving aside apparitions, no
one ever
sees disembodied consciousness nor indeed have our scientific
instruments
ever detected any disembodied consciousness. I think the argument would
then be that this strongly suggests that disembodied consciousness does
not exist.<br /> <br />There's an immediate problem here that occurs to me. If our scientific instruments <span><i>could </i></span>detect disembodied consciousness, then <span><i>by definition</i></span>,
consciousness would then be material or physical or at least have
material aspects. However, this is not something that sophisticated
believers in an afterlife would subscribe to. Consciousness, or the
self, cannot be seen, touched or detected in any manner <span><i>even when embodied</i></span>. </span></span><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span style="font-family: arial;">Indeed, this is why it is concluded by many that it is immaterial. And
if we cannot see or detect consciousness associated with bodies, why on
earth would we have any expectation that we will be able to observe <i>disembodied</i> consciousness?</span></span></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span style="font-family: arial;">But what if Reductive Materialism is correct?</span></span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span style="font-family: arial;"> <br /></span></span></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"></h4><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span style="font-family: arial;">Typically, when I give such arguments as I have above, people will claim <i>there is</i> a scientifically verifiable mechanism by which bodies come to be associated with consciousness and that we <i>can</i> in fact detect embodied consciousness. This will be the case should consciousness quite <i>literally</i> be what the brain <i>does. </i>Or<i>,</i> alternatively, </span></span><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" style="font-family: arial;">if consciousness doesn't really exist, and it is merely an illusion created by our brains.</span><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span style="font-family: arial;"> In other words, if some variety of reductive materialism is correct.<br /><br />However, assuming some variety of reductive materialism is a clear case of question-begging since those who believe in reincarnation will reject this position on the mind-body problem; or at least they will if they have in mind some type of self or soul that reincarnates. What the skeptic needs to do, therefore, is to advance arguments for reductive materialism. However, <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2018/06/why-existence-of-consciousness-rules.html" target="_blank">it seems to me</a> that this is an insurmountable challenge. <br /><br />Other posts in this Reincarnation series:<br /><br /><a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2021/09/reincarnation-and-its-critics-part-1.html" target="_blank">Reincarnation and its Critics, Part 1: The Increasing Population</a></span></span></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2021/10/reincarnation-and-its-critics-part-2.html" target="_blank">Reincarnation and its Critics, Part 2: Reincarnation isn't Falsifiable</a></span></span></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2021/10/reincarnation-and-its-critics-part-3.html" target="_blank">Reincarnation and its Critics, Part 3: Patterns in Reincarnation Cases are determined by Culture</a></span></span></div></div></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></span><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></span><br />*I say <i>someone</i>, but the article seems very ChatGPT..ish to me. It's reproducing the standard arguments for and objections to reincarnation, but it all seems rather derived and soulless. It is balanced but boring, and nothing novel in the text. Exactly like ChatGPT's responses to me. <br /></div>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-63143591443431290202023-01-16T16:26:00.008+00:002023-02-20T08:44:40.830+00:00A chat with ChatGPT about the possibility of an Afterlife<p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigcmKMJ3t7biZbiTh_Vj7UFGQnX5o6bxx2tsmE1B__zFg64adQBFRxJpedPb2ExE8aLy3dWSKl4EhlY9L9OQl4ZaH-ALDt2wJ1RS1kG2Be3UB_Ieewtglgkv3P-eedGXlvVVHSgX4Fcpx5OcVa7BfpXUC29NQDl5cdXvcnG0OxBpH7LqJNMIfZeko2sA/s960/AI.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="592" data-original-width="960" height="307" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigcmKMJ3t7biZbiTh_Vj7UFGQnX5o6bxx2tsmE1B__zFg64adQBFRxJpedPb2ExE8aLy3dWSKl4EhlY9L9OQl4ZaH-ALDt2wJ1RS1kG2Be3UB_Ieewtglgkv3P-eedGXlvVVHSgX4Fcpx5OcVa7BfpXUC29NQDl5cdXvcnG0OxBpH7LqJNMIfZeko2sA/w477-h307/AI.jpg" width="477" /></a></span></div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u">There's a new AI chatbot called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChatGPT" target="_blank">ChatGPT</a> that seems to be <i>vastly</i> superior in its responses to any other chatbot I have attempted to converse with. The following is my
2nd ever conversation with ChatGPT. I will make some comments at the end. I will add a little formatting to make it more clear. I have also slightly edited one sentence of mine to aid clarity.<br /></span></span><p></p><div><div dir="auto"><div class="x1iorvi4 x1pi30zi x1l90r2v x1swvt13" id="jsc_c_26o"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x1lliihq x1s928wv xhkezso x1gmr53x x1cpjm7i x1fgarty x1943h6x xudqn12 x3x7a5m x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" dir="auto"><blockquote><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span><b>Ian</b></span><br />How likely do you think it is that there is an afterlife?</span></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa"><span><b>ChatGPT<br /></b></span>As
a machine learning model, I don't have personal beliefs or opinions.
The concept of an afterlife is a matter of faith and not something that
can be proven or disproven by scientific means. Different people have
different beliefs and opinions on the subject.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span><b>Ian</b></span><br />What reasons can be given both for and against an afterlife?</span></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa"><span><b>ChatGPT<br /></b></span>There are several arguments that can be made for and against the existence of an afterlife.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">Arguments
for the existence of an afterlife often include religious or spiritual
beliefs, near-death experiences, and the concept of consciousness being
separate from the physical body. Some people believe that the soul or
spirit continues to exist after death, and that there is a realm or
plane of existence where the soul goes.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">Arguments
against the existence of an afterlife include scientific evidence that
the brain and consciousness are closely tied to physical processes, and
the lack of concrete evidence for an afterlife. Some people argue that
death is simply the end of consciousness and that there is no afterlife.
Others suggest that the idea of an afterlife is simply a human
construct, created to help people cope with the fear of death.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">Ultimately,
whether or not an afterlife exists is a matter of personal belief and
faith, and there is no scientific proof one way or the other.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span><b>Ian<br /></b></span>How do such brain/consciousness correlations provide evidence that there is no afterlife?</span></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa"><span><b>ChatGPT<br /></b></span>The
correlation between brain activity and consciousness suggests that
consciousness is a product of the physical brain and its functioning.
This is the basis of the argument that consciousness is not separate
from the physical body and that there is no soul or spirit that can
continue to exist after death.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">Research
in neuroscience has shown that specific areas of the brain are
associated with different cognitive functions, such as memory, emotion,
and perception. Damage to these areas can lead to corresponding deficits
in cognitive function. This correlation between brain activity and
cognitive function is seen as evidence that the brain is the source of
consciousness.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">Additionally,
the study of near-death experiences, which are often cited as evidence
for the existence of an afterlife, have been explained by medical and
neuroscientific explanations, such as the release of certain chemicals
in the brain during life-threatening events, or the effects of oxygen
deprivation on the brain.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">It's
important to note that this is an ongoing discussion and many
neuroscientists and philosophers are still researching on the
relationship between brain, consciousness and the afterlife. There is no
certain conclusion yet, and it is still a matter of debate.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span><b>Ian<br /></b></span>How
do correlations between brain activity and consciousness suggest that
consciousness is a product of the physical brain and its functioning?
Why do these correlations suggest a causal link from brains to
consciousness? Why is it not equally (if not more) possible that brains
merely <i>affect</i> consciousness rather than producing it?<br /><br />Incidentally,
near-death experiences have not been explained. For one thing, such
"explanations" assume <i>upfront</i> that the brain produces consciousness and
that this hypothesis is wholly unproblematic. This is in spite of the
"<a href="https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/" target="_blank">hard problem</a>" of consciousness. For another thing, such explanations
are purely speculative. And for yet a third thing, they do not explain
anything like the full range of phenomena and feelings associated with
near-death experiences, least of all the other anomalous phenomena that
people experience close to death.<br /><br /><span><b>ChatGPT</b></span></span><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">The
correlation between brain activity and consciousness is seen as
evidence for a causal link from the brain to consciousness, because when
specific areas of the brain are damaged, there are corresponding
deficits in cognitive function. This suggests that the brain is the
source of consciousness, rather than the brain simply affecting
consciousness.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">It's
important to note that this is an ongoing discussion in the field of
philosophy of mind and neuroscience, and there is no consensus on the
relationship between brain and consciousness. Some theories propose that
consciousness is a product of the brain's information processing and
that the brain creates a sort of "virtual reality" that we experience as
consciousness. Other theories propose that consciousness is a
fundamental aspect of the universe, and that the brain is a sort of
filter or receiver of consciousness.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">Regarding
near-death experiences, it's true that these experiences have not been
fully explained by neuroscience and that there is ongoing research on
the topic. The explanations that have been proposed are based on current
understanding of brain function and are not meant to be definitive.
It's also true that there are many aspects of near-death experiences
that are yet to be understood and that some people experience anomalous
phenomena. It is also important to note that many of the proposed
explanations for near-death experiences are based on the assumption that
consciousness is produced by the brain, and this is a subject of
ongoing debate.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">It's
important to note that these are complex issues and there is ongoing
research and debate in the field of neuroscience, philosophy, and
consciousness studies. There is no definite answer yet and different
people have different perspectives on this subject.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span><b>Ian<br /></b></span>Is it the case that whenever X affects Y that this suggests that X <i>creates</i> Y rather than X merely <i>affecting</i> Y? <br /><br />Near-death
experiences don't have any explanation at all. Indeed, there is no
explanation for any consciousness at all. And if any such alleged
explanations of near-death experiences assume upfront that brains create
consciousness, then this is a form of question-begging.<br /><br />[a long pause before it responds!]</span></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa"><span><b>ChatGPT<br /></b></span>No,
it is not the case that whenever X affects Y, this suggests that X
creates Y rather than X merely affecting Y. The relationship between
cause and effect is complex and can be difficult to determine. It is
possible for X to affect Y without X being the direct cause of Y, or for
there to be multiple causes for a single effect.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">You
are correct that there is currently no widely accepted explanation for
the phenomenon of consciousness and the relationship between brain
activity and consciousness is still a subject of ongoing research and
debate. Theories such as the idea that the brain creates a "virtual
reality" that we experience as consciousness or the idea that
consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe are still being
explored. It's also correct that some proposed explanations for
near-death experiences assume that consciousness is produced by the
brain, which is a subject of ongoing debate and discussion, and this
assumption can be seen as a form of question-begging.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span><b>Ian<br /></b></span>So
is it possible that the mind-brain correlations can be explained by the
brain merely affecting the mind or consciousness rather than creating
it?</span></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa"><span><b>ChatGPT<br /></b></span>It
is possible that the correlations between brain activity and
consciousness can be explained by the brain merely affecting the mind or
consciousness, rather than creating it. This is one of the perspectives
that is being considered within the field of philosophy of mind and
neuroscience.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">One
theory, called "panpsychism", postulates that consciousness is a
fundamental aspect of the universe, and that the brain is a sort of
filter or receiver of consciousness. In this perspective, the brain
would not create consciousness, but rather modulate it.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">Another
perspective is that consciousness is an emergent property of complex
systems, like the brain. In this view, the brain doesn't create
consciousness but it allows for it to emerge from the interactions
between its neural networks.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">It's
also important to note that even if it is determined that the brain
does not create consciousness, it would still play a crucial role in
shaping and modulating it, and that the correlations between brain
activity and consciousness would still be an important area of study in
order to understand this relationship.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">In
any case, it's important to keep in mind that the relationship between
brain and consciousness is an ongoing discussion and there is no
definite answer yet.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span><b>Ian</b></span><br />Is
it more likely that the mind-brain correlations are explained by the
brain creating consciousness rather than the brain merely changing,
modulating, and attenuating consciousness? If so, then why?</span></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa"><span><b>ChatGPT<br /></b></span>The
question of whether the mind-brain correlations are explained by the
brain creating consciousness, rather than the brain merely changing,
modulating, and attenuating consciousness, is a matter of ongoing debate
and research in the field of philosophy of mind and neuroscience.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">Some
scientists and philosophers argue that the correlation between brain
activity and cognitive function, as well as the effects of brain damage
on cognitive function, suggest that the brain is the source of
consciousness. They argue that the brain's information processing
creates a sort of "virtual reality" that we experience as consciousness.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">Others
argue that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe, and
that the brain is a sort of filter or receiver of consciousness, or that
consciousness is an emergent property of complex systems, like the
brain. In these perspectives, the brain does not create consciousness,
but modulates it, or allows for it to emerge from the interactions
between its neural networks.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">It's
important to note that there is no consensus on the relationship
between brain and consciousness and different people have different
perspectives on this subject. Some researchers and philosophers argue
that the weight of evidence supports one view over the other, but
ultimately, the question of whether the brain creates consciousness or
modulates it remains an open question in the field.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span><b>Ian<br /></b></span>What
are these arguments that </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x1lliihq x1s928wv xhkezso x1gmr53x x1cpjm7i x1fgarty x1943h6x xudqn12 x3x7a5m x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" dir="auto"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u">scientists and philosophers </span></span></span><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u">make which they regard as suggesting that the correlations between brain activity and cognitive
function and the effects of brain damage on cognitive function, are
best explained by supposing brains <i>create</i> consciousness?</span></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa"><span><b>ChatGPT<br /></b></span>Scientists
and philosophers who argue that the correlations between brain activity
and cognitive function, as well as the effects of brain damage on
cognitive function, suggest that the brain is the source of
consciousness, typically cite several pieces of evidence in support of
their position. Some of these arguments include:</span></span></blockquote></div><ol style="text-align: left;"><li><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa"><b>Neural
Correlates of Consciousness:</b> The discovery of specific areas of the
brain that are associated with different cognitive functions, such
as memory, emotion, and perception, and the fact that damage to
these areas can lead to corresponding deficits in cognitive
function, is seen as evidence that the brain is the source of
consciousness.</span></span></blockquote></li><li><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa"><b>Near-death
experiences:</b> Some researchers point out that near-death experiences can
be explained by medical and neuroscientific explanations, such as
the release of certain chemicals in the brain during
life-threatening events, or the effects of oxygen deprivation on
the brain.</span></span></blockquote></li><li><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa"><b>Brain
plasticity:</b> The brain's ability to adapt and change in response to
different experiences is seen as evidence that consciousness arises
from the brain's information processing.</span></span></blockquote></li><li><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa"><b>Evolutionary
explanations:</b> Some researchers argue that consciousness is an
adaptation that evolved to help organisms navigate and survive in
their environment, and that the brain is the organ that enables
this adaptation.</span></span></blockquote></li><li><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa"><b>Artificial
Intelligence and brain simulation:</b> As technology advances and we are
able to create more sophisticated artificial intelligence and brain
simulations, the idea that consciousness could be artificially
created or replicated is gaining ground.</span></span></blockquote></li></ol><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">It's
important to note that these are ongoing debates and different
scientists and philosophers have different perspectives on the
relationship between brain and consciousness. Some may find these
arguments more convincing than others, but ultimately, the question of
whether the brain creates consciousness or modulates it remains an open
question in the field.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span><b>Ian</b></span><br />Let's take these highlighted reasons one by one.<br /></span></div></blockquote></span></span><ol style="text-align: left;"><li><blockquote style="text-align: left;"><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><b>Neural Correlates of Consciousness: </b>As
I have already suggested, this is not a reason unless they explain <i>why</i>
these correlations are best explained by brains creating consciousness
rather than the brain merely changing, modulating, and attenuating
consciousness.<br /></span></div></blockquote></li><li><blockquote style="text-align: left;"><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><b>Near-death experiences: </b>You're repeating
yourself (as well as with 1). I refer you to my previous response on
near-death experiences. Also, even if no-one ever had a near-death
experiences, this wouldn't entail the brain creates consciousness.<br /></span></div></blockquote></li><li><blockquote style="text-align: left;"><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><b>Brain plasticity: </b>If
the brain merely changes, modulates, and attenuates consciousness --
and it will presumably have this function in order to allow us to
interface with this physical world -- then it is entirely unclear how
such plasticity favours the hypothesis that brains create consciousness
as opposed to the alternative.<br /></span></div></blockquote></li><li><blockquote style="text-align: left;"><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><b>Evolutionary explanations: </b>This
assumes that consciousness has causal powers over and above what the
neural correlates of consciousness are doing. But mainstream academic
opinion is overwhelmingly of the conviction that the physical world is
closed. In fact, what these researchers are doing is assuming
materialism UPFRONT, which is, of course, transparent question-begging.
In other words, this cannot be an argument for the thesis that brains
create consciousness as opposed to merely changing, modulating, and
attenuating consciousness.</span></div></blockquote></li><li><blockquote style="text-align: left;"><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><b>Artificial Intelligence and brain simulation:</b> Computers merely follow instructions. Why would this connote consciousness? </span></div></blockquote></li></ol><span style="font-family: arial;"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x1lliihq x1s928wv xhkezso x1gmr53x x1cpjm7i x1fgarty x1943h6x xudqn12 x3x7a5m x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" dir="auto"><blockquote><div class="x1e56ztr"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><br />OK,
at this point it is clear that I'm not going to get an answer to why it
is deemed more likely that brains create consciousness rather than
merely changing, modulating, and attenuating it. So thanks for the
conversation and goodbye.</span></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa"><span><b>ChatGPT<br /></b></span>I
apologize if my previous response was not clear enough. You are correct
that the arguments I provided do not necessarily prove that the brain
creates consciousness, rather than modulating it. The relationship
between brain activity and consciousness is a complex and ongoing debate
within the field of philosophy of mind and neuroscience, and there is
no consensus on the subject.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">It
is important to note that the arguments I provided are the ones that
some scientists and philosophers use to support their position that the
brain creates consciousness. However, as you have pointed out, there are
alternative explanations and perspectives that are also being
considered.</span></span></blockquote></div><div class="x1sy10c2"><blockquote class="xckqwgs x26u7qi x7g060r x1gslohp x11i5rnm xieb3on x1mh8g0r x1pi30zi x1swvt13"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xi81zsa">In
any case, I apologize if I did not provide a satisfactory answer to
your question. My goal is to provide accurate and useful information,
and I understand that this can be a complex and nuanced subject. If you
have any other questions or concerns, please feel free to ask.</span></span></blockquote></div></blockquote></span></span><h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x1lliihq x1s928wv xhkezso x1gmr53x x1cpjm7i x1fgarty x1943h6x xudqn12 x3x7a5m x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" dir="auto"><p style="text-align: left;">My thoughts on the conversation</p></span></span></h4><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><span class="x193iq5w xeuugli x13faqbe x1vvkbs x1xmvt09 x1lliihq x1s928wv xhkezso x1gmr53x x1cpjm7i x1fgarty x1943h6x xudqn12 x3x7a5m x6prxxf xvq8zen xo1l8bm xzsf02u" dir="auto"><p style="text-align: left;">When asking skeptics why they are so convinced that there is no afterlife, they almost invariably mention the fact that dysfunctional or damaged brains lead to impaired cognitive abilities and/or a change in personality, and hence the unavoidable conclusion is that brains, somehow or other, must give rise to minds or consciousness. Indeed, I have been reading skeptical sources on this subject for decades, and this is virtually the only reason given. <br /><br />But, as many of you who have read my other blog posts will be aware, I am not impressed by this argument. As I have pointed out in many places elsewhere, for example in <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/p/the-mind-brain-correlations.html" target="_blank">The Mind-Brain Correlations</a>, there is a close correlation between the acuity of our vision and the state of the lenses in the eyeglasses that we wear -- for example, if both the lenses were fogged up, our vision would be very much compromised. Yet, of course, we can all perfectly understand that such correlations do not entail the eyeglasses <i>create</i> our vision, they merely alter it. <br /><br /><i>(As an aside, I was wondering if I should have introduced this eyeglasses example to ChatGPT, but I suspected that if it has no understanding of anything whatsoever -- and I am personally convinced it doesn't -- then it wouldn't address the relevancy of this point and likely go off on a tangent talking about the opticians and 20:20 vision or whatever! And besides, it </i>ought<i> to be able to understand that x affecting y needn't entail that x produces y without the use of examples.)</i><br /></p></span></span></div></div></div></div><div data-visualcompletion="ignore-dynamic" style="padding-left: 8px; padding-right: 8px;"></div><div class="x168nmei x13lgxp2 x30kzoy x9jhf4c x6ikm8r x10wlt62" data-visualcompletion="ignore-dynamic"><div><div><div><div class="x1n2onr6"><div class="x6s0dn4 xi81zsa x78zum5 x6prxxf x13a6bvl xvq8zen xdj266r xktsk01 xat24cr x1d52u69 x889kno x4uap5 x1a8lsjc xkhd6sd xdppsyt"><div class="x6s0dn4 x78zum5 x1iyjqo2 x6ikm8r x10wlt62"><span aria-label="See who reacted to this" class="x1ja2u2z" role="toolbar"><span class="x6s0dn4 x78zum5 x1e558r4" id="jsc_c_26r"><span class="x6zyg47 x1xm1mqw xpn8fn3 xtct9fg x13zp6kq x1mcfq15 xrosliz x1wb7cse x13fuv20 xu3j5b3 x1q0q8m5 x26u7qi xamhcws xol2nv xlxy82 x19p7ews xmix8c7 x139jcc6 x1n2onr6 x1xp8n7a xhtitgo"><span class="x12myldv x1udsgas xrc8dwe xxxhv2y x1rg5ohu xmix8c7 x1xp8n7a"><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"></span></span></span></span></span></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><div><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;">Now, of course, skeptics might well claim that the mind-body relationship is utterly unlike that of eyeglasses and vision. But the crucial point here is that the correlations between brain states and mind states are <i>insufficient in and of themselves</i> to establish that brains create minds, or even that this is more likely than brains merely affecting our minds. <i>Arguments</i> need to be advanced in an attempt to show that in this instance, brains creating minds is a more reasonable interpretation of the correlations than the notion of mere alteration. As many of you will know, I come down on the side of alteration, which I won't go into here, but my reasons can be found under <i>Part 5:</i></span></span><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"> <i><span style="font-family: arial;">Dysfunctional brains lead to impaired minds</span></i><span style="font-family: arial;"> in my <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2022/06/the-many-fallacies-of-soul-fallacy.html" target="_blank">review</a> of <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Soul-Fallacy-Science-Letting-Beliefs/dp/1616149620/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1NJCU61Y7WWWX&keywords=the+soul+fallacy&qid=1673874938&sprefix=the+soul+fallacy%2Caps%2C693&sr=8-1" target="_blank">the soul fallacy</a>.</span><i><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></i></span></div><div><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><i><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></i></span></div><div><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;">Unfortunately, despite for many years scouring the Internet and various books, I have never been able to find out <i>why</i> people are so convinced that such brain-mind correlations strongly suggests the former creates the latter*. That is bizarre in itself, but not something I wish to address here. The point here is that this is an absolutely <i>crucial</i> pivotal question. After all, the question of whether there is an afterlife or not is surely of intense interest to the vast majority of us. And this point, that damaged brains result in damaged minds hence there is no afterlife, is constantly wheeled out by skeptics as if it is the very last definitive word on the subject. It is a skeptical prism through which all the purported evidence for an afterlife are viewed. This has the effect of rendering such evidence as near-death experiences as being "extraordinary claims".<br /><br />So this was why I was very keen to see what ChatGPT had to say on this issue and continually pressed it in the hope of eliciting an actual answer. I hasten to add that I didn't have any <i>expectations</i> that it would advance any such reasons. For where would it get those reasons from? I have never been able to find any. Of course, if it really <i>is</i> conscious, <i>is</i> sentient, then it is a non-human consciousness, an alien consciousness so to speak, and would be expected to advance its <i>own</i> thoughts on why the mind-brain correlations are best interpreted as the brain creating the mind. But, as I fully expected, it didn't. It answered like a politician does when asked a question; namely avoided answering it and simply continually repeated the point about the mind being impacted by the brain.<br /><br /></span></span><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;">What do I think of ChatGPT?</span></span></h4><h4><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></span></h4><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br />So what do I think of </span></span><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;">ChatGPT? I think it is absolutely incredible, <i>extraordinarily</i> impressive. But I do not think it is conscious. I do not think it is doing anything miraculous. </span></span><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;">If it were providing its own thoughts, it wouldn't parallel the mainstream academic opinion that is already out there. </span></span><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;">It's
more like a glorified encyclopedia that is trawling the net and other
sources, and regurgitating information out there even though it is often
paraphrasing that information.<br /><br />Frequently, that regurgitated information is irrelevant. For example, I ask in my penultimate comment what are the scientists and philosophers arguments that they believe demonstrate that the effects of brain damage on cognitive function are best explained by supposing brains create consciousness. In context, I was clearing asking why they considered that the mind- brain correlations are best explained by the brains create consciousness hypothesis rather than the brains merely affecting consciousness hypothesis. But then ChatGPT proceeded to give me a bulleted list of arguments for naturalism that can be easily found on the web and elsewhere, and which do not address my question (I responded anyway, but at that point I gave up on getting an answer). <br /></span></span></div><div><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></div><div><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;">More generally, there's a lot of extraneous information ChatGPT is providing (and, incidentally, not all of it correct) that is tangential to the question I was asking it. And a great deal of repetition. If I were conversing with a person, he might say in an exasperated tone, "I've given you my reasons for why we should suppose the brain produces consciousness, why do you keep repeating the question?" Then I might point out that he's already conceded that the fact that changes in X precipitate changes in Y certain't needn't imply that X creates Y. And maybe the conversation might develop from that, and even become a meaningful exchange. But </span></span><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;">ChatGPT comes across as more resembling an intellectual poseur similar to those endemic on the net, who doesn't really grasp what I'm saying, and simply regurgitates lots of tangential information he's absorbed from other sources so as to give a favourable impression to onlookers. <br /><br />Incidentally, I said at the beginning that this was my second conversation with ChatGPT. For those interested in my first conversation, I put it on my <a href="http://ianwardells.blogspot.com/2023/01/a-conversation-with-chatgpt-ai-bot.html" target="_blank">other blog</a>. <br /></span></span></div><div><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></div><div><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></div><div><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></div><div><span class="x4k7w5x x1h91t0o x1h9r5lt xv2umb2 x1beo9mf xaigb6o x12ejxvf x3igimt xarpa2k xedcshv x1lytzrv x1t2pt76 x7ja8zs x1qrby5j x1jfb8zj"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: arial;">*Of course, I get the <i>feeling</i>. If a beloved relative is suffering from Alzheimer's, then it <i>seems</i> that that person is no longer there, has irrevocably gone, has ceased to exist. But this is a <i>feeling</i>, not an <i>argument</i>. If someone were to wear eyeglasses the entirety of her life, and her vision slowly became poorer and poorer as the lenses became dirtier and dirtier, she might <i>feel</i> that she's slowly becoming blind and nothing can reverse that process. And yet, her vision becomes vastly better on taking the eyeglasses off. And, in fact, with a phenomenon labelled <a href="https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/terminal-lucidity-dementia" target="_blank">terminal lucidity</a> (sometimes called paradoxical lucidity), which occurs close to death, there is a brief return of mental clarity that might possibly be explained by a soul or self disengaging from one's body and hence no longer having one's consciousness modulated and changed (deleteriously in the case of Alzheimer's) by one's brain.</span></span><i><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></i><br /></span></div>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com1England, UK52.3555177 -1.1743197-0.66646000558301211 -71.4868197 90 69.1381803tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-55816850732351091272023-01-05T13:05:00.001+00:002023-02-12T23:52:07.992+00:00Is breakfast the most important meal of the day?<p><span style="font-family: arial;">I frequently come across the claim that it is very important to eat a breakfast since <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0091743511003367" target="_blank">skipping breakfast is associated with a high prevalence of obesity and being overweight</a>.<br /></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">I confess, I never eat breakfasts and have scarcely done so my entire life. I simply do not feel hungry immediately after getting up. It takes about 3 or 4 hours after getting up before I start to feel hungry.<br /><br />It seems peculiar to me that for those similar to me and are averse to eating food in the morning, that they will actually <i>lose</i> weight or stay slim by <i>forcing themselves</i> to eat food, which is quite the opposite to what one might expect. Further, doesn't the body generally tend to regulate its own weight by eliciting hunger pangs when you need food? <br /><br />But what about this research? Well, at most it establishes that those who are overweight have a greater propensity to skip breakfasts. Similar to seemingly most epidemiological research claiming this, that and the other, it fails to establish a <i>causal</i> relationship. When ice cream sales go up so do cases of sunburn. But no-one would <i>dream</i> of saying that eating ice cream <i>causes</i> sunburn. And most people die in bed, but no-one would <i>dream</i> of claiming that beds are therefore dangerous.<br /><br /> So before concluding that one thing causes another, we need at least some possible plausible <i>causal mechanism</i>, and then we need to <i>show</i> that it is <i>this</i> causal mechanism that is behind the correlated pattern that we see. In addition, for the specific case of whether eating breakfasts is always wise, there needs to be a study on those who are overweight and averse to eating breakfasts, to start eating breakfasts and to see whether these people end up losing weight.<br /><br /> Lacking such a plausible causal mechanism, there will always be other possible explanations for such patterns. In the specific case of slimmer people regularly eating breakfasts, </span><span style="font-family: arial;">very possibly there is a link between eating breakfast and people adhering to societal norms and being concerned about their well-being and health. These people will have a propensity as a whole to avoid extreme, or what is generally considered to be unwise behaviour e.g. they don't eat loads of junk food, they tend to eat lots of fruit and vegetables, and they tend to eat regular meals, including breakfasts. This then might explain why they aren't fat. In other words it has nothing to do with eating breakfast <i>per se</i>. Rather it is because they avoid junk food and indulge less in the risky behaviour that might have a deleterious effect on their health. <br /></span><br /></p>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-90437002387653261212022-12-03T12:43:00.001+00:002023-02-12T23:53:21.508+00:00Often it's extremely hard to decide what is the rational thing to believe.<p><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>It's extraordinarily difficult for most of us to decide what the truth is on many contentious issues. Will we witness catastrophic climate change in the coming decades? Does psi exist? Is there some type of afterlife? What policies or political system is the most favourable for promoting economic growth, and indeed should such growth necessarily be our aim? Will consuming 5 to 10 portions a day of fruit and vegetables (provided not potatoes) promote health and longevity? Does an objective morality exist, or is what we judge as praiseworthy or heinous behaviour simply a reflection of one's culture? Do we have free will?</span></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>At the outset, we should recognise in ourselves the prior propensity to favour a particular side on any given issue. Most often this results in us seeking out those sources that back up our beliefs
whilst at the same time we shun those sources that contradict them. That is, we tend to read or listen to people defending what we are predisposed to believe in the first place, and to ignore, or
even adopt a hostile stance, to the arguments advanced by the opposing side.</span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> <br /></span></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>To counteract this natural propensity, it therefore might seem sensible to simply listen to both sides of an argument, then attempt to make up our own minds. But arguably this is not ideal. For is it sensible to pay equal attention and give equal time to the arguments of a lone maverick compared to the arguments of the many experts who disagree with that maverick? Perhaps instead, the best strategy is to simply trust what experts say on any particular topic?<br /><br /><span>It might seem especially wise to listen to scientists. They are, after all, supposedly informed by what the science says and might be expected to be objective and impartial. But even when it comes to scientists </span></span><span>there are vested interests in asserting a specific view, and vested interests by others in denying that view. There's groupthink, there's the fear of the impact on their careers for those scientists in voicing a contrarian or unfashionable view. There are positions that seem clearly false, but where no-one dares point it out, that is they are afraid to point out that <a href="http://ianwardells.blogspot.com/2019/12/the-emperor-has-no-clothes.html" target="_blank">the emperor has no clothes</a>. In short,</span><span> there are many pressures to conform and simply parrot the mainstream position. However, unfortunately for the mainstream position, many of the alleged discoveries in science </span><a href="https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/21504366/science-replication-crisis-peer-review-statistics" target="_blank">cannot be replicated</a><span>. <br /></span></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>And
frequently there are no experts as such. Or at least there are no
people that are especially privileged in having superior knowledge to
the rest of us, even if we are not aware of this. </span><span>To give one example, the predictions of economists fare little better than flipping a coin.</span><span> <br /></span></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>There is another worry with scientists. The very fact they enjoy a high level of prestige and are respected, means they are listened to and judged by most people to know what they're talking about, even when they pontificate on topics that reside outside their area of expertise. For example, when they derisively dismiss</span><span> psi, an afterlife, "God", an objective morality, and other contentious issues of a philosophical nature. But, given that most of them have never studied philosophy, or perhaps even given these topics much thought, how seriously ought we take their opinions here?</span></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>It's also worth pointing out that there are contentious issues where one personally can be confident in the correctness of a specific stance. </span><span>This is so despite the fact that the opposing view to one's own might be held with a great deal of conviction and passion. Let's, for example, consider predictions regarding technological progress and, in particular, the so-called <a href="https://futurism.com/singularity-explain-it-to-me-like-im-5-years-old" target="_blank">technological singularity</a>. There are </span><span>supposedly informed and respected people</span><span> that worry that sentient robots will be developed that take over the world and enslave humanity. But, at least t</span></span><span style="font-family: arial;">o my mind, the very notion of such a technological singularity is preposterous. For a kick-off, it rests on the implicit notion that consciousness or sentience is quite <i>literally</i> merely information processing.</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> This seems to me to be straightforwardly false since information processing simply fails to connote consciousness. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">Apart from that, we should be very leery of such predictions involving technology since people like Elon Musk and others have vested interests in playing up the rate of technological progress and change. And let's face it, overstating the rate of change in technology is exciting, it's what people like to hear. They don't want to hear someone predicting an unimaginative prosaic future. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>We can also be confident of a specific stance if we are informed by having direct
experiences, or experiences reported by those whom we trust. Hence, we
can witness for ourselves the peculiar weather in recent years that
seems to justify our worry about climate change. And many of us have had
direct experience of psi. But on other issues where the answer is not so obvious, how do we decide?</span></span><br /><span style="font-family: arial;"><br />My solution? First and foremost, think for yourself. Do your own homework if a topic particularly interests you. Listen to both sides, but be cynical of people claiming this, that and the other. Don't be afraid of voicing a minority opinion, or even an opinion that might be uniquely yours.</span></p><p><br /></p>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-13464890122900808522022-10-19T12:54:00.004+01:002023-02-12T23:54:01.861+00:00Our inexplicable existence in a cold dark Universe<p><span style="font-family: arial;">What is this world that we inexplicably find ourselves in? Were we placed here by some unknown intelligence for some unfathomable reason? Or is it all just a huge joke, that it's all just meaningless fortuity and happenstance that we find ourselves in existence now and having such thoughts? <br /><br />If that were not enough, this world, this <i>reality</i> we find ourselves in, is <i>highly</i> strange. Consider our situation. We exist, apparently, on the surface of a small sphere that is suspended in the midst of an effective eternal, cold, dark, nothingness. An effective nothingness utterly inhospitable and even possibly entirely bereft of any complex life apart from on this one tiny planet. When we gaze up in wonder and forlorn hope seeking to understand why we're here, what it all means, what our role might be, whether there is other life out there, the stars merely gaze back down at us with cold pitiless indifference. <br /><br />I find our situation to be highly peculiar. Certainly not something I thought about as a child, but the weirdness of our situation has slowly dawned on me the older and older I get. And even at my relatively advanced age, the feeling of weirdness continues to grow.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><span>Perhaps
we will eventually find out the answer to such questions in some
unknown reality after we die, perhaps we won't. Personally, I feel that
we will.</span></span></p>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-75106176751345434072022-09-29T15:23:00.005+01:002023-02-12T23:54:58.596+00:00What can we do about being stuck in a miserable and futile existence?<p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiWFd3WcPzKUtByJKvDCUpeLEelTO2pHomWo3wU5G8dn9GTWPTED4P8y-Lpx2iq_cipsP0ZSX1Lw5DKPU8YzOWwvqlufRJT-QPXZoEexkUY23RvQ72Hy28lcqafU2fEwYsW1F-pmMS0xHO1NHMjVqAd-z4_8an0DXvehYrmTWAhqSywFuiiXG6_UHvlhw/s686/office%20life.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="686" data-original-width="526" height="524" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiWFd3WcPzKUtByJKvDCUpeLEelTO2pHomWo3wU5G8dn9GTWPTED4P8y-Lpx2iq_cipsP0ZSX1Lw5DKPU8YzOWwvqlufRJT-QPXZoEexkUY23RvQ72Hy28lcqafU2fEwYsW1F-pmMS0xHO1NHMjVqAd-z4_8an0DXvehYrmTWAhqSywFuiiXG6_UHvlhw/w401-h524/office%20life.jpg" width="401" /></a></span></div><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span><p></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">The following article, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2022/sep/25/ask-philippa-perry-i-feel-desperately-stuck-and-unable-to-find-happiness?utm_term=632ffc74be4ee68887626e53b87b9a4d&utm_campaign=GuardianTodayUK&utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&CMP=GTUK_email&fbclid=IwAR1oIto3OO8fpU4gwVg202EyGWnQhvB6LvKXhKRL2W7TX1BUCSpl0Wecvwc" target="_blank">I’m stuck in a miserable and futile existence</a>, quotes someone who laments:<br /></span></p><p></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;">I see a therapist once a week. But I have a shameful and persistent feeling of despair. I’m stuck in a miserable and futile existence. I don’t like work. I hate being trapped within someone else’s schedule, sending pointless emails, attending pointless meetings. I hate the nine-to-five, the long commute, asking permission to take leave – it’s just sleep, work, sleep, work.<br /><br />
I have no garden, and noisy neighbours. I won’t starve or lose the roof over my head but I can neither afford to go away on holiday nor to dine out or buy clothes and books.<br /><br />
My family and friends are wonderful. I have a partner who loves me. But I am just desperately unhappy. How can I say any of this out loud to the people close to me? I feel like a petulant child: stuck, wailing. I don’t know how to be alive in this world and be happy. <br /></span></blockquote><p></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">The rise of modern capitalism and the introduction of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/division-of-labour" target="_blank">division of labour</a> to maximise profits has resulted in most people living their lives as wage slaves, obliged to do work that is dull and repetitious. For many people, this is partially offset by the meeting up with people in the workplace, making friends, having a laugh with them. But for others who are not so gregarious, and maybe find it awkward to get on with others, going to work is often then just a daily grind that is unfulfilling and simply lacks any personal meaning. It is surely not how we are <i>meant</i> to live. Many of us are simply existing, not <i>living</i>.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">It is true that we can get temporary distractions from the “toys” we can buy; the latest smartphone, or TV, or whatever. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">Or going on holiday. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">But even here, we are constantly comparing ourselves to others, feeling a failure as many others seem to be able to afford more than we can, or go on holiday more frequently. They can afford the latest and most expensive smartphone, and we can’t. But even when we do have enough money to buy all the latest gadgets’, this most often only temporarily ameliorates any feelings of emptiness, loneliness, and despair.<br /><br />
Nor, for many of us, is it helpful if we didn’t work at all. Many people find it profoundly boring not being in a full-time job as an employee. That they have nothing to do all day. Indeed, many people claim that when they were unemployed they were sleeping 12 hours a day and were just depressed.<br /><br />
I suggest that, ideally, we need to have a job, find work, which engages our interest. One needs to be intimately and emotionally involved in the product we're creating or the service we're providing. To produce something, or provide some service, that other people really appreciate together with the knowledge that not many others have the requisite skills to do likewise. It's working towards some goal, and for others to exclaim "wow" when they see what you've done. It's pride in producing something, or providing some service. And this in turn will encourage a sense of purpose and enjoyment in the work.<br /><br />
That’s the ideal, but in reality not the sort of work that most of us will ever obtain since modern industrial capitalist society creates precisely the type of work that is dull and repetitious. This is compounded by the fact that most of us work for 40 or more hours a week, hence leaving us less time for more purposeful activity. Incidentally, this is particularly vexing since it is my suspicion, and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/the-sixhour-work-day-increases-productivity-so-will-britain-and-america-adopt-one-sweden-a7066961.html" target="_blank">indeed some evidence suggests,</a> that we could be just as productive, <i>if not more so</i>, if we worked fewer hours.<br /><br />
It seems to me that for a meaningful, fulfilling life, what we really need, what we <i>really</i> yearn, is a feeling of being <i>alive</i>. A feeling of life being an adventure. That life is a journey with ongoing meaningful experiences. But our modern industrial capitalist world forces us into meaningless soulless work and also conveys the message that we are just mere meat robots with no free-will destined to cease to exist when we die. All of which is antithetical to our yearning souls.<br /><br />
To be honest, I suspect we were all much happier in the Stone Age. Life won’t have been insipid, bland and boring back then. Yes, it might have been a hard life. A life full of many close brushes with death. But the comradeship and camaraderie when others save your life, and you theirs and the collective outpouring of emotions with the bitter and sweet taste of life in the raw, more than compensates. As would the implicit feeling that death is just another journey and all will come right in the end.<br /><br />
But I am not here to exclusively rail against all the failings of our modern world (I’ve done that <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2020/06/is-there-better-alternative-to.html" target="_blank">elsewhere</a>). To coin a phrase, it is what it is. The question is, for those who live bleak unfulfilling lives, what can we do about it?</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">If we cannot find work that is fulfilling, perhaps we can at least find work that has shorter hours, or where we interact with those with a similar mind-set to our own.
<br /><br />
But I think the best course of action is to develop goals that we can strive towards. Develop an interest on some topic and read extensively about it. Or learn some new skill. It’s the striving towards a goal of some nature, even if it’s only a short term goal, which creates meaning and direction in our lives. But not unrealistic goals, rather something that you feel you can genuinely attain with some dedication and effort.</span>
</p>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-36816922525088004652022-07-06T14:46:00.001+01:002023-02-12T23:56:07.097+00:00The Many Fallacies of "The Soul Fallacy"<h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">1. Preliminary</span></h4><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><span style="font-family: arial;">I recently finished reading <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Soul-Fallacy-Science-Letting-Beliefs/dp/1616149620/ref=sr_1_1?crid=PA2A0A835IK3&keywords=the+soul+fallacy&qid=1654677072&sprefix=the+soul+fallacy%2Caps%2C201&sr=8-1" target="_blank">The Soul Fallacy</a> by Julien Musolino for the second time, and I thought I'd pen down some of my thoughts.<br /><br />As a preliminary, I should mention that my reading of skeptical sources on whether or not there is an afterlife is extensive. In my experience, the arguments opposing an afterlife, a soul and substance dualism, all tend to be very similar. In general, it seems they employ the same fallacious arguments and mischaracterize their opponents' positions in precisely the same manner. It can be deduced from this that skeptics of an afterlife are <i>not</i>, in the main, <i>independently</i> coming up with their own thoughts, ideas, and arguments. Rather, they appear to be reading from the same sources and/or each other and regurgitating what others have already said<a href="#1" name="top1"><sup>1</sup></a>.<br /><br /><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Soul-Fallacy-Science-Letting-Beliefs/dp/1616149620/ref=sr_1_1?crid=PA2A0A835IK3&keywords=the+soul+fallacy&qid=1654677072&sprefix=the+soul+fallacy%2Caps%2C201&sr=8-1" target="_blank">The Soul Fallacy</a> follows this same trend. Hence, my criticisms of the arguments that Musolino makes also apply to many of the pervasive criticisms and misconceptions of a soul that one finds echoed in both skeptical literature and discussion boards on the net.</span><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">2. What is the Soul?</span></h4><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Since the author, <a href="https://psych.rutgers.edu/faculty-profiles-a-contacts/118-julien-musolino" target="_blank">Julien Musolino</a>, is attempting to argue that the soul doesn't exist, he first needed to define it. So how does he conceive of the soul? More importantly, does it align with the way I and others sympathetic to an afterlife conceive of it?</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Early on in the book, Musolino says he agrees with the following conception of the soul:</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><blockquote>[The soul is] the traditional idea that there is something incorporeal about us, that the body is spiritualized by a mysterious substance. In this view, the soul is the nonphysical principle that allows us to tell right from wrong, gives us our ability to reason and have feelings, makes us conscious, and gives us free will. Perhaps most important, the soul is the immortal part of ourselves that can survive the death of our physical body and is capable of happiness or suffering in the afterlife. This is the soul that this book is about. (Musolino, Julien. The Soul Fallacy (p. 65). Prometheus. Kindle Edition.)</blockquote></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">He also informs us that, “<i>the soul hypothesis is a scientific claim about the detachability of mind and body and the existence of a mysterious substance powering our mental lives</i>” (Ibid. p. 87). At another point, he says that those who believe in a soul hold that “<i>the mind and voluntary behavior is triggered by an influx of soul substance</i>” (Ibid. p. 152).</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">So, according to Musolino, soul proponents hold that the body is spiritualised by a mysterious substance and this substance both creates and powers our mental lives. I'll also note that this word “substance” is strewn throughout the book with it frequently being labelled as mysterious. The obvious question here is, what on earth actually <i>is</i> this “substance”?</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Unfortunately, he never answers this question. But, clearly, what Musolino is referring to is what is generally labelled a <i>mental substance</i>. I explain this term's meaning in a blog post, <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-self-or-soul-as-mental-substance.html" target="_blank">The self or soul as a mental substance</a>. In brief, it is the commonsensical conception of the self. The idea here is that with every thought, there is a <i>thinker, </i>and as well as experiences in the broadest sense, there is someone that experiences them. So a <i>thinker</i> or <i>experiencer</i>, or more generally the self, is not <i>identical</i> to thoughts and conscious experiences, rather the self is that which <i>has</i> those thoughts and experiences. It is what we all instinctively believe. That is until we are educated out of this conception of the self as a consequence of it being difficult..nay..<i>impossible</i> to reconcile with materialism. Note that this self needn't entail that it survives the death of our bodies, but if it does survive, then we can refer to it as the soul.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Are phrases like “mysterious substance”, and “influx of soul substance”, likely to conjure up this commonsensical conception of the self? Clearly not. It conjures up the impression that we are talking about something unknown, obscure, and baffling. And, of course, something mysterious. Quite the converse of what a mental substance <i>actually</i> refers to. Why do this? Why give a misleading impression? Why not just provide a definition of a mental substance similar to what I just gave? There seem to be two possibilities here:<br /><ol style="text-align: left;"><li><span style="font-family: arial;">His principal purpose is to persuade people that there is no soul. If portraying souls as being something unknown, obscure, and baffling furthers that aim, then that is a price worth paying, even though it is misleading.</span></li><li><span style="font-family: arial;">He doesn't understand what a mental substance is and genuinely thinks it depicts something obscure and baffling.</span></li></ol>Neither possibility places the author in a favourable light.<br /><br />As for “1”, if it is indeed fairly obvious that souls do not exist, then why resort to underhand methods to persuade people of its non-existence? Surely it is vastly preferable to precipitate a <i>genuine</i> understanding in people that mental substances or souls are unlikely to exist? Yet if “2”, surely that would make him the wrong person to be writing this book? To be fair to the author, though, those that subscribe to materialism frequently mischaracterize what a mental substance is, and in a comparable manner.<br /><br />There is another major problem with Musolino's conception of mental substance. This idea that this mysterious substance “gives rise to the mind” (p. 152), conjures up the idea that the soul and mind are <i>two distinct things</i>, even though the mind is caused by the soul. Since we are directly acquainted with our own minds, but not souls, this will naturally lend support to the idea that souls are superfluous. After all, why hypothesize an invisible soul to account for our minds when we have our visible, tangible bodies that can fulfil that role?<br /><br />But many of those that subscribe to an afterlife hold that minds, mental substances, souls, and indeed selves <i>all refer to one and the same entity</i>. Arguably, we are all immediately acquainted with the fact that we are <i>thinkers</i> and <i>experiencers</i> (mental substances), and the question is simply whether such a self, so characterized, survives death. There is no <i>additional</i> entity—a “soul”—that is being hypothesized.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">In summary, Musolino's conception of the soul is a morass of misleading characterizations, leaving the reader with the impression that souls are wholly mysterious, whilst at the same time leaving the reader in the dark as to what a soul actually is.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">3. The Soul is a Scientific Hypothesis?</span></h4><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Musolino persistently claims throughout the book that the hypothesis of a soul is a scientific one. He says:<br /><blockquote>Maintaining that the soul plays an active role in our psychological functioning, that it can operate independently from the body, and then trying to argue that these claims are not scientific is a clear case of doublespeak. (Ibid. p. 58)</blockquote>And shortly after he says:<br /><blockquote>[T]he idea of an immaterial substance that can interact with our body to make us do the things that we do— act morally, feel sad or elated, or jump up and down on Oprah Winfrey's couch Tom Cruise– style— is a claim about physics. (Ibid. p. 59)</blockquote>A self's conscious states do indeed play a role in our psychological functioning. What this boils down to is that soul proponents, as well as those interactive dualists that deny an afterlife, reject the idea that the physical world is closed. The phrase that the “physical world is closed”, sometimes referred to as <i>physical causal closure</i>, refers to the idea that all change in the world is purely and exclusively a result of the interactions of the four physical forces existing in nature (namely, gravity, electromagnetism, the weak nuclear force, and the strong nuclear force). Believing in a causally potent soul/self contradicts such physical causal closure.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">I agree that, <i>at least in principle</i>, this contravening of physical causal closure will be detectable. However, I suspect that the initial impact on consciousness will likely be <i>minute</i>, perhaps on the quantum scale. It is only then, via physical chains of causes and effects, that this initial impact cascades into larger and larger effects. Importantly, since neuroscientists are virtually all materialists, they won't be looking for any such influence, least of all any <i>minute</i> influence. Furthermore, and crucially, our functional MRIs lack the resolution to make any assertions in this regard in any case.<br /><br />Musolino also states that psychology and biology will be impacted by the existence of a soul. However, even if we grant that these disciplines are, <i>in principle,</i> reducible to fundamental physics, in practice they have their own laws--laws that are revealed by our empirical investigations of the world. Hence, if causally efficacious non-material selves or souls exist, their activity in the world will be implicitly incorporated into such laws.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">There is a more decisive reason, though, why dualism, and by extension, the existence of a soul, isn't primarily a scientific hypothesis. To see why we have to go back to the 17th century when modern science was born. At that time, it was taken as a matter of fact that the world is full of colours, sounds, odours, and other qualitative aspects. This created a problem for a scientific description of the world since such qualitative aspects of the world cannot be measured, and hence cannot be captured by mathematical equations. For example, neither the red colour of a tomato nor its characteristic taste can be captured by mathematical equations.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">It took Galileo's reimagining of the world to take care of this problem. In this reimagining, material objects, indeed, the whole material world <i>including the brain</i>, don't <i>really</i> possess colours, sounds, odours, and other qualitative aspects. Instead, the material world was defined as merely consisting of the <i>quantifiable</i> or measurable aspects of reality; namely size, shape, location, motion, <i>and nothing else</i>. Hence, colours, sounds, and odours and so on were no longer treated as being part of the material world <i>at all, </i>instead they were relegated to <i>existing in the mind</i> <i>only. </i>And in fact, at least in science, the words standing for these qualities have been <i>redefined</i> to refer to those aspects of the material world that precipitate the appropriate qualitative experiences in our minds.<i> </i>For example,<i> </i></span><span style="font-family: arial;">colours were redefined to refer to the respective specific wavelengths of light that objects reflect. The upshot of all this is that it</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> left the material </span><span style="font-family: arial;">world as being exclusively composed of things and processes that can, in principle, be detected by our measuring instruments, and thus can be measured. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br />The consequence of this was that the physical sciences could now potentially describe the material world <i>in its entirety</i>. That is, no aspect of the material world resides beyond its ambit. Yet, science also has its limitations since it can only describe that which is measurable, or in other words, that which is material. This means that our experience of colours, sounds, and odours reside beyond the ambit of science. So too do our emotions, our thoughts, the pains we experience, and indeed, the entirety of our conscious lives. Hence, consciousness as a whole, and <i>a fortiori,</i> the self or soul that <i>has</i> all these conscious experiences, resides outside the ambit of science. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">In order to make this notion that science has its <i>limitations</i> more clear, it might be illuminating here to introduce an analogy. Metal detectors have a great deal of success in detecting metal. But they cannot detect wood, plastic, rubber, or anything else non-metallic. And, so long as metal detectors are merely metal detectors, they will only <i>ever</i> be able to detect metal, <i>and never anything else</i>. In a similar manner, the physical sciences can only detect the material or that which is measurable. It cannot detect that which is non-measurable, so it cannot directly detect </span><span style="font-family: arial;">consciousness, or </span><span style="font-family: arial;">selves, or souls should they exist. At best, we could only measure the effect on bodies initiated by the causal power of consciousness. But, as I have already mentioned, such an initial mental influence is unlikely to be currently detectable.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">I conclude, </span><i style="font-family: arial;">contra</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> Musolino, that we cannot claim that the soul is a scientific hypothesis. It is a philosophical one and, more specifically, a metaphysical one.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><div style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="font-family: arial;">I perhaps should add here that although a type of dualism is seemingly <i>entailed</i> by virtue of the way that Galileo defined the material world, this in no shape or form entails the existence of a soul that survives the death of our bodies. All dualism means is that there are two types of things or existents in the world. There is the material world, cashed out by everything we can measure. And there is consciousness, with all its contents. There is nothing innately contradictory about physical things and processes somehow <i>creating</i> such a non-material consciousness. </span></div><div style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"><br /></div></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">4. Reductive Materialism</span></h4><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4Wr50WRE7ZseWSW0k1HT4xgVseq6sdyT0CN8wI_f_lNFrXWKPDkR1k0Jh6Pi--t-MUVCBZSxxokuvrN_OlH2oh1RCvz5dStXEFaRI0a80iEWzbpeppOsqnUcuQWE0Q9UcNY05g2doomFIVsxxvNcew95G_f_KQ3BmJ7ZsQIyvnuRPENL53-5Bdu-3JA/s740/Elvis1.png" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="740" data-original-width="590" height="459" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4Wr50WRE7ZseWSW0k1HT4xgVseq6sdyT0CN8wI_f_lNFrXWKPDkR1k0Jh6Pi--t-MUVCBZSxxokuvrN_OlH2oh1RCvz5dStXEFaRI0a80iEWzbpeppOsqnUcuQWE0Q9UcNY05g2doomFIVsxxvNcew95G_f_KQ3BmJ7ZsQIyvnuRPENL53-5Bdu-3JA/w365-h459/Elvis1.png" width="365" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Pixelated "illusion"</td></tr></tbody></table><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Despite the carving up of reality that Galileo introduced that seemingly <i>entailed</i> a type of dualism, there is a position that explicitly denies any type of dualism, a position called reductive <span style="font-family: arial;">materialism,</span><a href="#2" name="top2"><sup>2</sup></a> This </span><span style="font-family: arial;">holds that consciousness, if it exists at all, is reducible to material processes. The argument is that although consciousness might </span><i style="font-family: arial;">seem</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> very different to any physical thing or process, this doesn't mean that it is. Musolino, near the end of his book, tries to illustrate this to his readers by presenting us with a picture of what appears to be an assortment of random pixels (see picture above). However, when viewed from afar, the pixels can be seen to represent a crude picture of Elvis Presley. Let me try to further illustrate this idea by providing my own example. A house seems something very different to its component bricks, but nevertheless, a house is </span><i style="font-family: arial;">nothing but</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> an assemblage of such bricks. In a similar vein to these examples--or so the argument goes--it might </span><i style="font-family: arial;">seem</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> strange that our conscious experiences are really </span><i style="font-family: arial;">nothing but</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> an assemblage of neurons firing, but that is what they </span><i style="font-family: arial;">are</i><span style="font-family: arial;">. Note that, here, we are </span><i style="font-family: arial;">not</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> saying that the brain somehow </span><i style="font-family: arial;">causes</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> consciousness, rather, consciousness just </span><i style="font-family: arial;">are</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> brain processes, but at a different level of analysis.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br />We would rule out the possibility of a picture of Elvis existing without any pixels or anything else composing it. Likewise, should reductive materialism be correct, then it definitively rules out any type of essence or soul that might continue on after our brains cease to function. Indeed, if reductive materialism could, <i>purely by reason,</i> be shown to be the correct depiction of the mind-body relationship, there would be no need to appeal to any empirical arguments in order to reject a soul. So there would be no need to appeal to, for example, an argument such as the apparent dependency of the mind on a properly functioning brain.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Yet there is a problem here, and it is this: the analogies appealed to are false, and, it seems to me, transparently so. For, <i>at least in principle</i>, we can always see how an object--say some elaborate model created by <i>Lego</i> or <i>Meccano</i>--is merely an aggregation and arrangement of its component parts. More importantly, we wouldn't expect that <i>Lego</i> bricks, no matter how many and elaborately assembled, could somehow <i>constitute</i> an experience. So, to mention a few examples. <i>Lego</i> bricks, no matter how arranged, could ever as a collective whole somehow constitute the bitter taste of lemons, or of a pain like cramp, or the experiences of blueness, or of any other raw experience. And it doesn't help if we imagine the <i>Lego</i> bricks are able to move in relation to each other. Nor even if we imagine the bricks to have other properties, say the ability to repulse or attract other bricks. At the end of the day, they cannot, as a collective whole, constitute <i>anything other</i> than an elaborate physical structure. The exact same point applies to the ultimate constituents of material reality, namely electrons and quarks. Neither the <i>Lego</i> bricks nor any other physical object or process, can, as a collective whole, constitute raw experiences.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">It appears to me, then, that at least <i>reductive</i> materialism is not tenable, as it cannot be squared with the existence of consciousness. How does Musolino respond to this argument?<br /><br />He doesn't. He says:<br /><blockquote>If body and mind are two sides of the same coin, then how can we reduce the latter to the operation of the former? I'll let philosophers worry about this question. (Ibid. p. 65)</blockquote>So Musolino doesn't even <i>attempt</i> to justify reductive materialism<a href="#3" name="top3"><sup>3</sup></a>. He's not the only one, either. None of the authors of <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Myth-Afterlife-against-After-Death-ebook/dp/B00UV3VFW8/ref=cm_cr_othr_d_product_top?ie=UTF8" target="_blank">The Myth of an Afterlife</a> attempt to justify reductive materialism either, nor indeed anywhere else <i>that I've ever seen</i>.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Musolino does, however, advance philosophical arguments against dualism, although he simply repeats more or less the same arguments that many others have made. I have argued in various places that none of these arguments has merit (for example, see my <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2019/11/a-causal-consciousness-free-will-and.html" target="_blank">A Causal Consciousness, Free Will, and Dualism</a> under the subheading <i>Various Objections</i> and my <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2022/02/the-alleged-problems-with-interactive.html" target="_blank">The Alleged Problems with Interactive Substance Dualism</a>). Moreover, even if, contrary to my position, these objections <i>did</i> have some force and moreover were even <i>decisive</i>, this could do nothing to make reductive materialism tenable. It would merely oblige us to choose another position on the mind-brain relationship, apart from reductive materialism or dualism. Perhaps some variant of idealism, for example. In fact, some variant of idealism is what I personally gravitate towards.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">To reiterate, reductive materialism's failure to accommodate consciousness in no shape or form implies that brains <i>do not</i> somehow create consciousness. Nevertheless, its failure is of high significance. For since the birth of modern science in the 17th century, it was the gradually spreading conviction that the world is wholly material that justified a rejection of a soul in the first place (see my <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2015/01/science-afterlife-and-intelligentsia.html" target="_blank">Science, the Afterlife, and the Intelligentsia</a>).
<br /><br />But if, as I have argued, consciousness cannot be reduced to material processes, then it is something extra above material processes, even though arguably produced by them. Consciousness is then not publicly observable. That is, no matter how much we might explore someone's brain, we will only ever detect material processes; we could never see someone's thoughts, or emotions, or any other mental phenomena. So instead, we are obliged to infer that others are conscious through their bodily behaviour. Yet, if their consciousness <i>itself</i> is invisible, how could we know that it ceases to exist when their bodies eventually cease functioning? That it doesn't depart the body and continue existing, perhaps ascending to another reality?<br /><br />The answer to this question is allegedly the empirical data, and especially the fact that dysfunctional brains lead to impaired minds. It is to the consideration of such empirical data that we will now turn.<br /><br /></span><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">5. Dysfunctional brains lead to impaired minds</span></h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><br />As I have mentioned, in my experience, those who reject a soul virtually never advance arguments for reductive materialism. Instead, in order to justify their stance that brains create minds, what they almost <i>exclusively</i> do is to appeal to the empirical evidence. This evidence, in turn, almost exclusively revolves around the fact that dysfunctional or damaged brains can have a major impact on our minds. Musolino, in common with other skeptics, likewise mainly relies on the empirical evidence. For example, he says:<br /><blockquote>If damage to only parts of the brain can make you lose your ability to see, think, or feel, then how can all these abilities remain intact when your whole brain is completely kaput? (Ibid. p. 153)</blockquote>Exactly the same sentiment is expressed by many other skeptics of souls. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Harris" target="_blank">The philosopher Sam Harris</a>, for one, and I respond to him in my blog post, <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/p/the-mind-brain-correlations.html" target="_blank">The Mind-Brain Correlations</a>. I recommend people read that blog post now if they haven't already (it's fairly short). Here is a relevant question: would Musolino, Harris <i>et al.</i> be equally mystified by the fact that someone’s vision can be more and more impaired as the lenses in their eyeglasses fog up, even though, notwithstanding this, their vision is fully restored when they take their eyeglasses off?</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Of course, they might attempt to counter this by saying that eyeglasses and other such examples are incorrect analogies. However, it seems to me, that such analogies are only incorrect if one assumes <i>up-front</i> that brains <i>create</i> minds. Since that is precisely the issue at hand, it follows that saying it's an incorrect analogy would, therefore, simply beg the question (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question" target="_blank">in the sense of the informal fallacy</a>). </span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Indeed, on the face of it, it seems to me that in this context, the analogy of eyeglasses and vision are of a similar nature to brains and minds. For just as there is no possible mechanism in the lenses in eyeglasses that could <i>create</i> vision, similarly there is no conceivable mechanism within brains that could <i>create</i> consciousness. To elucidate, we have chains of material causes and effects occurring in the brain and these causal chains, like all material causal chains, are exclusively characterised by properties such as mass, charge, momentum, spin, and so forth. But, at the end of such causal chains, we get a sudden abrupt change, a radical disconnect from these measurable processes to subjective experiences such as the greenness of grass, the warmth of love, the smell of roses, and so on. These subjective experiences do not have physical properties, so the usual material causal mechanisms cannot apply to account for their existence. Indeed, to my mind, this possibility that brains <i>create</i> consciousness is, on the face of it, just as outlandish as to suppose our glasses are <i>creating</i> vision.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">I feel I may still not <i>yet</i> have adequately conveyed the deeply implausible nature of this hypothesis that brains create consciousness. Let me put it this way. When I was a child, one of my favourite books was <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Marvellous-Land-Oz-original-illustrations/dp/B08YQM3SX7/ref=sr_1_3?crid=1WV30OXT5G0LL&keywords=The+Marvellous+Land+of+Oz&qid=1656840349&sprefix=the+marvellous+land+of+oz%2Caps%2C1001&sr=8-3" target="_blank">The Marvellous Land of Oz</a>. In this book, the main character constructs a man mainly made out of wood, but also with a pumpkin for a head. A magic spell makes this wooden man come alive, that is, become conscious. As young children, I'm sure that most of us would think this is at least plausible, but as adults, most of us would find such an idea absurd. And yet, this is comparable to what we are being asked to accept. For, in a sense, it seems equally magical that brains could create consciousness, since there is no conceivable mechanism. <br /><br />But let's waive aside the deeply implausible nature of this claim that brains create consciousness. Let's, for the sake of argument, accept that it’s at least <i>possible. </i>That it might well be an unanalysable brute fact about the world that certain physical activity of a certain type of complexity just spontaneously brings conscious experiences into being. Why, though, prefer <i>this</i> possibility to the alternative that selves and their conscious states already exist with brains merely <i>affecting</i> our minds?<br /><br />Indeed, this alternative is surely vastly more plausible. To illustrate this, consider the following. Let's imagine that I can see a tree in front of me. How is this possible? Well, the tree has to exist, my eyes need to be functioning, and the appropriate regions of my brain need to be functioning correctly. Considering how incredibly complex my brain is, this makes for an intricate causal chain. Yet, for all that, I can stop my vision of the tree, in a sense, delete my vision, by the simple act of closing my eyes. Or, to introduce my eyeglasses example again, my vision of the tree could be compromised, or even blocked if the lenses were fogged up. Conversely, my vision of the tree can be restored by the simple act of opening my eyes again or cleaning the lenses of my eyeglasses. However, opening my eyes or cleaning my lenses obviously play no role in <i>creating</i> my vision. The bottom line is this. The process by which we are able to visually see is a complex, involved one. Contrariwise, very simple acts or procedures can block or restore our vision. But it would be very naive to suppose that these very simple acts and procedures play any role in the actual <i>creation</i> of our vision.<br /><br />The point is this, generally speaking, the act of <i>creating</i> something tends to be a convoluted and complex one, whereas merely adversely <i>affecting</i> something is, typically, far easier to achieve. Why not, therefore, prefer the far more feasible and relatively unproblematic hypothesis that the self and its conscious states are not created by the brain at all? That the brain, instead, merely changes, modulates, and attenuates this pre-existing self with its conscious states?</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Musolino has other things to say regarding the empirical data. He says:<br /><blockquote>Your memory, your ability to talk, and your personality can be wiped out by brain damage. People who suffer from asomatognosia will assure you that part of their body, say their left arm, does not belong to them. In anosognosia, patients are convinced that a paralyzed limb is perfectly functional. The Capgras delusion is a condition in which patients sincerely believe that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. Individuals who suffer from Fregoli syndrome hold the delusional belief that they are persecuted by a person who can take the appearance of different people. All these conditions result from damage to different areas of the brain. The allegedly indestructible soul is very fragile indeed. In light of such evidence, how can anyone believe that the mind will continue to function when the entire brain has given up? (Ibid. p. 161)</blockquote>What Musolino refers to as the fragility of the mind is simply that it can be changed and altered by the brain, which he believes implies that the mind is created by the brain. As I have already argued above, this in no shape or form follows. We also need to remember here that we’re talking about a mental <i>substance</i> as defining the self or soul (see part 2). In which case, beliefs, memories, and indeed personality, are <i>properties</i> of such a self–they can change without the self or soul <i>literally</i> changing, least of all without the soul being destroyed. To reiterate, the proposal is that the brain is merely able to attenuate, allow or block the expression of such properties (see my <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-self-or-soul-as-mental-substance.html" target="_blank">The self or soul as a mental substance</a>, where I elaborate upon this idea).<br /><br />But what, specifically, should we say about delusional beliefs? If the brain <i>doesn't</i> create consciousness, could it still precipitate delusional beliefs such as, for example, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capgras_delusion" target="_blank">Capgras syndrome</a>?</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">To go back to my eyeglasses. Suppose someone has perfect unaided vision and puts on a pair of eyeglasses where the lenses both contain aberrations of a certain nature. Wearing them, she might think she can read the registration plate of a car 25 metres away. But, in fact, what she <i>thinks</i> are the letters and numerals are incorrect, as she can ascertain by taking the eyeglasses off.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">So delusional beliefs are not definitive proof that the brain wholly causes our consciousness. Having said that, if we consider this evidence in isolation, it is surely the more straightforward explanation. However, we also need to take into account that we have no conceivable mechanism whereby brains <i>could</i> create consciousness. Moreover, even if we did, the brain merely affecting consciousness in various ways is undoubtedly a far less convoluted and complex task than actually <i>creating</i> consciousness.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">6. Summing Up</span></h4><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">How impressive are Musolino's arguments that there is no soul? Of pivotal importance to his arguments is the notion that the soul is a <i>scientific</i> hypothesis. But, as I argue above, in no shape or form can this be maintained. Furthermore, he fails to understand both the dualism he attempts to attack and the reductive materialism he subscribes to but chooses not to defend. His attacks against the former appear to be a more or less copy and paste from other sources, attacks that I think lack any meaningful impact. Worse yet, he clearly fails to understand what is meant by a mental substance and, therefore, what a soul is. So there's a lack of understanding of <i>any</i> of the main terms. Moreover, the few philosophical arguments he advances are naive and shallow.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Having said that, the empirical arguments don't depend on knowing what <i>any</i> of these terms mean; rather, they attempt to show more <i>directly</i> that the mind in every way is implicitly dependent on a functioning brain. However, in the general sense, the fact that X <i>affects</i> Y in no shape or form implies that X <i>creates</i> Y. I gave the example of eyeglasses, but many other examples could be given (see my blog post <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2018/11/can-we-really-be-so-certain-theres-no.html" target="_blank">Brains affecting Minds do not rule out an Afterlife</a> where I provide more examples).</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">I think Musolino, just like other materialists, simply buys into and echoes the prevailing belief that our ubiquitous technology and control of the world somehow vindicates the idea that the physical sciences must potentially describe the <i>whole</i> of reality, otherwise why would science be so phenomenally successful? I discuss the origin of this pervasive belief in my <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2015/01/science-afterlife-and-intelligentsia.html" target="_blank">Science, the Afterlife, and the Intelligentsia</a><a href="#4" name="top4"><sup>4</sup></a> I find it perplexing that people do not understand that such a materialist perspective is not consistent with the existence of consciousness, regardless of whether consciousness is created by the brain or not.<br /><br />In conclusion, I do not think that this book offers any substantive arguments against the notion of a soul. Indeed, I regard it as being even poorer in this regard than <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Myth-Afterlife-against-After-Death-ebook/dp/B00UV3VFW8/ref=cm_cr_othr_d_product_top?ie=UTF8" target="_blank">The Myth of an Afterlife</a> (see <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2018/04/a-response-to-myth-of-afterlife.html" target="_blank">my review</a> of that book).<br /><br />There's a lot I haven't covered in this review. I do, though, cover more of the material in my <a href="https://ianwardells.blogspot.com/2022/05/my-kindle-notes-on-soul-fallacy.html" target="_blank">Kindle notes</a>. In addition, I also cover some of Musolino's arguments in various blog posts <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-self-or-soul-as-mental-substance.html" target="_blank">here</a>, <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2020/06/the-tabletop-illusion.html" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2020/06/god-of-gaps.html" target="_blank">here</a>, although the latter two are not concerned with the soul as such.</span>
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<a name="1"><b>1 </b></a><span style="font-family: arial;">Of course, this doesn't just apply to those skeptical of a soul. My experience is that this is universal, most notably in politics, where people gravitate to polarised positions and adopt all the beliefs of their chosen in-group. They generally do not independently formulate their own views</span>.<a href="#top1"><sup>↩</sup></a></span></p></div>
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<a name="2"><b>2 </b></a><span style="font-family: arial;">There are other forms of "materialism" that Musolino never mentions. Most notably, there is <i>non-reductive materialism</i>. However, it seems to me that in as much as non-reductive materialism holds that qualia <i>exist </i>and are irreducible to material processes, then it cannot be materialism; at least not in the sense of being exhausted by its quantitative properties. Rather, it seems to me that it's <i>actually</i> a form of dualism; namely, a form of <i>property dualism</i>. As such, the arguments I advance in part 5 that question the plausibility of the thesis that brains somehow create consciousness, will also apply to non-reductive materialism.</span><a href="#top2"><sup>↩</sup></a>
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<a name="3"><b>3 </b></a><span style="font-family: arial;">He claims there is overwhelming evidence supporting materialism, by which he appears to mean reductive materialism. However, it is clear to me that he simply means overwhelming evidence that the brain somehow creates consciousness. Unfortunately, Muslino seems confused about what both the words materialism and dualism actually <i>mean</i>.</span><a href="#top3"><sup>↩</sup></a>
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<a name="4"><b>4 </b></a><span style="font-family: arial;">Recently, I have slightly modified this <i>Science, the Afterlife, and the Intelligentsia</i> essay.</span><a href="#top4"><sup>↩</sup></a>
</span></p><p></p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br />Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com16tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-61441154514758527912022-06-04T11:17:00.007+01:002023-02-17T10:32:20.959+00:00Why are people so certain there's no soul or an afterlife?<p><span style="font-family: arial;">Are we essentially souls and will our souls continue on after we die? Both from a philosophical perspective and by virtue of all the evidence, I gravitate strongly towards a "yes" answer.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">This is not to say I am certain. For one thing, it all seems very fanciful that at the threshold of death I'll ascend into some other reality, and to perhaps be greeted by dead relatives. We live in a cold, harsh, dreary, material world and it <i>feels</i> implausible, far-fetched, whimsical, and a product of wishful thinking to suppose there's anything beyond this life.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">And there's also another reason. The preponderance of educated people, and especially those with a scientific background, emphatically reject the existence of a soul or an afterlife. Indeed, both professional scientists and philosophers appear to be virtually unanimous in this judgement. If so many seemingly intelligent</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> people disagree with me on this issue, and indeed seem so <i>certain</i> in their dismissal of an afterlife, could it be that I am missing something? That I'm not understanding something?</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">To be absolutely honest, having extensively read skeptical literature in addition to having thought deeply about </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">this topic</span> for decades, I don't think I <i>am</i> missing anything. I think many educated people are extremely impressed with the phenomenal success of modern science and this has played a pivotal role in encouraging a certain metaphysical view of the world -- namely that the world is wholly material, and that science, <i>at least in principle,</i> can </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">provide a complete account of it.</span> Our fundamental natures, that is what we essentially <i>are</i>, will not be excluded in such an account. Hence, the conclusion is that</span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span>we are wholly material beings whose behaviour </span><span style="font-family: arial;">is simply the inevitable consequence of physical laws playing out. In other words, we are </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">no different to</span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> any other material object. </span></span></span>The existence of consciousness is played down, being reinterpreted as being one and the very same thing as a material process, or even being viewed as <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/" target="_blank">simply being an illusion</a>.<br /><br />Groupthink amongst the intelligentsia reinforces this materialist conception of reality. Even when academics harbour doubts, they are likely to keep such views close to their chests since dissenting views are often ferociously attacked.</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> One notable example here is the philosopher </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Nagel" target="_blank">Thomas Nagel</a> who was <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-heretic" target="_blank">ferociously attacked</a> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">for </span>having the temerity to attack materialism in</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">his book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Mind-Cosmos-Materialist-Neo-Darwinian-Conception/dp/0199919755/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1422376924&sr=8-1&keywords=Mind+and+Cosmos" target="_blank">Mind and Cosmos</a> </span>. </span>This d</span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">espite the fact he rejects both an afterlife and a God.<br /><br /></span>I think that in something like 500 years time</span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">, an afterlife might well be universally accepted</span> and many people will look back to this time </span><span style="font-family: arial;">with some bemusement and even bewilderment </span><span style="font-family: arial;">at peoples trenchant certainty in materialism. They'll be especially bemused and bewildered at those who believe consciousness is an illusion. Indeed, to a certain extent, the behaviourism of the early 20th century is already viewed with incredulity by many. Human beings, including academics, are very prone to believing in the most fatuous things, and it is often only in retrospect that a sufficient number of people recognise this fatuity for what it is.</span><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /><br />So <i>intellectually</i> I believe in an afterlife and for the reasons I have expressed in a number of essays in this blog. Nevertheless, the fact that an afterlife <i>feels</i> fanciful together with so many peoples unwavering certainty that this is the only life there is, does give me pause for thought. <br /></span></p>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-20301684727541258702022-05-08T09:42:00.001+01:002023-02-17T10:32:49.334+00:00After death will we be subsumed into a universal soup of consciousness?<span style="font-family: arial;"><span class="css-901oao css-16my406 r-poiln3 r-bcqeeo r-qvutc0">After death I don't think our individual selves or souls are subsumed into a universal soup of consciousness, which I regard as being close to the extinction of the individual. Perhaps we survive as distinct entities, </span><span class="css-901oao css-16my406 r-poiln3 r-bcqeeo r-qvutc0">but acquire an infinite telepathic identification and empathy with all others, or at least of those souls similar to oneself. So a kind of joining together. This of course need not happen immediately after death, but may be the ultimate destination.</span></span><br /><br /><br />Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-85401215861357984672022-04-19T14:17:00.001+01:002023-02-17T10:33:16.195+00:00Philosophy has been accused of making no progress, does it therefore make it pointless?<p style="text-align: left;"></p><h4 style="text-align: left;"></h4><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjh-dHPx0TmWp3XnMEOUV4xarkPaBn-V-9ExENK0b8HXGuxEOgGFqs9Ptm_cS-Mh6iPOI06TlqM0DStd6edaWUX2A7adRWOZolvu_88qVU7pebA4q2iahKjIkDP88kgS_iGXr_9gBQoH_XXcPXxS9ZY_-JbwgeVUI77iZB2q_GdJxLnafQZw3oLidiPTA/s474/OIP.VY9nTMi6_zgVioib8hc1OQHaDh.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="225" data-original-width="474" height="282" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjh-dHPx0TmWp3XnMEOUV4xarkPaBn-V-9ExENK0b8HXGuxEOgGFqs9Ptm_cS-Mh6iPOI06TlqM0DStd6edaWUX2A7adRWOZolvu_88qVU7pebA4q2iahKjIkDP88kgS_iGXr_9gBQoH_XXcPXxS9ZY_-JbwgeVUI77iZB2q_GdJxLnafQZw3oLidiPTA/w534-h282/OIP.VY9nTMi6_zgVioib8hc1OQHaDh.jpg" width="534" /></a></div><br /></span>Science makes progress so why doesn't Philosophy?<span style="font-family: arial;"> <br /></span></h4><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Since the scientific revolution of the 17th Century, the progress of science has been a relentless triumphant one. This is vindicated by the fact that it has been extraordinarily fruitful in terms of the prediction and manipulation of our environment, as well as in the creation of our technology. The same cannot be said for philosophy. Why has there been such a lack of progress in philosophy, especially when we compare it to science?</span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">We first have to recognize the difference between science and philosophy. Both disciplines seek to establish the truth. But, although there is overlap, in general, I would suggest that the nature of the truths that each of these disciplines seeks to establish are of differing types.<br /><br />At a minimum, science seeks to accurately describe how the physical world unfolds and to manipulate the environment in the creation of our technology. Here we can easily see why progress is relatively easily achievable. For i</span><span style="font-family: arial;">f someone proposes a scientific theory that describes some aspect of the world, it is in principle susceptible to being tested through our observations. A theory that fails to mirror what we actually observe can be discarded</span><span style="font-family: arial;">.</span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Now, let's consider philosophy and specifically the most important questions we can ask ourselves. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">Questions such as, 'what is the world', 'why is there something rather than nothing', 'does a creator exist', 'do we have free will', 'is there a purpose to our existence'</span><span style="font-family: arial;">? Or in</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> the realm of ethics where we ask practically important questions such as, 'what is the Good', 'how should we live', 'should society seek to maximise happiness', and so on. All these questions appear to be purely philosophical since it seems there are no empirical investigations we can carry out that can help us to establish the answers to them. The resolutions to such questions have to rely upon arguments alone.<br /></span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">So, what <i>generally</i> (but see the next section) demarcates scientific issues from philosophical ones, at least for a lot of the <i>deeper</i> philosophical questions, is that the former can be tested, the latter has to rely upon arguments. </span><br /></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">There's a problem with just exclusively employing arguments though, and it is this. Even if the arguments are <i>sound</i>, other people have to be able to understand them, and a sufficient number of people at that to
overturn prevalent pre-existing </span><span style="font-family: arial;">beliefs.
Compounding this problem, people have to be motivated to read
the arguments in the first place. How many people are motivated to read
an argument that contravenes their implicit beliefs? And, even when they
do, might they not be doing so in order to try and pick holes in it rather than adopting an attitude of an open-minded enquiry and a dispassionate search
for the truth? If that were not enough, philosophy is <i>extremely
difficult</i>. It includes asking the most important questions we humans can
ask ourselves, and the process of reasoning to certain conclusions can
engender no end of misunderstandings and </span><span style="font-family: arial;">confusions</span><span style="font-family: arial;">. Sound reasoning is frequently heavily outweighed by erroneous reasoning that comes to incorrect conclusions.</span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">So the reason why </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">philosophy </span>doesn't progress is due to the fact that on the few
occasions where someone has an insight and produces a sound argument for
something or other, it does not have sufficient influence amongst other people to gain sufficient traction. People will frequently not be able to comprehend the argument. Or they may feel antipathy towards the conclusion of the argument if it contravenes their entrenched beliefs. More often still, though,
philosophical arguments are simply ignored. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">Contrast this with science. For example, consider the science behind powered flight. Would such science have been convincing in the absence of a practical demonstration? It seems not since the stories regarding the success of the Wright brothers were <a href="https://www.seniorific.com/health/inventor-feels-wright-brothers-when-no-one-believed-they-could-fly-0" target="_blank">met at first with ridicule</a>. But seeing is believing. In short, </span><span style="font-family: arial;">science progresses because people are convinced by what they can see with their eyes. Philosophy generally lacks this validation.</span></p><h4 h4=""></h4><h3 class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; text-align: left;">Is philosophy therefore pointless, or even meaningless? <br /></h3>
<p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">It is commonly felt that because philosophy doesn't progress, at least in the form of universal assent, <i>then it has no use at all</i>. That is to say, it is pointless. Indeed, there are even some that suggest that the questions philosophy asks are<i> meaningless</i>. I suppose the idea here is that if no progress is made, then this implies no progress <i>can</i> be made because the questions themselves are, <i>in principle</i>, unanswerable. And they presume they are unanswerable since they are, quite literally, <i>meaningless</i>. <br /><br />I do not think this charge passes muster for one second. First of all, the lack of progress will be for the reasons I mention above. Moreover, clearly many philosophical questions have at least <i>meaning,</i> even the deepest questions<i>. </i>For example, either there is a creator (however conceived), or there isn't. If the latter, then the whole shebang came into existence by blind fortuity, or by</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> happenstance, or by however one chooses to frame it. But, even when rejecting a creator, the question of whether or not there is a creator still has <i>meaning</i>. So, whatever the truth is here, whether there is a creator or not, there is a <i>fact</i> of the matter, even if it is a fact that forevermore lies beyond the ability of human beings to fathom. </span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">There are further reasons to reject the contention that philosophical questions are meaningless, or at least pointless. I mentioned above that what demarcates scientific issues from philosophical ones is that the former is decided by empirical investigations, the latter by arguments. But that was a bit simplistic. It</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> is somewhat more involved and nuanced than this. In fact, there is no rigid demarcation between science and philosophy.<br /><br />For example, consider </span><span style="font-family: arial;">Galileo's argument that demonstrates that objects of different weights must fall at the same acceleration (see my post </span><a href="http://ianwardells.blogspot.com/2016/05/thought-experiments.html" style="font-family: arial;" target="_blank">Thought Experiments</a><span style="font-family: arial;"> in my other blog). Thought experiments, such as this are, strictly speaking, philosophical. But Galileo's argument is an example of a thought experiment that can be empirically investigated -- namely by dropping two objects of different weights from a high height and seeing if they reach the ground at the same time.</span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">There are also examples of philosophical reasoning or thought experiments that although cannot be empirically established at the time they are articulated, are eventually susceptible to empirical investigation.</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> So, for example, <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2014/03/a-very-brief-introduction-to-subjective.html" target="_blank">George Berkeley</a> back in the 18th Century</span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> in his essay <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Motu_(Berkeley%27s_essay)" target="_blank">Du Motu</a></span> produced sound arguments against the notion of absolute space, although his argument was ignored by virtually everyone. Berkeley's insight foreshadowed the rejection of absolute space in the 20th Century that came with the general acceptance of Einstein's special theory of relativity.</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: arial;">So we can definitively conclude that at least <i>some</i> philosophy is able to establish truths about the world. And what is pivotal to their widespread acceptance is whether they can be empirically investigated -- sound arguments <i>alone</i> are generally insufficient. But whether some sound philosophical argument or insight can be empirically investigated or not is <i>incidental to an argument's soundness</i>. That is, a philosophical argument can be sound, even if it can never be empirically validated.</span><br /></p><h3 style="text-align: left;">Should we exclusively refer to science to establish truths about the world?</h3><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">It seems to me to be clear that our empirical investigations of the world do not always overturn those reached by a process of reasoning. </span><span style="font-family: arial;">To give one example, if we measure the area of a circle and it differs from πr², we wouldn't conclude the geometrical reasoning establishing it is πr² was incorrect. Rather, we would assume our measuring was inaccurate, or alternatively that it wasn't a perfect circle. Likewise, if we had measured objects of different weights falling at differing accelerations, would we conclude that Galileo's thought experiment was flawed and even pointless? No, because given the crucial proviso that Galileo's reasoning was <i>sound</i>, we should conclude there must have been some mistake in our empirical investigations that only <i>seem</i> to suggest that the heavier an object is, the faster it falls. Perhaps the experimenter was dropping a stone and a feather! <br /><br />There is another reason to reject this contention that we should just rely <i>solely and exclusively</i> on science to tell us about the world. Earlier, I said that at a minimum science seeks to accurately describe how the physical world unfolds and to manipulate the environment in the creation of our technology. But the vast majority of people -- and this also includes the vast majority of scientists -- regard science as doing much <i>more</i> than this. They regard science, or at least physics, as revealing to us the <i>ultimate nature of reality</i>. That our scientific theories depict <i>literal</i> states of affairs. That the plethora of subatomic particles and the four forces featuring in our theories in physics, all have a <i>literal</i> existence. There is also most scientists' belief that the success of science entails that materialism, indeed often reductive materialism, provides the correct depiction of reality.<a href="#1" name="top1"><sup>1</sup></a> <br /><br />As many of you will know, I question all of this. For example, see my <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2022/01/what-physicists-claim-exists-can-be.html?fbclid=IwAR2lnOeGLGKeZmsnrrev8sQWohWWOreCmiA-0WWmYjhOhjZtJ8n2L2ehNX4" target="_blank">What physicists claim exists can be doubted</a>, my <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2022/03/self-floating-books.html?fbclid=IwAR0mUwHc4Yfv2kD_e-mjsdAh2Y3Gyo-grkdHCQf5JctPh5Ev8jA3CVV-WfY" target="_blank">Self-floating books</a>, my <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2017/03/what-philosophical-questions-does.html?fbclid=IwAR0WA50XgXS08jRel0NuqS0Ftzbwphc8MMozTWCrOF1iln8VjQ0niaUTSMQ" target="_blank">What philosophical questions does science answer?</a>, and my <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2018/06/why-existence-of-consciousness-rules.html" target="_blank">Why the existence of consciousness rules modern materialism out</a>. </span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">But whether you agree with me or not in <i>any</i> of these essays is simply not relevant. By all means, disagree with me, <i>but this doesn't alter the fact that these issues are philosophical ones</i>, not ones that can be decided by science itself. The problem here, though, is that most people, including scientists, do not appear to understand this. O</span><span style="font-family: arial;">ur scientific education, which in turn smuggles in certain metaphysical suppositions, instils certain beliefs about the nature of the world. We soak up, almost by osmosis, western "wisdom" about what exists, what the world is and so on.<br /><br />So philosophy, or more specifically <i><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics" target="_blank">metaphysics</a></i>, is always implicitly involved in forming our conception of the nature of reality. It's just that many people, including scientists, are not <i>aware</i> that it is. They mistakenly think that science validates their metaphysical conception of reality. I regard this as highly undesirable. As those who have read some of my blog will be aware, this in my opinion had led to many fatuous conclusions regarding the nature of the world and what we human beings are. <br /><br />Let me provide just one example of such fatuous conclusions. Consider the claim that physicists make that consciousness <i>in and of itself</i> lacks any causal efficacy. In reality, everything we ever do, and <i>even think</i>, is the result of the blind interactions of subatomic particles and their forces. But if we strip physics of its metaphysical assumptions and hold that physics merely <i>describes</i> changes in material reality that utilizes mathematical equations, we can see how silly this is. For, when we get right down to it, we are effectively saying that the patterns we observe in the subatomic realm serve to negate our <i>immediate</i> and <i>direct</i> experience of our own causal agency.</span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Let me go into more detail to try and explicate this further. Firstly, people are immediately aware of their own causal agency. They then project this concept of causal agency into the material world in order to try and make sense of change within it (i.e. they don't like to suppose the patterns in the material world are just a brute fact). Crucially, they regard such material causes as accounting for <i>all</i> change in the world, this includes our brains too since they are material objects. Couple this with the belief that</span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> the brain produces consciousness,</span> then it follows that it will be such material causes that account for the totality of our behaviour, including the progression of our thoughts. Hence, they now deny their immediate experience that it is their own consciousness <i>per se</i> that is responsible for their behaviour.<br /><br />Just reflect for one moment how <i>crazy</i> this is. First of all, it seems we were directly cognisant of the mental causal potency of our own consciousness as witnessed by our ability to move our own bodies and think our own thoughts. We thereby inferred the material world is also governed by causes, this time by <i>material</i> causes. <i>We then </i></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><i>turned this on its head</i>.</span> For we now <i>deny</i> that our own immediately experienced causal agency exists, and in fact, only the <i>inferred</i> causal agency in the material world exists!<a href="#2" name="top2"><sup>2</sup></a> <br /></span></p><p style="text-align: left;"></p><h3 style="text-align: left;">Conclusion<br /></h3><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: arial;">Scientists enjoy a prestige only dreamt of by professional philosophers. </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Hence,
there is a disincentive for philosophers to advance ideas challenging scientists' metaphysical presuppositions. A philosopher doing so risks having their ideas labelled "absurd" and even being mercilessly
ridiculed. This in turn runs the risk of their careers being negatively impacted.</span> Because of this, and due to other factors such as groupthink, professional philosophers tend to pander to scientists beliefs. Regretfully, as a consequence, philosophy lacks the impact it should and <i>ought</i> to have. Philosophy's lack of influence is not due to its pointlessness though, it's due rather to the unjustified hegemony of scientists' metaphysical beliefs.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></div>
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<a name="1"><b>1 </b></a>Note that materialism is <i>independent</i> from the question of whether our theories in physics depict a literal state of affairs -- one could be a dualist, for example, and be happy to hold that our theories in physics gives a literal representation of material reality<a href="#top1"><sup>↩</sup></a>
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<a name="2"><b>2 </b></a>Of course, one can believe both in the causal efficacy of consciousness or mental causality, and material causality too. However, that would contravene physicists belief that the world is physically closed. Physically closed just means they believe that only material causes exist (see a relevant post in my other blog <a href="https://ianwardells.blogspot.com/2021/07/the-claim-consciousness-would-have-been.html" target="_blank">here</a>)<a href="#top2"><sup>↩</sup></a><br /></span></p>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-62106120512725418022022-04-08T10:44:00.002+01:002023-02-17T10:34:19.890+00:00My beliefs regarding a "God".<p><span style="font-family: arial;">I'm not an atheist, at least not the modern western kind with the associated beliefs that the Universe is a brute fact, and we are just biological robots with no afterlife and simply create our own meanings to our lives. I do not think we have compelling reasons, or frankly <i>any</i> reasons, to believe any of this.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">But I also reject this idea that there is this cosmic superhero type of God who is all powerful and tinkers with the laws of nature to bring about desirable ends. That is, I do not believe in the type of "God" that atheists tend to focus on and ridicule. <br /></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">I'm not sure what I <i>do</i> believe, I only have a vague feeling. I think such a question is perhaps beyond what we human beings can understand or discern.<br /><br /> But, if pressed, I would say that I tend to gravitate towards the idea that there is a fundamental non-personal ‘spiritual presence’ that pervades and suffuses the entirety of reality. That reality as a whole is somehow infused with this conscious presence that we all somehow partake in. And that all conscious creatures -- indeed all things, all events, everything that has been, everything that will be -- is infused with ultimate meaning. But what such an ultimate meaning is eludes us in our present states. </span></p>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-38392910968839746312022-03-24T15:54:00.003+00:002023-02-17T10:34:32.904+00:00Is there much point in arguing with others?<span style="font-family: arial;">Whatever the topic it seems to be a pretty much universal tendency for those who oppose a particular stance or position, to only address the more naïve and weakest arguments for it. And even when engaging with more thoughtful opponents, they tend to attribute to them a more naïve or simplistic position than the one they actually hold and attack that instead.</span><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">When challenged on this, they tend to defend this strategy by claiming that many, if not most people, do actually subscribe to the belief in question for the very reasons that they are attacking.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Of course, most people might well believe something for weak or misguided reasons -- or indeed, often for no reasons at all. But I do not see how this has any relevance to the truth or falsity of a more nuanced stance on the belief in question.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">For example, many people believe that evolutionary theory holds that we humans descended directly from apes, or even monkeys. But would attacking such a notion and showing how implausible it is, have any implications for the actual <i>mainstream</i> evolution theory? Obviously not, since attacking such a wrongheaded notion of evolution doesn't <i>touch</i> the idea that both humans and apes <i>evolved from a common ancestor</i> (humans didn't evolve from apes!). But this type of attacking of the more naïve stances taken on a belief happens constantly, for example when attacking the notion of an afterlife.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">If we want to show a belief is foolish, we don't achieve this by attacking and ridiculing the <i>weakest</i> reasons and/or evidence, even though many people might be convinced by such weak reasons/evidence. Rather we should seek out the strongest reasons or evidence and attempt to show that it is lacking.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">I think the main goal when people argue is to get back-slapped by their supporters and increase their status and prestige amongst them. But I also think they themselves become convinced that they have genuinely confronted the best reasons and evidence. People actually <i>self-deceive</i> themselves that they have genuinely engaged with the more powerful arguments and defeated them.
This seems to be pretty much universal, even within the academic community.
</span></div>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-28421441002537112922022-03-16T11:00:00.001+00:002023-02-17T10:34:47.142+00:00The degrading of our mental faculties as we age<p><span style="font-family: arial;">I know I keep banging on about the same topic, but I just find it <i>extraordinary</i> that people (mainly skeptics, but also some believers) think the degrading of our mental faculties arising from a dysfunctional or impaired brain will also apply in any afterlife. Hence, if someone is suffering from dementia at the time of their death, then they will also be suffering forevermore from dementia in any possible afterlife. For example, <a href="https://bigthink.com/videos/bill-nye-on-mortality-and-mind-uploading/" target="_blank">Bill Nye said</a>:</span><br /><br /></p><blockquote><p>"People my age have a lot of grandparents and parents who are not as sharp, certainly not as athletically capable or physically capable as they were when they were younger.</p><p>"And so watching ourselves die is to me, overwhelming evidence that there is no life after death.</p><p>"There's certainly no — it doesn't seem to be any reason to think that when you die, you go back to your optimum age at your optimum athletic ability in your optimum intellectual sharpness."</p></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Either:</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">a) The brain produces consciousness and the self.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">b) Consciousness and the self/soul can exist apart from the brain. However, when the self/ soul is associated with a brain (embodied), the brain affects the self's/soul's conscious states.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">If there is an afterlife, at least in the sense of a soul dwelling in some afterlife realm, then "a" <i>cannot</i> be true. So if there is an afterlife we <i>must</i> subscribe to "b".</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">So assuming "b", any deterioration in our mental faculties that happens as a consequence of a dysfunctional or impaired brain is . .well . . due to the brain </span><span style="font-family: arial;">and the brain </span><i style="font-family: arial;">alone... </i><span style="font-family: arial;">duh</span><i style="font-family: arial;">..</i><span style="font-family: arial;">. Or, in other words, it's <i>not</i> due to any change in the </span><i style="font-family: arial;">soul</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> or </span><i style="font-family: arial;">self</i><span style="font-family: arial;">. Therefore, there <i>cannot</i> be any implications for our mental faculties in any afterlife. To understand this, consider the following analogy.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Bob has normal visual acuity. One day he puts on a pair of fake eyeglasses that just uses normal glass in the frame rather than lenses. So his vision is not altered. What if he continues to wear them year after year and never takes them off during this time? Also, he never cleans the glass nor replaces it? As time goes by, the glass will accumulate dirt and possible damage, and Bob's vision will progressively get worse and worse. But then, one day, he whips the eyeglasses off, and <i>voila</i>! His vision returns to his initial visual acuity.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">So why on earth would it be any different for the soul or self? If the brain <i>doesn't</i> create the self, soul, or consciousness, how on earth could the detrimental effects arising from a dysfunctional brain somehow mysteriously linger on when one is in a disembodied state, as in the afterlife? Our souls will no longer be associated with a brain, hence a dysfunctional or impaired brain cannot <i>possibly</i> affect our mental faculties in any afterlife. It's just silly to suppose otherwise, and I think people are simply not thinking this through.<br /><br /><br /><br /> </span></p><p></p>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-72238442080498705612022-03-06T11:54:00.006+00:002023-02-17T10:35:21.014+00:00Self-floating books<p><span style="font-family: arial;">Let's imagine there's a stack of books floating in mid-air. There appears to be no reason for it. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">But suppose someone says we can explain why the top book is there. It's being supported by the book beneath it. The 2nd top book, that is, is exerting a force on the top book keeping it where it is.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Likewise we can explain why the 2nd top book is there -- it's being supported by the 3rd top book. And so on.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">But what about the bottom book? Perhaps we can say there's no explanation for that. It's just a brute fact that it can float there mid-air!</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">But if that is the case have we actually provided an explanation for why <i>any</i> of the other books are there in mid-air? Surely not, we've simply kicked the explanatory can down the road, so to speak.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">A similar situation exists in physics. We observe the regularities of the world and say the reason why there are such regularities is ultimately due to fundamental physical laws and/or due to innate forces as revealed by physics. Why do these fundamental physical laws or forces exist? We don’t know, they are just a brute fact about the world with no further explanation. But given that these physical laws/forces exist, we can explain how they give rise to certain phenomena.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">It seems to me though that this is the same type of "explanation" as our floating stack of books. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Going back to the stack of books. I said that it might be suggested by someone that the top book remains where it is due to resting on the book beneath it, which exerts an upward force keeping the top book in its place. But why can’t each book simply be <i>self</i>-floating? The bottom book appears to have the capacity to be self-floating, so if no further explanation is required here, then why would any of the other books be different?</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">We imagine that forces exist out there in the world. But, strictly speaking, we always just see events following each other. We project forces into the world because we like explanations. But, especially when we consider such forces do not provide a <i>true</i> explanation, do we have any reasons to suppose that such forces <i>literally</i> exist at all?</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Consider computer games. Our character that we control performs various actions in that game – our character perhaps presses a button in that game environment and a building in that game explodes. But there are no actual forces here, the game does what it does due to following the rules the computer programmer has implemented. <br /><br />Do we have any compelling reasons, <i>or indeed any reasons at all</i>, to suppose our reality is different? Even if there is no analogical equivalent to a computer programmer or "God", perhaps reality simply exhibits patterns that our physics describes? But physics doesn't tell us <i>why</i> reality is like it is, it doesn't provide any <i>true</i> explanations any more than it does with our floating stack of books.<br /><br />Related: <br /><br /><a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2022/01/what-physicists-claim-exists-can-be.html" target="_blank">What physicists claim exists can be doubted</a><br /><br /><a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2018/01/the-difference-between-science-and.html" target="_blank">The difference between science and metaphysics</a></span></p><p><a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2015/02/do-scientific-explanations-actually.html" target="_blank"><span style="font-family: arial;">Do scientific explanations actually explain?</span></a></p><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2019/10/the-limits-of-science.html" target="_blank">The Limits of Science</a></span></div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-77065527339442726642022-02-25T11:37:00.002+00:002023-02-17T10:35:34.269+00:00The Alleged Problems with Interactive Substance Dualism<span style="font-family: arial;">I read the following blog post <a href="https://jamesbishopblog.com/2022/02/22/arguments-against-mind-body-substance-dualism-and-responses/" target="_blank">Arguments Against Mind-Body/Substance Dualism and Responses</a>. I typed out a response which I posted in my facebook group <a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/PhilThoughts/posts/2947229055607756/" target="_blank">here</a> and also as a comment below his blog post. Unfortunately, despite apparently being sympathetic to dualism, the author didn't accept it. Normally it is those who subscribe to materialism that refuse to publish my comments! (One example is <a href="https://ianwardells.blogspot.com/2017/01/five-allegedly-hard-to-swallow-facts.html" target="_blank">here</a>). I reproduce my comment below without alteration. <br /><br />All these arguments are ridiculous.<br /><br /><b>1. Damaged brains lead to damaged minds.</b></span><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Churchland claims this “<i>comes close to being an outright refutation of (substance) dualism</i>.”<br /><br />Obviously we can think of many examples where A <i>affects</i> B but where no-one would dream of concluding that A <i>produces</i> B.
For example, eyeglasses affect our vision. As the lenses fog up, become scratched, perhaps warped or whatever, our vision will suffer. But then, when we take our glasses off, our vision is restored to what it was originally.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Moreover, just as there is no <i>conceivable</i> mechanism within eyeglasses that could produce vision, so there appears no <i>conceivable</i> mechanism within brains that could produce consciousness.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">This damaged brains lead to damaged minds objection can only be rescued if we assume that cognitive ability, moods, memories etc are <i>intrinsic</i> to the soul and should never be able to be changed or altered, or attenuated. But here one would be assuming a materialist conception of personal identity and hence would be begging the question. For the substance dualist has a <i>commonsensical</i> conception of the self. The self is that which makes one feel one is the very same person from one hour to the next, one day to the next, and one year to the next. One’s moods might change from one hour to the next, one’s interests and even intelligence might change from one year to the next, nevertheless, it is still that person that undergoes all these changes. The <i>I</i> or <i>me</i> is the mental substance; contrariwise the moods, cognitive abilities, memories, interests and so on are the <i>properties</i> of the self/mental substance. These properties can change without me ceasing to exist and turning into another person.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><b><span style="font-family: arial;">2. Problem of embodiment</span></b></div><div><br /></div><div><blockquote>The critic of substance dualism asks: What is it for the mind to be housed in a body? What is it for a body to belong to a particular subject? The problem of embodiment, argues the critic, makes the union between mind and body mysterious.</blockquote></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">What’s really mysterious is what this objection means or amounts to. One could retort that all change and interactions in the entire Universe are equally mysterious. The facts of the Universe are just given and physics merely describes change using mathematical equations. Likewise, it is a fact that my consciousness affects my body as is exemplified by the words that I am typing out now. Although we don’t have the mathematical equations describing such interactions, I don’t see any reason why they should not eventually be forthcoming.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><b><span style="font-family: arial;">3. Problem of the physical conception of human beings</span></b></div><div><br /></div><div><blockquote>There is the argument from the physical conception of human beings at the beginning of life. According to this objection, no one views fertilized ova as having minds; rather, these are purely physical entities. But if human beings began as wholly physical beings and nothing non-physical was later added, then they are still wholly physical creatures and substance dualism must be false.</blockquote></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Why on earth would the critic of dualism assume nothing non-material would be added? How can we be conscious at all if nothing is added?</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>4. Problem of Interaction</b> </span></div><div><br /></div><div><blockquote>Interactionism on substance dualism maintains that the mind and body causally influence each other. But some philosophers argue that this causes problems: if, on substance dualism, the mental substance is so radically distinct from the physical substance (the mental is, unlike the physical, immaterial, unextended, and therefore has no size, shape, location, mass, motion, or solidity), then they lack commonality necessary for interaction. </blockquote></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">I suggest that the people who voice this objection have a certain view of reality where only certain types of regularity are permitted; namely a mechanistic view of reality where all changes are captured by such contiguous physical chains of causes and effects. Essentially, they hold the view that A influences B because there is some innate power in the world that travels from A to B and necessitates change in B.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">But, why must reality be limited to such regularities? Why must causes be contiguous? What permits us to <i>a priori</i> rule out a reality that admits influences from consciousness, or indeed even mystical principles, or magic and so on? Note that in saying causes may not need to be contiguous, we are not contradicting any physical laws. Rather, we are contradicting the mechanistic view of reality, which at best is a presupposition of science, or at least it was a presupposition of science back in the 17th and 18th Centuries. Physics simply tries to model reality based on observations in the past to predict events in the future. We call these regularities physical laws. I do not believe we can impose <i>a priori</i> constraints on the patterns we find there, that is we cannot say reality must conform to contiguous causes. Empirical investigation should guide our beliefs rather than <i>a priori</i> presuppositions. Should we dismiss the phenomenon of entanglement because it contravenes such assumptions? And, if we don't, then the alleged universality of contiguous physical causes and effects is refuted. Where one exception is found, we can surely not be surprised if we find others.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><b><span style="font-family: arial;">5. Argument from evolution</span></b></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">
Churchland says:</span></div><div><br /></div><div><blockquote>The important point about the standard evolutionary story is that the human species and all of its features are the wholly physical outcome of a purely physical process… If this is the correct account of our origins, then there seems neither need, nor room, to fit any nonphysical substances or properties into our theoretical account of ourselves. We are creatures of matter. And we should learn to live with that fact.</blockquote></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">The evolution story is supposed to explain the origin of our bodies and why our bodies have the characteristics they do. It only accounts for the arrival of consciousness should one assume that <i>consciousness is literally part of the body</i>, or in other words, if one assumes materialism upfront. But, as I have argued elsewhere, materialism is fatally problematic. Apart from that, we have yet again, a clear case of question begging.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Indeed, in order for evolution to account for consciousness, consciousness has to actually <i>do</i> something. But the mainstream view is that the physical world is closed, hence our consciousness is causally superfluous.<br /><br />(Also see my <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2019/11/a-causal-consciousness-free-will-and.html" target="_blank">A Causal Consciousness, Free Will, and Dualism</a>, under the heading "Various Objections")</span></div>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-56901365904244881012022-01-19T15:07:00.003+00:002023-02-17T10:35:54.023+00:00Should the rich be subject to a wealth tax?I frequently hear the sentiment that it is immoral for Governments to tax people. If people want their money to fund a health service, or to alleviate people's poverty and so on, then it should be voluntary. So, in the context of funding a health service, someone on Meta said:<br /><blockquote>"Forcing others to do things, even righteous things, is not morally sound. That is also basic common sense".</blockquote>It seems to me, though, that this is confused thinking, perhaps deliberately so.
Think of a rich person who is a socialist. He thinks society ought to be a great deal less unequal than it currently is. Now, he personally can give an appreciable amount of his money away and for no other rich person to do so. But, if he is giving away his money equally to <i>millions</i> of people, that won't make much of a dent in alleviating their poverty since his money, being spread out over so many impoverished people, will make little difference to <i>any</i> of their lives. So it is fairly futile, all that happens is that he becomes that much poorer. So what he wants is for ideally<i> all</i> rich people to give a percentage of their wealth away, not just him alone.<div><br /></div><div>Let's suppose many, if not most, rich people feel exactly the same way. That is, they are not in favour of giving any substantial amount of their wealth away if they are the <i>only</i> ones doing so. But they <i>are</i> in favour of giving a percentage of their wealth away should all other rich people do so too. In that case, by introducing some type of wealth tax, Governments would be forcing them to do what they want as a collective whole. <br /><br /><br /></div>There's a relevant article just been published today:<br /><br /><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/jan/19/millionaires-call-on-governments-worldwide-to-tax-us-now?fbclid=IwAR2NTq6viRVEk_IbFNYPQc6TxKptfRnuruxAdZ-lyphTOL7Eva512lTnUBs" target="_blank">Millionaires call on governments worldwide to ‘tax us now’</a><div><br /></div><div>It says:</div><div><br /></div><div><div></div><blockquote><div>The group, which also includes Nick Hanauer, a venture capitalist who made an almost $1bn fortune from an early bet on Amazon, said an annual “wealth tax” on those with fortunes of more than $5m (£3.7m) could raise more than $2.52tr.<br /><br /></div><div>That would be enough, they said, to “lift 2.3 billion people out of poverty; make enough vaccines for the world and deliver universal healthcare and social protection for all the citizens of low and lower-middle-income countries (3.6 billion people).”</div></blockquote><p>So rich individuals would be forced to pay this tax, but it is far from immoral since, first of all, it is consonant with what a number of rich people would actually <i>prefer</i>. But, more importantly, it would alleviate a vast amount of hardship and suffering. Indeed, I submit it is immoral <i>not</i> to have either a wealth tax or some other measure to help out the most impoverished. <br /><br />People might find my following blog post also of interest:<br /><br /><a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2020/06/is-there-better-alternative-to.html" target="_blank">Is there a better alternative to capitalism?</a><br /><br /><br /></p><div></div></div>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-85194934535094353032022-01-11T12:52:00.005+00:002023-08-31T18:07:43.562+01:00What physicists claim exists can be doubted<span style="font-family: arial;">Do our theories in physics mirror how reality <i>really is</i>? Physicists invoke a bewildering plethora of subatomic particles and sometimes even "<a href="string theory" target="_blank">strings</a>", warped space-time, extra dimensions and so on to explain our observations of the world. And, indeed, doing so can often accurately predict what we observe. But look at the following gif.</span><br /><br /><img atl="Gif" height="550" src="https://twistedsifter.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/st-pattys-shirk-21.gif" width="550" /><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">In the gif we can see that the movement of the small black circles can be explained if we imagine they reside on the corners of moving invisible equilateral triangles, or alternatively on the corners of moving invisible squares, and so on. <br /></span><br /><span style="font-family: arial;">Invoking alternative, apparently incompatible, invisible mechanisms to explain what we observe can also be applied to the actual physical world. Watch the short 3 minute video below.</span><br /><div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='560' height='391' src='https://www.blogger.com/video.g?token=AD6v5dyi8tHxgMe63ycCDqu-hKPyx-JDMibX1jzKG3NGhUdkrJCVpAiywZcAupBpqgl6JE5FT6duHGI8enmfyoJ1bg' class='b-hbp-video b-uploaded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div><br /><div><br /></div><div> <br /><span style="font-family: arial;">If it's the case that distinct <i>differing</i> mechanisms can explain our observations, then this invites the question of whether <i>any</i> of these invisible mechanisms actually <i>exist</i>?<i> </i>Perhaps they simply function as tools to enable us to predict and ultimately control the world?</span></div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br />On this issue theoretical physicist <a href="https://newhumanist.org.uk/contributors/2335/mano-singham" target="_blank">Mano Singham</a> asks in "<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Great-Paradox-Science-Conclusions-Relied-ebook/dp/B07Z5B1VXC/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2NXGEHRJJPDZF&keywords=The+Great+Paradox+of+Science&qid=1641901698&sprefix=the+great+paradox+of+science%2Caps%2C674&sr=8-1" target="_blank">The Great Paradox of Science</a>":</span><br /><br /><blockquote>If extraterrestrial beings were to visit the Earth at some point, that would imply they possessed technology superior to ours. If we could communicate with them, would we find that the theories of science on which their technological prowess was based were the same or a close approximation to ours (as would be the case if the theories of science are true or approaching truth), or would we find them to be completely different, suggesting that there is no unique truth out there waiting to be discovered?</blockquote><p><span style="font-family: arial;">I think most probably that the aliens' conception of reality would be very different from ours. It is my suspicion that it's not truth that physics is revealing, rather physics merely provides the means for improved engineering. Hence, despite their usefulness,</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> the theoretical entities conjured up by physicists, such as the various subatomic particles, do not have a </span><i style="font-family: arial;">literal</i><span style="font-family: arial;"> existence. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: arial;">Indeed, I am inclined to think that what theoretical physicists allege exists and doesn't exist gets it precisely the wrong way around. H</span><span style="font-family: arial;">ence, it seems to me that the various hypothetical entities</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> employed in physics might well not literally exist. Contrariwise, that colours, sounds, and odours <i>do</i> exist*. <br /><br />*I mean by the words </span><span style="font-family: arial;">colours, sounds, odours</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> as we actually <i>experience</i> them so that the external world is <i>literally</i> coloured. I intend to argue for this in a future blog post. <b>31/8/23</b> <b>Edited to add:</b> <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2023/08/do-colours-sounds-and-odours-as-we.html" target="_blank">I have now done so</a>.</span></p></div>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-85995749450466696402021-11-28T18:42:00.001+00:002023-02-17T10:36:32.705+00:00Thoughts on the Winning BICS Essay<p><span style="font-family: arial;">All 29 essays from the 2021 BICS essay contest that have been awarded a prize are now available to download and can be read for free from <a href="https://www.bigelowinstitute.org/contest_winners3.php?fbclid=IwAR0z0meu76ruGkicl7A0qsY8OYd6G-teuM7ijuTch-CNT38o2WmUvfrzzv8" target="_blank">here</a>. Thus far I have only read the winning essay, which was written by <a href="https://www.parapsych.org/users/jmishlove/profile.aspx" target="_blank">Jeffrey Mishlove</a>. I had previously heard of Mishlove, but had not hitherto read anything by him nor had I watched any of his interviews. So I was not previously aware of his specific beliefs on the afterlife and hence am reading this without any preconceived ideas. Here are my thoughts on his winning essay.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Ideally, how should we judge whether there’s an afterlife? I suggest, firstly, that we need to take a look at the <i>totality</i> of the evidence. Not only that which might seem to support the possibility of an afterlife but also that which might seem to contradict it too. But, secondly, we also need to examine and possibly amend our philosophical <i>assumptions</i> regarding the nature of reality, since such assumptions are the lens whereby we view the evidence. Most pertinently, these assumptions will dictate whether we regard an afterlife as being an extraordinary claim or not. At the end, we hopefully will have obtained a well-rounded appraisal of all the evidence and reasons to allow us to make an informed judgement on this issue.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Unfortunately, in reality, regardless of whether we are discussing the possibility of an afterlife or indeed any other topic, there seems to be this pretty much universal pattern whereby people concentrate on the evidence and reasons supporting the particular position that they happen to favour, but they pay scant regard to any awkward evidence or opposing arguments. This is certainly the case when it comes to debating whether there is an afterlife or not, regardless of a person’s specific belief on this issue. Regretfully, this essay by Mishlove doesn’t break that mould.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Mishlove’s essay predominantly consists in outlining people’s experiences – accounts of NDEs, apparitions, and so on. Doing so is, of course, indispensable. We need to be acquainted with the evidence, get a <i>feel</i> for it. But this is the easy part that can, after all, be obtained by a quick Google search. We also need to do lots of digging. It does not seem to me that Mishlove’s essay adequately fulfils this criterion. Let me justify what I say above by considering a few examples from his essay. </span></p><h3 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Near-Death Experiences</span></h3><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Similar to the other avenues of evidence, Mishlove mainly concentrates on the personal experiences of NDErs. Of course, these do sound persuasive, and I do not dispute that a great deal of weight should be attached to them. This is especially so when we consider that, </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">regardless of their prior beliefs,</span> the vast majority of people who have undergone an NDE become convinced there is an afterlife. There are difficulties though for the afterlife interpretation, difficulties that Mishlove neglects to address.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">What about, for example, the fact that only something like 10 to 20 percent of people coming close to death recollect an NDE? Is it that only 10-20 percent of us will actually go on to an afterlife with the rest of us simply ceasing to exist? I have actually heard a couple of people independently suggest this, but for reasons I won’t go into here, I find this deeply implausible. Instead, I suggest that only 10 to 20 percent recollect an NDE will either be because:</span></p><ol style="text-align: left;"><li><span style="font-family: arial;">They forget the experience.</span></li><li><span style="font-family: arial;">Their souls never became detached from their bodies in the first place (an appropriately dysfunctional body will prohibit any experiences until they detach from it).</span></li></ol><p><span style="font-family: arial;">But I don’t want to get into details regarding my own thoughts. The point being is that Mishlove should have explored this issue himself. It’s not as if this is unimportant. Indeed, I frequently hear people ask why so few people have near-death experiences. Addressing this, and suggesting answers such as I have hinted at, would surely have been far better.</span></p><h3 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Peak in Darien experiences and encountering apparitions still alive</span></h3><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Mishlove talks about “Peak in Darien” experiences. These are NDEs where the experiencer encounters a deceased person during their NDE <i>that they did not realise were dead</i>. Should these experiences actually occur – and so far as I am aware the evidence seems to be compelling that they do – then this presents<i> very powerful evidence indeed</i> that the people and entities encountered during NDEs are real, or at least have a real element. They are not, that is, total fabrications of the mind.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">So far so good. But what Mishlove <i>doesn’t</i> mention is that sometimes people during their NDEs encounter apparitions of people who are still alive! As Keith Augustine states: “NDE’rs have reported seeing friends out of body with them who are, in reality, still alive and normally conscious”. Augustine goes on to say that seeing such living people “make[s] perfect sense if NDEs are brain-generated hallucinations. The fact that living persons are occasionally encountered in NDEs severely undermines survivalist interpretations of NDEs". (From the chapter "Near-Death Experiences are Hallucinations" in the book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Myth-Afterlife-against-After-Death/dp/0810886774/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1637940911&sr=1-1" target="_blank">The Myth of an Afterlife</a>).</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">So Peak in Darien experiences and NDE’rs encountering people who are still alive during their experiences, are polar opposites. They are <i>inconsistent</i> with each other since the former suggest these encounters are of a genuine external reality, the latter that they are brain-generated hallucinations. Augustine tries to resolve this by suggesting that <i>some</i> (emphasis as in original) Peak in Darien experiences could arise by chance. Though he then insinuates they might <i>all</i> do so. But he also adds that these visions are rarely documented “prior to learning that the recently deceased persons in question have died leaving plenty of room for inaccurate recall or embellishment about what transpired”. (From the chapter "Near-Death Experiences are Hallucinations" in the book </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Myth-Afterlife-against-After-Death/dp/0810886774/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1637940911&sr=1-1" target="_blank">The Myth of an Afterlife</a></span>).</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Is Augustine correct in his conclusion? Not necessarily. As I said in <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2018/04/a-response-to-myth-of-afterlife.html" target="_blank">my review</a> of </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Myth-Afterlife-against-After-Death/dp/0810886774/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1637940911&sr=1-1" target="_blank">The Myth of an Afterlife</a></span>:</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;">A crucial question here is whether these NDEs are phenomenologically identical to the standard NDEs where apparitions of dead people are encountered. If they are, then this might suggest that the people and entities seen during <i>all</i> NDEs are likely to be all hallucinations. But, if they are not, and especially if the experience of seeing living people seems less authentic, then this objection loses much of its force.</span></blockquote><p></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">So we need to know how real the experience of seeing those who are still alive is compared to seeing the deceased. If indeed both experiences are phenomenologically identical, as Augustine simply <i>assumes</i>, then this considerably weakens the evidence for an afterlife provided by NDEs. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">However, I relatively recently discovered that NDE research challenges this assumption. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruce_Greyson" target="_blank">Bruce Greyson</a> in his recent book on near-death experiences called <a href="https://www.amazon.com/After-Doctor-Explores-Near-Death-Experiences/dp/1250263034/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=After+Bruce+Greyson&qid=1637943008&s=books&sr=1-1" target="_blank">After</a>, says:</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;">It turns out that there <i>are</i> a few NDEs in which experiencers report meeting people who are still alive. In our collection that now includes more than a thousand NDEs, 7 percent involved seeing someone in the realm of the NDE who was still living. But in every one of those rare cases, the experiencer described that person as still living, in most of those cases pleading with the experiencer to come back. <i>None</i> of the NDEs in our collection involved an experiencer mistakenly thinking a person still alive had died.</span></blockquote><p></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">So this then suggests that those apparitions of people still alive that are encountered during NDEs are phenomenologically dissimilar to those apparitions of people who are deceased.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">The point here is that I think it would have made Mishlove’s essay vastly better if he had addressed this difficulty and other difficulties in the evidence. Failing to do so leaves his essay vulnerable to attack and easily dismissed. A $500,000 prize-winning essay arguing for an afterlife needs to be well-rounded and capable of heading off the obvious objections.</span></p><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Reincarnation process influenced by cultural beliefs</span></h4><p><span style="font-family: arial;">In the psi encyclopaedia entry <a href="https://psi-encyclopedia.spr.ac.uk/articles/patterns-reincarnation-cases" target="_blank">Patterns in Reincarnation Cases</a> it says:</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;">Sceptics of a reincarnation interpretation of the cases point to the association between beliefs about the reincarnation process and case features such as the presence or absence of sex change and argue that this is proof that people are imagining or constructing the cases in accordance with their culturally-mandated ideas.</span></blockquote><p></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Mishlove on this topic in his essay says:</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;">If the afterlife operated independently, according to its own laws and principles, one would expect the intermission length reported by children with past-life memories – as well as gender change between lives – to be unaffected by cultural expectations. This is clearly not so. However, since we are referring to solved reincarnation cases, neither can the results be purely a fantasy based, cultural artifact. Such findings show us we the living can influence the afterlife. People who enter the immediate afterlife will see what they need to see or what they’re prepared or conditioned to see.</span></blockquote><p></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Skeptics are saying that our background cultural beliefs should not influence which sex we are born, how long we spend in between our lives before we are reincarnated, and so on. The fact that the research shows they <i>do</i> implies that the evidence cannot be what it seems. And at first blush I’m sure that many, if not most people, would agree with skeptics here. Or at least believe that this constitutes a difficulty for the evidence for reincarnation.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Contrariwise, Mishlove seems to me to be saying that a person’s beliefs on the details of the reincarnation process will carry on into the afterlife and that such beliefs are able to influence the reincarnation process so that it aligns with the implicit expectations of that individual. Why is this explanation superior to the skeptic’s belief that these experiences are simply fabricated? Mishlove thinks his interpretation is required due to solved reincarnation cases -- that is those cases where a previously living person was located and seemed to match up to the previous life memories of a child.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">But, of course, this doesn't really resolve the disagreement. What Mishlove and the skeptics both needed to do was dig a bit into the issues. Skeptics implicitly assume that if reincarnation occurs, then the process will be governed by an impersonal natural "mechanism", or in other words </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">a process that is not influenced by a person’s beliefs or desires</span> (what Mishlove describes as the afterlife operating “independently, according to its own laws and principles”). If skeptics could <i>argue</i> that this is indeed a reasonable <i>prior</i> supposition, that is what one <i>ought</i> to expect <i>before</i> looking at the research, then they would have been in a much stronger position to argue that the evidence pointing to reincarnation is unlikely to be what it appears to be. But they don’t. Ideally, Mishlove should have talked about this failure on the part of skeptics and argued -- <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2021/10/reincarnation-and-its-critics-part-3.html" target="_blank">as I did in this essay</a> -- that skeptics have no good reason to assume it would be such an impersonal natural "mechanism".</span></p><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Kübler-Ross, </span><span style="font-family: arial;">Mrs. Schwartz, and the Note<br /></span></h4><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Mishlove outlines an anomalous experience that Kübler-Ross alleged that she had. The story goes that she was approached by a woman, a certain Mrs. Schwartz, <i>who had been dead for the past 10 months</i>. This Mrs. Schwartz insisted that Kübler-Ross must not abandon her work on death and dying. Most significantly, Kübler-Ross asked Mrs. Schwartz to write a note, which she duly did! So the deceased Mrs. Schwartz was aware that Kübler-Ross was about to quit her job, implying she could read Kubler's mind or was aware of her emotional state, and could intentionally appear to her and even write a note using a pen. Mishlove considers this case to be “significant because it combines evidence of identity, spirit materialization, and evidence of intentionality with a life transforming event”.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">What are we to make of this episode? As an aside, I do not consider the prospect of an afterlife to be an extraordinary one. Indeed, the supposition that the prospect is extraordinary seems to presuppose some broadly materialist conception of reality, hence is essentially question-begging. However, this is not to deny that some of the alleged evidence might be extraordinary, and this episode related by Kübler-Ross seems to be a good candidate. We might ask ourselves that if the deceased are able to do this, why do they not do so far more often? Of course, this might be a rare talent amongst the deceased. Nevertheless, we have to be leery about accepting this evidence as being<i> significant</i> as Mishlove does. There is surely a good possibility that Kübler-Ross was mistaken, or indeed that she simply fabricated the entire alleged incident.</span></p><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Evaluating the Evidence</span></h4><p><span style="font-family: arial;">I’ve mentioned a couple of areas where Mishlove needed to go into somewhat more detail. This advice extends to much of the other evidence too. More specifically, he needed to address the obvious objections that skeptics are liable to mention. Doing so would have made the essay more impartial, objective, and generally well-rounded. Of course, this would have used up more of the allotted word limit. But I think he might well have been advised to skip some of the evidence altogether, particularly rarely encountered anomalous episodes such as the one recounted by Kübler-Ross. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Let’s now turn to the philosophical issues.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></p><h3 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Philosophical Considerations</span></h3><h3 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></h3><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">The Mind-Body Correlations</span></h4><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Bertrand Russell once said:</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;">"The mind grows like the body; like the body it inherits characteristics from both parents; it is affected by disease of the body and by drugs; it is intimately connected with the brain. There is no scientific reason to suppose that after death the mind or soul acquires an independence of the brain which it never had in life". (Quotation from <a href="https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/5700/we-needed-a-book-about-humanism-as-an-active-approach-to-life" target="_blank">here</a>).</span></blockquote><p></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Many people seem to take it for granted that the brain produces consciousness and they surmise this because when the brain is damaged the person’s mind is also damaged. Such damage not only can result in the diminishing of one’s mental capacities, <i>it often seemingly changes the actual personality</i>. The obvious conclusion is that the brain produces consciousness, otherwise why should the mind be affected?</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Indeed, it often seems that this is the <i>sole</i> argument against an afterlife. For example, in </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Myth-Afterlife-against-After-Death/dp/0810886774/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1637940911&sr=1-1" target="_blank">The Myth of an Afterlife</a></span></span> where each chapter was written by a differing author, the majority of the authors contented themselves with harping on about all the ways our mental life is affected by the brain, going into great detail and frequently repeating each other. In that great huge thick book, it scarcely got beyond that.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">So it is <i>imperative</i> that this alleged problem is comprehensively addressed. What does Mishlove say about it? He says:</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;">Gardner built upon William James’ 1897 filtration theory of brain function. This hypothesis likens the brain to a filter or reducing valve, not the source of consciousness. The brain accesses mind-at-large, or universal consciousness, in all its magnificent potency. Then the brain places into the spotlight of awareness a reduced level most useful for biological survival. James presented this theory as a way of accounting for life after death. </span></blockquote><p></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Would all those impressed by the fact a damaged brain leads to a damaged mind and therefore surmise that the former produces the latter, have a sudden change of heart on reading this? I doubt it. Yes, Mishlove makes the very important point that the brain could merely alter consciousness rather than create it, but it surely needs to be elaborated on and fleshed out a great deal more than this. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">For example, there’s the very important issue of personal identity. Will I meaningfully be the very same person after death as I was before? Mishlove links to several short video clips of him interviewing <a href="https://philpeople.org/profiles/bernardo-kastrup" target="_blank">Bernardo Kastrup</a>. In one of them <a href="https://www.youtube.com/embed/-OLLK7n3O9E?start=310&end=365" target="_blank">here</a> (in his essay the link is dead for me, but it has the address in footnote 221), Kastrup says: </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;">[Death is] a dramatic change, you have a physical body and then you don't have one any more. It's naive to expect that it will be just your good old self. What age would you have then, will you be your child self, will you be the self the moment that you died. I mean all kinds of issues open.</span></blockquote><p></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">As it happens, I don’t agree with Kastrup here. I think we might very well be our good old selves. That is, immediately after death there will be no discontinuity in my sense of self, it will feel that I am simply transitioning out of my body. That is not to deny that my mental faculties might not improve and that my mood, my emotional state, and so on might not change. But it will still be <i>me</i>. I'll leave it at that since I have already comprehensively argued for this in several places already in this blog. See <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/p/the-mind-brain-correlations.html" target="_blank">here</a>, <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-self-or-soul-as-mental-substance.html" target="_blank">here</a> (where I also comprehensively address objections to the filter hypothesis), <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2017/04/who-am-i.html" target="_blank">here</a>, <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2019/12/if-my-essence-is-enduring-self.html" target="_blank">here</a>, <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2016/08/keith-augustine-in-myth-of-afterlife.html" target="_blank">here</a>, <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2018/08/why-are-we-all-so-convinced-brain.html" target="_blank">here</a>, and <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2021/02/the-filter-hypothesis-of-mind-brian.html" target="_blank">here</a>. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">But it is of little avail for <i>me</i> to comprehensively address this damaged brains cause damaged minds argument. I am an unknown who virtually <i>no one</i> will read. For such a crucially important, if not really, the <i>only</i> objection to an afterlife, a comprehensive rebuttal needed to come from someone with a high profile and who will therefore be widely read. The winning essay of the BICS contest would have been the ideal place. The failure to do so is a tragically lost opportunity. </span></p><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">The alleged impossibility of dualism</span></h4><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Mishlove says:</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;">Dualism, a major metaphysical school of thought, has the unresolvable problem of how two metaphysically unique substances – mind and matter – can interact.</span></blockquote><p></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">This is something that those who subscribe to materialism constantly allege.They rarely justify this assertion, and I regard it as nonsense. Indeed, I do not regard this as being a problem at all, least of all an unresolvable one. Essentially, it seems to me that the objection presupposes the mechanistic view of reality, a view that is closely aligned with materialism. I explain more fully my thoughts on this in the following blog post, <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2019/11/a-causal-consciousness-free-will-and.html" target="_blank">A Causal Consciousness, Free Will, and Dualism</a>. Go to “Various Objections, 2. How can the immaterial impact on the material?” </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Why do I regard Mishlove’s claim here to be such an important issue? It’s important because dualism is the commonsensical position that we all instinctively believe. If we are told that it has an unsolvable problem, and we are naïve enough to simply accept this, then the other choices available to us are either some flavour of materialism, or some flavour of idealism. Some might well feel that if <i>this</i> is the choice, then materialism is the sensible option. But materialism, at least the main view, is untenable as I explain <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2018/06/why-existence-of-consciousness-rules.html" target="_blank">here</a>. Moreover, all flavours of materialism are incompatible with an afterlife, at least in the form of an essence or soul surviving death. So we really need some excellent reasons for rejecting dualism. I agree dualism has some problems, though not this particular alleged problem. Idealism has problems too. But the problems with dualism and idealism do not approach the seeming irreconcilable problems that confront all versions of materialism.</span></p><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">The mysterious undefined Hyperspace</span></h4><p><span style="font-family: arial;">Near the beginning of his essay, Mishlove has a subheading, “Hyperspace and consciousness”. Immediately underneath this, he says, “Gardner’s instinct about hyperspace was correct”. However, hitherto, the word “hyperspace” had not been used. Moreover, Mishlove <i>never</i> explicitly defines what he means by this term. Apparently, Gardner subscribed to the notion of a “higher-dimension self”. But if this has anything to do with “hyperspace” as the essay alludes, it is entirely unilluminating since I have no idea what could be meant by such a self. Regardless, I assume not defining the word “hyperspace” was an oversight on Mishlove’s part. But surely he or others must have proofread his essay? </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">The way that Mishlove uses the word hyperspace appears to refer to any location that isn’t within our usual 3D space. He further indicates that he is sympathetic to the notion that our normal 3D space is within a much greater hyperspace, a hyperspace that will include any afterlife realm. But, within idealism (which Mishlove subscribes to), space is not some <i>thing</i> or <i>reality</i> existing <i>independently</i> of any conscious entity, rather space is an artefact of minds (see an <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2021/05/more-on-george-berkeley-and-his.html" target="_blank">essay of mine</a> on Berkeley’s idealism). It might be useful to compare it to the virtual reality when we put on a VR headset. Any afterlife realm we find ourselves in we could label “hyperspace” if we so choose. But it would then just be a word signifying nothing. The idea that normal 3D space is within a much greater hyperspace makes as much sense as saying virtual reality is within normal 3D space. In short, I’m not sure that in introducing the word “hyperspace” that anything substantive is being said at all. It just sounds impressive!</span></p><h4 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Conclusion</span></h4><p><span style="font-family: arial;">I think this essay gives a good overview of all the evidence, but that is where the praise ends. The essay never delves into the evidence and never considers any difficulties for the afterlife interpretation. The philosophical considerations suffer from the fact that, quite frankly, there aren’t any. The only attempt is when “hyperspace” is mentioned. But this is never explicitly defined and I found its meaning to be elusive. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">This essay seems rather reminiscent of the countless popular books extolling the reality of an afterlife. Books that concentrate on the evidence for an afterlife but accept it uncritically. Typically, difficulties with the evidence are rarely, if ever, addressed. Alternative hypotheses are seldom considered. The philosophical thought, if any, tends to be superficial. Those books are all about <i>persuasion</i>. Persuading people it is utterly foolish to reject an afterlife. I would place this essay into the same category as those books.
</span></p>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-41415808792680682332021-11-18T13:56:00.001+00:002023-02-17T10:36:46.367+00:00Hostile reactions to the evidence for an afterlife<span style="font-family: arial;">I read <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-10186723/Woman-doesnt-believe-ghosts-reveals-TWO-encounters-late-friend.html?fbclid=IwAR2aVRvZvmftKBJzfJwEyAtZ_F25-yWtcf7HYRilDk61abaebF8FTbVkFxM" target="_blank">this Mail article</a> concerning ghosts.<br /><br />In the comments someone says:<blockquote>
Why we pay the BBC to promulgate such nonsense at further expense to the vulnerable sadly bereaved I have no idea.</blockquote>I often hear this sentiment that such anomalous experiences shouldn't even be mentioned. So, there are certain characteristic anomalous experiences that have been experienced across human history and across all cultures, <i>but they shouldn't even be mentioned</i>? <i>Shouldn't even be discussed?</i> Why?
Because it's obvious that people are simply making up these stories? And this explanation is so obvious that no one should even be allowed to discuss them?
Do these "sceptics" ever worry that their conviction is an artefact of the culture they find themselves born in? That had they had lived in a different time or place they would view these experiences <i>very</i> differently?
How can they be <i>certain</i> that these experiences are made up or are mere hallucinations? Are we allowed to ask that, or is not even that permitted? </span>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-31590660709948024492021-11-10T15:32:00.001+00:002023-02-17T10:37:00.644+00:00Bigelow competition for the best essay on the evidence for an afterlife<p><span style="font-family: arial;">The results of this competition have recently been announced. Go <a href="https://www.bigelowinstitute.org/News4.php" target="_blank">here</a>. Apparently all 29 essays that won a prize will shortly be freely available to read. I'd just like to make a few comments.<br /><br />By far the main obstacle to an acceptance of an afterlife is the notion held by the intelligentsia that an afterlife is an "<i>extraordinary</i> claim". Any evidence, no matter how persuasive, is typically simply written off as not being extraordinary enough. This being so, simply outlining the evidence in its various forms will be insufficient if we hope to convince skeptics, particularly so for those of an academic persuasion. The question of <i>why</i> an afterlife is considered to be an extraordinary claim needs to be addressed and rebutted. This involves underlying<i> philosophical</i> issues </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(e.g. does the fact damaged brains lead to damaged minds entail the former produces the latter as many skeptics allege?)</span>. Unfortunately, </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial;">since the competition explicitly asked for the best <i>evidence</i></span>, I fear none of these essays will devote much space to such issues (the explicit emphasis on <i>evidence</i> is the reason why I didn't submit an essay to the competition myself).</span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">It would have been far better if the competition were open to <i>any</i> essays that persuasively argue that the survival (afterlife) hypothesis is a reasonable one and, furthermore, more reasonable than the annihilation hypothesis. The essays could then have had the option of either simply addressing the evidence, addressing the underlying philosophical issues, or ideally, addressing both. Then the essays, as a collective whole, would be more likely to present a more rounded and robust appraisal of the various reasons to regard the belief in an afterlife as being a reasonable one.<br /></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;">The problem with all the pro-afterlife material that currently exists is that the vast majority of it doesn't touch the philosophical issues and this competition simply perpetuates this imbalance. My suspicion is that most of these essays will largely regurgitate the evidence that is already out there and will do little to persuade skeptics. But we shall see.<br /></span></p>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8392804955786463612.post-90932680725991349192021-11-02T15:12:00.003+00:002023-02-17T10:37:50.236+00:00A comment on a skeptical article on Near-Death Experiences<span style="font-family: arial;">I read the following article two days ago:<br /><br /><a href="https://www.iflscience.com/brain/can-we-explain-near-death-experiences/?fbclid=IwAR2wtpvqi9lO993Q7Z8sa9U0ipEPOMfbHnPLLosVdoRbGxMHVh02KroGPfY" target="_blank">Can We Explain Near-Death Experiences?</a><br /><br />The author concludes that, "<i>NDEs are probably caused by changes in brain activity rather than direct contact with a supernatural dimension</i>".
<br /><br />Why does he think this? <br /><br />Briefly because:<br /></span><ol style="text-align: left;"><li><span style="font-family: arial;">Strokes, seizures, and brain injuries can lead to experiences reminiscent of NDEs.<br /><br /></span></li><li><span style="font-family: arial;">Brainwave oscillations have been observed in rats having heart attacks.<br /><br /></span></li><li><span style="font-family: arial;">Psychoactive drugs -- ketamine, DMT -- resemble NDEs.</span></li></ol><span style="font-family: arial;">First of all, the author assumes the idea that the brain produces consciousness is entirely unproblematic. That's false, it's extremely problematic. There is, what has been labelled, the <a href="http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Hard_problem_of_consciousness" target="_blank">hard problem of consciousness</a>. This is a problem engendered by the notion that it is the brain that somehow produces consciousness. I explore this problem in a few places in this blog. For example, in part 2 in <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2018/11/can-we-really-be-so-certain-theres-no.html" target="_blank">this blog post</a> and also <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2015/01/science-afterlife-and-intelligentsia.html" target="_blank">this blog post</a>, especially from part 3 onwards. Incidentally, I should add that if consciousness is <i>not</i> generated by the body, this doesn't mean there aren't any problems. Nevertheless, they don't appear to be the apparent <i>intractable</i> problems associated with "the hard problem". </span><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Secondly, it ignores the fact that there is no detectable brain activity at the threshold of death, which is when NDEs appear to take place.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Thirdly, it ignores all the anomalously acquired information that NDErs give when they come back from the brink.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Clearly, NDE type experiences are facilitated by an appropriately dysfunctional brain. One possibility is that's because the brain <i>produces</i> NDE's, and indeed all other conscious experiences. But that possibility encounters the difficulties I mention above. Arguably, difficulties that are insurmountable. <br /><br />There is another possibility. Let's assume there <i>is</i> an afterlife. Consider that we do not normally have contact with this afterlife realm whilst in our embodied state. Why would this be the case? I suggest it would have to be because the brain <i>inhibits</i> access. Sometimes this is referred to as the filter theory of the mind-body relationship.<br /><br />What, though, if the brain is not functioning correctly? Could it <i>always</i> perform this inhibiting function <i>regardless</i> of how the brain is altered? Surely not. And, if it doesn't, this might occasionally allow our consciousness to have a glimpse of other realities that we may enter into after death (and note the word <i>realities</i>, the afterlife might not simply be one place but might consist of possibly innumerable realms). Such a hypothesis is supported by not only what we label NDE's, but also mystical experiences, psychedelic trips, and the occasional <a href="https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/bering-in-mind/one-last-goodbye-the-strange-case-of-terminal-lucidity/" target="_blank">reports of people recovering their mental faculties near death</a>. I should also note that recent research into psychedelic induced experiences suggest they are initiated by <a href="https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/misreporting-and-confirmation-bias-in-psychedelic-research/" target="_blank"><i>reduced</i> activity of the brain</a>. All of which gives weight to the notion that the brain serves to inhibit consciousness rather than produce it. I address objections to this inhibiting or filter hypothesis <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2021/02/the-filter-hypothesis-of-mind-brian.html" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-self-or-soul-as-mental-substance.html" target="_blank">here</a> (latter half). <br /></span><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><div class="ecm0bbzt e5nlhep0 a8c37x1j"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span class="d2edcug0 hpfvmrgz qv66sw1b c1et5uql lr9zc1uh a8c37x1j keod5gw0 nxhoafnm aigsh9s9 d3f4x2em fe6kdd0r mau55g9w c8b282yb iv3no6db jq4qci2q a3bd9o3v b1v8xokw oo9gr5id" dir="auto" lang="en"><div class="kvgmc6g5 cxmmr5t8 oygrvhab hcukyx3x c1et5uql"><div dir="auto">Incidentally, the skeptical article originally included a video that now seems to have disappeared in the two days since I last looked (nor can I locate the video in the link he now provides). I actually linked to and discussed this video around 5 years ago in my other blog <a href="http://ianwardells.blogspot.com/2016/08/return-from-dead.html" target="_blank">here</a>. Unfortunately, the link to the video on there is now dead too. This video is elusive! Fortunately, it can be watched on facebook <a href="https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1234759753202494&t=17" target="_blank">here</a> (at least at the time of typing this).<br /><br />Also see:<br /><a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2019/04/ndes-burden-of-proof-and-ockhams-razor.html" target="_blank">NDE’s, burden of proof, and Ockham’s razor</a><br /> <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2021/03/guardian-article-on-near-death.html" target="_blank">Guardian Article on Near Death Experiences (NDE's)</a><br /> <a href="https://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2020/01/reasons-not-to-scoff-at-ghosts-visions.html" target="_blank">Reasons not to scoff at ghosts, visions and near-death experiences</a></div></div></span></span></div></div></div>Ian Wardellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com0