Showing posts with label afterlife. Show all posts
Showing posts with label afterlife. Show all posts

Sunday, 1 November 2026

Claude Is Not So Smart: Disentangling the Implications of the Mind-Brain Correlations

A number of years ago I posted on Facebook a response to something that Sam Harris had said. He said:

"we know [there are very good reasons for doubting an afterlife] from 150 years of neurology where you damage areas of the brain and faculties are lost and they're clearly lost, it's not that everyone with brain damage has their soul perfectly intact and they just can't get the words out, everything about your mind can be damaged by damaging the brain".


My response back then in italics:

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Sam mentions, for example, that brain damage can result in not being able to recognise faces. So it's *not* the case that we really *do* recognise faces, but find we're cannot communicate to other people our knowledge.  Our minds are actually *adversely* affected.

The problem with his argument, and the mistake that skeptics always make, is that he *conflates* the soul with the mind.  In fact, even with brain damage, our souls can still be perfectly intact.  Suppose someone has perfect unaided vision and puts on a random pair of eyeglasses.  Wearing them she cannot read the registration plate of a car 25 metres away.  It's not as if she *can* really see the plate but is unable to communicate this information.  She really *can't* see the registration plate.

But it nevertheless remains the case that her unaided vision is still perfectly intact.  Her bespectacled vision is poor, but not her unaided vision. And she merely needs to take the eyeglasses off to restore her vision. Likewise, with brain damage, our *minds* might be affected, but not our souls. Our souls merely need to detach from our bodies to restore full cognitive abilities (or indeed enhanced cognitive abilities).

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I pasted in to Claude what Sam Harris said together with my response. It seems to me that it's not possible to dispute my point, so my expectation was that it would simply agree with me. It took absolutely ages to respond, perhaps about 15 to 20 minutes or so. However, it didn't agree with me. I reproduce its response in full below. The numbers in square brackets are what I myself added so that I can more easily refer to the relevant parts of its response. 

[1] The eyeglasses analogy doesn't do the work you need it to, and the reason is instructive.

[2] When someone puts on the wrong glasses, we already have independent, overwhelming evidence that unaided vision exists and works: billions of people see fine without glasses, we understand the optics of why a bad lens distorts light, and the same person can immediately demonstrate intact vision the moment the glasses come off. The "intact vision underneath" isn't posited to explain away the bad-glasses case — it's independently verified.

[3] The soul hypothesis has none of that supporting structure. There's no independent case demonstrating that a soul exists, sees, thinks, or remembers apart from a brain. So the move isn't "we already know unaided vision exists, and this case doesn't threaten that" — it's "let's posit an entity for which we have zero independent evidence, give it exactly the property needed to absorb this counterexample, and declare the mind/soul distinction whenever brain damage threatens it." That's not analogous reasoning; that's a rescue device. Philosophers call this an unfalsifiable auxiliary hypothesis — you can save any theory from any evidence if you're willing to keep adding custom-fitted patches.

[4] There's a sharper problem too. With the glasses, we can check the underlying capacity separately from the impaired condition — take the glasses off and look. With the soul, there is no analogous check. You can't take the "brain glasses" off a living person and test whether the soul underneath sees fine. The claim is only ever cashed out as a promissory note about what happens after death, which is precisely the one moment no one can report back and verify it. A claim that is in-principle unverifiable in exactly the way that would let it be tested isn't a rival explanation of the neurology — it's structured so it can never be checked against the neurology at all.

[5] And the pattern of the damage is itself evidence against the hypothesis, not just a fact the hypothesis has to accommodate. It's not random what breaks: damage to the fusiform gyrus specifically knocks out face recognition while leaving object recognition intact; damage to Broca's area knocks out speech production while comprehension survives; damage to the hippocampus prevents new memories while old ones remain. The deficits track the brain's functional anatomy with remarkable precision — which is exactly what you'd expect if the brain is doing the cognitive work, and not what you'd expect if an immaterial soul is doing the work and the brain is merely a "radio" or "eyeglasses" the soul operates through. If the soul is the real seat of face-recognition, why would damaging one specific patch of cortex — and not the pineal gland, not "wherever the soul interfaces with the body," but the fusiform gyrus, reliably, across patients — knock out that one specific faculty? The transmission model has never explained why the correlations are so anatomically fine-grained rather than global or scattered.

[6] None of this proves no soul exists. But it does mean the eyeglasses analogy isn't evidence for the mind/soul split — it's a template for how to make any theory unfalsifiable, applied here without the independent support that makes it legitimate in the vision case.

 

The Eyeglasses example


I thought it might be useful to provide an extended, detailed response to what Claude has said here. I do so because its response very closely parallels how skeptics respond to me when I point out that the mind-brain correlations do not compel the conclusion, nor arguably even make it likely, that the brain produces consciousness. Indeed, so closely does Claude's response parallel certain fallacious skeptical arguments out there that I suspect it's essentially just lifted them from the net, albeit expressed in its own words. I'll have more to say about this at the end.

In the following, I shall refer to the thesis that the brain produces consciousness as the production thesis. Conversely, I shall refer to the thesis that the brain merely changes, modulates, and attenuates conscious states as the filter thesis.

Claude's very opening sentence [1] immediately suggested to me that it had not understood my argument at all, and this was vindicated when I read part [2] of its response. I want in this paragraph to clear something up. In my response to Sam Harris, I gave no evidence nor reasons to suppose that the filter thesis is a superior one compared to the production thesis, nor did I imagine I had. For even though I do think it's superior, that was not the purpose of my response. My purpose was to simply point out that there is an alternative thesis to explain why mind states are adversely affected by brain states. And should this thesis be the correct one, then negatively impacted mind states resulting from impaired brain function should not by themselves give reasons to doubt a soul, nor indeed have any consequences for one's self or soul once one is disembodied and existing within some afterlife environment. In short, I was questioning Sam Harris' assertion that we have very good reasons to doubt an afterlife since his point that one's mind can be adversely affected by brain damage doesn't, by itself, appear to achieve this. He would have needed to argue that this negative impact on the mind is far more plausibly accounted for by the production thesis than the filter thesis. However, he didn't even seem aware that there were any alternative theses to explain this fact, an ignorance seemingly shared by the vast majority of the skeptics of an afterlife. 

Does Claude's explanation for how eyeglasses work and how they differ from the mind and body relationship, refute or at least cast considerable doubt on the filter thesis? Absolutely not at all. First of all, it is worth mentioning I could have mentioned any other number of examples where X adversely influences the output or functioning of Y, yet without X causing or producing Y. Examples of this are the picture displayed by a TV set, a song outputted by a radio, a mobile phone displaying a webpage, a prism splitting white light into its component colours, and so on. In each of these cases we can provide a full explanation of how Y is affected by X, just as Claude attempts with eyeglasses in paragraph [2]. The question here is, why cannot the brain and mind share a similar relationship to all these examples even though in this case we are ignorant of the causal mechanism? If one is unconvinced then consider this: Would providing full explanations for the various instances where X produces Y cast doubt on the production thesis? For example, someone defending the production thesis might point out that despite the fact that smoke is very unlike fire, fire nevertheless produces smoke. So even though consciousness is very different from brain processes, he might say that perhaps we shouldn't be too surprised that brains can produce consciousness. Clearly, it would be besides the point if I were to point out we have overwhelming evidence for how fire produces smoke, whereas we do not know how brains produce consciousness. For this gives us no reason to suppose brains do not in some currently unknown manner or other produce consciousness. But then, equally, the fact we do not know how the brain changes, modulates, and attenuates conscious states does not in itself provide any reasons or evidence that it doesn't do this. 

Allow me to make what I said in the previous paragraph even clearer. It might be useful to compare my eyeglasses analogy to the balloon analogy of the Universe. Dots are painted on the surface of a balloon that are meant to represent galaxies. Blowing up the balloon represents the expanding Universe with the surface of the balloon representing the entire Universe. We can see that it makes no sense to talk about any of the dots being at the centre of the surface of the balloon, and we can see that none of them are located in any privileged position. One of the aims of this analogy is to facilitate the understanding that there need not be any privileged centre of the Universe, least of all that the centre is where we are. This is despite the fact that all the other galaxies are receding from us. Now, suppose I were to say this balloon analogy fails to provide any evidence that the Universe doesn't have a centre. Suppose I then proceeded to provide an explanation for why the dots move apart on the surface of the balloon in the way they do. This clearly would provide no reason or evidence whatsoever that the Universe does have a centre and isn't in fact expanding. It would be to completely miss the point of the analogy and the person giving the balloon analogy would rightfully flag me as either being stupid, or being deliberately obtuse. 

So what Claude says in [1] is simply wrong and [2] is irrelevant and its assertion in part [6] that the eyeglasses analogy is not evidence is attacking a straw man. 

I will advance reasons why I think we should favour the filter thesis over the production thesis in the My Positive Arguments section below. 

The fine-grained correlations between brain and mind states

To be fair on Claude, it does in the latter part of its response attempt to put some meat on the bones of its contention. It mentions that the mind-brain correlations are not scattered or random but rather they are "anatomically fine-grained", and that the thesis that I have advanced, the filter thesis, does not account for this. Unfortunately, it never specified why it thinks the filter thesis does not account for this, and it is far from obvious to me. Consider our eyeglasses. Fogged up lenses affect our vision in one way, warped lenses affect our vision in another way, scratches on the lenses in yet another way, painting the lenses black would even make us go blind. Even if such correlations between the defects in our vision and damage or alteration to the lenses are not deserving of the label "fine-grained", it is arguably getting there.

But it might be more instructive in this context to think of the analogy of a television set rather than eyeglasses, although I go into more detail than others have done regarding this analogy. So the TV signal itself, which is invisible to our eyes, carries all the information about a programme being screened. It carries the information about which pixels should light up, in what colour, and when. And all this information constitutes the programme being screened, such as a film. However, damage to the TV sets internal components can adversely affect the picture being displayed in all manner of ways. Perhaps the set might develop dead pixels, or the information conveyed by the TV signal is misinterpreted and some pixels light up the wrong colour. Indeed, no end of other aberrations of the picture can manifest themselves. But crucially, note that no amount of damage could result in an actual change to the plot of a film being screened. In other words, damage to the internal components does absolutely nothing to the TV signal itself, it still conveys precisely the same information regardless of the state of the TV set receiving the signal.

In this analogy, the TV signal represents the soul or the self. The TV picture stands for what we normally might refer to as the mind, which is the result of the self or soul as it manifests itself and gets shaped by the brain. So damage to the brain might result in damage to the mind, but if this analogy is roughly accurate, it cannot damage the self or soul.

Note that any damage to the components can result in "fine-grained" aberrations in the picture displayed. This despite the fact that the programme being shown has its origin from outside of the TV set.  So the question is, why would one expect the soul-brain relationship to be different? Claude never specifies why, and I have the suspicion there simply is no good answer to this question. Claude and people articulating this objection don't appear to have thought this through.

The Entity as a Rescue Device

Getting back to what Claude says, in paragraph [3] it states, "there's no independent case demonstrating that a soul exists, sees, thinks, or remembers apart from a brain". It also asserts that this soul, or "entity" to use Claude's terminology, is a "rescue device" to save the afterlife hypothesis. In the very next paragraph, paragraph [4], it says: "[t]here's a sharper problem too. With the glasses, we can check the underlying capacity separately from the impaired condition — take the glasses off and look. With the soul, there is no analogous check".

Actually, paragraph [4] is not making a sharper point than paragraph [3] for the very simple reason both paragraphs are both making precisely the same point! They just use different words. And as I shall shortly explain, nor is this single point sharp. Indeed it is blunt enough not to threaten anyone, least of all my argument. 

To make things simpler, there are three separate issues that should be distinguished here, although I will not be addressing the second one of these in this particular blog post. Firstly, what is this self or "entity"? Secondly, does such a self or "entity" exist at least during our physical lives on earth? Thirdly, if it does exist during our physical lives on earth, does it also survive the death of our bodies? If it does, then we might label this self as a soul.

So what is this self? Quite simply, it's the common-sense conception of what the vast majority of us consider our selves to be. The self, or "entity", is the thinker that has thoughts, the experiencer that undergoes experiences. So experiences and thoughts don't just exist by themselves, they are not free-floating as it were. Rather the idea here is that experiences cannot exist without an experiencer, thoughts cannot exist without a thinker, and that this experiencer or thinker is simply what we mean by the self. Further, this self, together with its conscious states, would usually be thought of as being non-physical. After all, no self, nor even any of its conscious states, can be detected. At best, only the underlying neuronal activity of conscious states can be detected.

Should this conception of the self be correct, then it follows that we are the very same person throughout our lives. Our moods, intelligence, interests, general personality characteristics can change throughout our lives, and when it comes to our moods, they can change from one hour to the next, yet we are still the very same person, self, experiencer or thinker throughout these changes. And this aligns with how we feel. Most of us are convinced we are the very self-same individual throughout all these changes. It should also be added that this conception of the self entails that our sensory perceptions, thoughts, memories, general personality characteristics and so on, do not comprise our selfhood, rather they are merely attributes of this self. The position known as substance dualism is the most common position in the mind-body debate that incorporates such a conception of the self. 

So if we accept this concept of a self, there are two possibilities: Either this self ends with the death of the body, or it survives the death of the body. If the former, then the self requires the brain to enable us to think, remember, undergo emotions and more generally to have experiences. If, on the other hand, the self survives the death of the body, then the brain plays no role in the production of these attributes; it merely changes, modulates, attenuates and frequently inhibits them. This implies that when a self is in its disembodied state it will experience its unchanged or unaltered attributes or conscious states. 

Would it be reasonable to believe that such a self survives the death of its body? I suggest that even if we ignore all the evidence suggesting we survive, such as NDEs and so on, it might be reasonable to do so. We just need to consider that our bodies change throughout our lives. So how can there be an underlying self or essence that doesn't change when this self is produced by a changing body?
 
However, it should be noted that most philosophers, and arguably most scientists, emphatically reject such a conception of the self regardless of whether it survives the death of the body or not. So they do not believe there is a thinker and an experiencer, rather there are only thoughts and experiences. It follows that this idea that we are the author of our thoughts and experiences is simply an illusion created by our brains. I won't address their arguments here, but my blog posts here, here, here and here may be of interest in this regard.

But regardless of the merits of the arguments for and against such a self, what cannot be maintained is that I have simply conjured up this conception of the self to save the afterlife hypothesis. On the contrary, it's the self that we adopt in our formative years before being exposed to other ideas pertaining to personal identity. A concept of the self that most of us never question, even from those who reject any afterlife. 

Is this Self or Entity Falsifiable? 


The previous section addressed the allegation that I had simply conjured up this self or soul to save the afterlife hypothesis. This in turn suggests that this concept of the self or soul I have advanced could not be considered an unfalsifiable auxiliary hypothesis. But I need to clarify this point, and to this end it will be helpful to explain what the falsifiability criterion is, what an auxiliary hypothesis is, then explain precisely why they are not relevant here.  

The falsifiability criterion was advanced by the philosopher of science Karl Popper to demarcate scientific from non-scientific theories. The idea is that if one has a purported scientific theory explaining some aspect of reality, but all conceivable observations of the world are compatible with the theory being either true or false, then at least from a scientific perspective, your theory is devoid of any content. You're not actually saying anything about the world since all possible physical states of affairs are compatible with the theory. So Popper held that scientific theories must be falsifiable, that is we must be able to point to possible observations that would falsify or disconfirm one's theory.

In practice, theories are often saved by what are called auxiliary hypotheses. Imagine a situation where our theory does not match the empirical data. We can often remedy this by hypothesizing some entity or process, or some modification of the original theory, to make the main theory concordant with the data. Such an auxiliary hypothesis then prevents the theory from being falsified. Since auxiliary hypotheses circumvent the falsifiability criterion, it's generally regarded as bad practice to invoke them to save one's theory. 

Let's apply this falsifiability criterion to the case of a soul that survives death. It might initially be assumed that after death we will retain the same general personality traits, cognitive ability, interests, and so on that we had shortly before death. However, clearly this is not a position that can be intelligibly held. Consider those that die from dementia. How could one's mental states after death correspond to one's mind shortly before death if we had suffered from dementia? Dementia is a consequence of a diseased brain. Therefore, once you're dead and the brain is burnt to a crisp, or eaten by worms or whatever, there is no brain left that could have any influence on a soul that has vacated the body. Hence the accusation made by Claude, and people ill-disposed to an afterlife, is that I have conjured up a novel conception of a soul that can accommodate such awkward facts — namely, the concept of a soul that I outlined in my previous section. This conception of a soul would then fit the label of an auxiliary hypothesis.

However, as I explained in the previous section, this accusation has no merit since the conception of the self or soul I outlined is the default belief of the vast majority of humankind. This includes many of those who emphatically reject an afterlife. Even Karl Popper, the very person who proposed the falsifiability criterion in the first place, held more or less this conception of the self, even though he was personally disposed to reject an afterlife. The crucial point being that my conception of the soul was not simply conjured up to save the afterlife hypothesis — indeed, nothing could be further from the truth. Hence, to label it an auxiliary hypothesis is simply inaccurate, and grossly so.

Having now shown the auxiliary hypothesis accusation has no merit, I could have finished this section at this point. However, since the falsifiability criterion is so often appealed to in discussions on the net as to what is scientific or not, especially when related to issues regarding the viability of an afterlife, I felt it might be helpful if I were to make two more supplementary points. 

The first point to make is that even if, contrary to the facts, the conception of a soul I have advanced were purely an auxiliary hypothesis with no independent reasons to subscribe to it, it is interesting to note that auxiliary hypotheses can often be fruitful in rescuing the main theory. Indeed, this fact was instrumental in formulating more sophisticated conceptions of 
falsifiability and even questions whether falsifiability is always a suitable guidance to scientific progress.

The second point to make is that the filter thesis is not a scientific hypothesis in any case. Nor indeed, despite the widespread conviction otherwise, is the opposing thesis that the brain somehow produces consciousness. This is why I've been referring to both theses as theses rather than hypotheses. It might seem surprising that the brain producing consciousness thesis is not a scientific one. But given there is no conceivable mechanism to achieve this (see the next section) it is unclear why it is deserving of the label scientific, whereas the rival thesis, the filter thesis, is not. All we can do empirically is to map out all the correlations between mind and brain states. However, such correlations fail to distinguish between the two competing theses. Since no mechanism for either of the competing theses has been advanced, or arguably could be advanced, it seems more appropriate to label both theses as philosophical ones.

What if we were to instead stipulate that consciousness is literally what the brain does, or that consciousness is illusory? But these positions also fail to be scientific hypotheses since they also cannot be verified nor falsified purely by empirical means. They are metaphysical stances, and in my assessment are of highly dubious intelligibility. It seems then that both of the competing theses can only potentially be defended by arguments. If this were not so, if we could currently test and potentially falsify them, then we wouldn't have the mind-body problem or "the hard problem" in the first place.

My Positive Arguments

I think it might be useful to some people if I were at this juncture to give my own positive reasons for preferring the filter thesis over the production thesis. There is all the evidence of course, and I find all the anomalous phenomena near death persuasive. For example, near-death experiences including shared-death experiences, deathbed visions, terminal lucidity, apparitions of the dying, clocks stopping at the moment of death, and so on. I also find persuasive the alleged memories of young children who appear to remember a past life and where the details the child provides largely check out on being investigated (the main examples being the research by Ian Stevenson). But I won't go into details here since all this evidence is explored extensively elsewhere and by people more knowledgeable about this evidence than I am.

In addition to the evidence, there are also philosophical arguments for preferring the filter thesis to the production thesis. Perhaps the most compelling is that
the production thesis is arguably cripplingly problematic in explaining how there could be any mechanism or causal chain whereby the brain produces consciousness. Consider that consciousness is supposed to come into being as the end consequence of physical chains of causes and effects. Such causes and effects are cashed out in the form of processes that we can measure; namely particles with physical properties such as charge, momentum, spin and so on, and their interactions. But at the end of such causal chains we get a sudden abrupt change from these measurable processes to subjective experiences such as, for example, the greenness of grass, the warmth of love, the smell of roses and so on. But here it seems we have an unbridgeable ontological gap between the termination of such physical causal chains, and such raw experiences. There is no appropriate mechanism, or conceivable causal chain, whereby such qualitative experiences could be created. This difficulty of how the brain could produce consciousness has been labelled the hard problem.

It seems to me that the filter thesis does not seem quite so problematic. To illustrate this, consider the following. Let's imagine that I can see a tree in front of me. How is this possible? Well, the tree has to exist, my eyes need to be functioning, and the appropriate regions of my brain need to be functioning correctly. Considering how incredibly complex my brain is, this makes for an intricate causal chain. Yet, for all that, I can stop my vision of the tree by the simple act of closing my eyes. Or, to introduce my eyeglasses example again, my vision of the tree could be compromised, or even blocked if the lenses were fogged up. Conversely, my vision of the tree can be restored by the simple act of opening my eyes again or cleaning the lenses of my eyeglasses. However, opening my eyes or cleaning my lenses obviously play no role in creating my vision. 

The point is this: generally speaking, the act of creating something tends to be a convoluted and complex one, whereas merely adversely affecting something is, typically, far easier to achieve. Why not, therefore, prefer the seemingly less problematic hypothesis that the self and its conscious states are not created by the brain at all? That the brain, instead, merely changes, modulates, and attenuates this pre-existing self with its conscious states?

An Appraisal of Claude's Response


To put it mildly, I'm not impressed by Claude's response. Let's take a look.

Part [1] of its response where it states that my eyeglasses analogy doesn't achieve what it needs to achieve, is not justified by [2] since [2] is irrelevant.

Parts [3] and [4] convey the idea I am simply conjuring up some "entity", as Claude refers to it, which will accommodate the fact that brains adversely affect mind states, hence allowing it to potentially survive death. This then makes such an entity an unfalsifiable auxiliary hypothesis. The unwary reader would be surprised indeed to discover that this mysterious sounding "entity" is simply the pretty much universal concept of the self that we all instinctively accept, even from those rejecting an afterlife. This means that the entity or self is not something I've conjured up out of thin air, and hence cannot be an auxiliary hypothesis. It is true that, strictly speaking, this self, and indeed the filter thesis, are unfalsifiable, but so too is the production thesis. However, this isn't relevant since neither of these theses are scientific hypotheses in the first place. Finally, regarding these two sections, why is Claude more or less repeating in part [4] of its response what it had already said in part [3], yet stating that [4] is an even more compelling problem for such a self or soul than [3] is?

Part [5] of its response concerning the fine-grained correlations between brain and mind states is potentially better since this does seem to make it plausible that the straightforward explanation for such fine-grained correlations is the obvious and simplest one that the brain produces consciousness. But in order for the production thesis to be a superior explanation here, such fine-grained correlations need to be absent where X adversely influences the functioning of Y, yet doesn't produce Y. But if X is very complex, such as in a brain, this seems questionable. Especially when something considerably less complex, such as a television set, has what might be labelled "fine-grained correlations" between the functional state of its internal components and the picture it displays. 

Moreover, even if all of Claude's arguments were not fallacious and some or indeed all of them had merit, there is another issue. Namely, there is absolutely no attempt to deliver an impartial, thoughtful, response where both sides of the argument are carefully assessed. It adopts a partisan position. Claude's response seems to be all about persuasion, trying to bludgeon readers who lack an extensive knowledge of such issues into accepting what it says. But for what purpose? To look impressive to any readers that are reading the exchange? To have appeared to have "won" the argument? This might explain why a human being might pen something that Claude has, but not a large language model (LLM). To my mind, this strongly suggests that Claude is simply repeating what it finds elsewhere. Indeed, this suspicion is bolstered by the fact I have encountered such arguments ad nauseum in the skeptical literature e.g The Myth of an Afterlife, which I review here. 

Claude also appears to copy skeptics in their virtually universal implicit assumption that the production thesis is the more reasonable default position. As a consequence, when skeptics of an afterlife make confident proclamations to the effect that it is very obvious the brain produces consciousness, but someone sympathetic to an afterlife questions how they can be so confident, in my experience skeptics tend to demand that person prove there is an afterlife! The thinking here seems to be that it is very obvious that brains produce consciousness, and if one makes the somewhat implausible suggestion that it might not, then they need to supply some compelling evidence to justify their stance. We can see this tendency by Claude in paragraph [2] where it assumes I would need to prove or provide compelling evidence that the the brain doesn't produce consciousness in order to dispute what Sam Harris said. This then shifts the burden of proof. What they need to do is to argue their case, or at least to justify why the production thesis ought to be the default position. And, as I hope I've made clear, this will involve more than pointing out that a damaged mind results from a damaged brain. 

So, in summary, Claude's arguments sound superficially compelling, but providing we have sufficient understanding of the underlying issues, we can see that they completely fall apart when we examine them. Further, it's adopted a partisan position where it appears to be more focussed on "winning" the argument, or in persuasion, rather than in a genuine search for the truth. Given that so many people find these LLMs as being authoritative and reliable and use them extensively in writing scholarly papers and essays, I do find it of concern that these LLMs are prone to employing fallacious arguments as well as adopting partisan positions. 

Incidentally, I did try and respond to it with a much shorter version (~500 words) than what I've typed above  But again, it was taking an inordinate amount of time in its response, so I got impatient and just clicked 'respond now' (or words to that effect). But then I got a message saying something along the lines that I've exhausted my questions for the time being! I imagine that it was in deep research mode, or whatever Claude calls this type of response? But that makes its initial response even more unsatisfactory and disappointing.

Friday, 29 March 2024

Ralph Lewis's Arguments against an Afterlife

I read an article by Ralph Lewis M.D entitled:


He attacks any possibility of an afterlife. He says:
Mind-brain dualism is the view that brain and mind are derived from entirely different kinds of things — physical stuff and mind-stuff. Dualism assumes that both kinds of stuff exist in the universe and that science has simply not yet detected and discovered the mind-stuff. Dualism feels intuitively correct to most people, as it fits with our subjective experience. But it is completely contradicted by science.
Some clarity is in order here. All forms of dualism hold that consciousness is non-physical; that is, consciousness lacks any physical properties. This is regardless of whether it is somehow produced by the brain or not. Thus, dualists hold that consciousness has no mass, charge, location, or any other physical property. In the quote above, Lewis is specifically referring to substance dualism, which further holds that such conscious experiences are generally held to occur to selves. So, for example, there is a conscious experience of a pain, but there is also a self that experiences such a pain — namely the experiencer. And there are thoughts, but also a self that has such thoughts — namely the thinker. This experiencer, thinker, or more simply self, also lacks any physical properties and, therefore, is also non-physical. This self is sometimes referred to as a mental substance, hence the term substance dualism, or what Ralph Lewis and other skeptics often misleadingly and disparagingly label "mind-stuff".

It seems to me to be very difficult to deny that consciousness is non-physical. Regardless of whether brains produce consciousness or not, it seems straightforwardly obvious that consciousness itself lacks mass or any other physical properties. This is in stark contrast to the neural correlates of consciousness.
It's also very difficult to deny the existence of a mental substance. For is it intelligible to say there could be, for example, a pain without any entity undergoing that pain? Or that there can be thoughts without a thinker? So, contrary to what Ralph Lewis claims, I'm not sure if it is correct to say any assumptions are being made here. Rather, substance dualism seems to be derived from our immediately lived experience. It is for this reason that substance dualism is the commonsensical position that we are all born believing. Even most of those who emphatically reject an afterlife implicitly accept this commonsensical position.

But is substance dualism contradicted by science? Although it is true that science has not detected either this self or its conscious experiences,
the failure here neither suggests anything about their existence nor does it point to a defect of science or contradict it. Science only detects the measurable or quantifiable aspects of reality. Hence, it can detect neurons firing, but it cannot detect the conscious experiences correlated with this neuronal activity. But this doesn’t mean that selves and their conscious experiences don't exist, nor that science is wrong, rather science is simply the wrong tool for the job. Compare this to the fact that a metal detector will fail to detect wood or plastic. We certainly wouldn't conclude that wood and plastic don't exist, nor that the metal detector is working incorrectly. 

He also says:
There is no aspect of the mind, the personality, or the self that is not completely susceptible to chemical influences or physical diseases that disrupt neuronal circuitry.
I have discussed this issue ad nauseam on my blog (a good starting point is here), and skeptics never address how it constitutes overwhelming evidence that the mind is a product of the brain.

Finally, he also says:
So, how is it that scientists are so certain that dualism is false? Quite simply, because for dualism to be true, all of science would have to be false.
 …
Dualism so fundamentally contradicts the foundations and entire accumulated evidence of modern science that in order for it to be true, we would have to start rebuilding modern science from the ground up. If dualism turned out to be true, it would also be a complete mystery or fluke as to how most of our advanced technologies (including all of our electronics) work at all, since their design and engineering are based on the very principles that would necessarily be entirely invalidated if dualism were true.

I'm going to go into a bit more detail here since this is a serious charge to make. For, if true, it places advocates of dualism firmly in the anti-science camp. But why on earth do certain materialists believe this?

From reading around, and especially reading the arguments of the physicist Sean M. Carroll (whom the author appeals to in a footnote), it seems they are convinced that science entails that the physical world is closed. This is the thesis that physical causation wholly accounts for all change in the world, including all of our voluntary behaviour and even the direction our thoughts take. This is what all forms of materialism hold, and at least interactive substance dualism contradicts this since
, contrary to the materialists, those who subscribe to it believe consciousness, in and of itself, is causally efficacious. So since substance dualists usually believe in the existence of mental causes in addition to physical ones, they are committed to denying that our current laws can be completely accurate. Does this entail most of our modern technology wouldn't work, as Lewis and others claim?

Firstly, we should remind ourselves that this contravening of physical causal closure only occurs with the impact of consciousness on processes within the brain. This impact will likely be minuscule, most likely on the quantum scale, and hence will be undetectable. After this initial impact by consciousness, we might suppose the usual chains of physical causes and effects apply, cascading this initial minuscule change to larger and larger effects resulting in our voluntary behaviour. But, apart from any changes precipitated by our own voluntary activity, why on earth do they imagine that the rest of physical reality would be affected? After all, the vast preponderance of the Universe is far removed from this initial change precipitated by consciousness.

Secondly, and building upon the first point, the history of science teaches us that our theories give approximations only, even if those approximations might be very close ones. So, for example, the classical mechanics espoused before the advent of Quantum Mechanics is perfectly adequate to describe the macroscopic realm, even though it might be "wrong". Quantum Mechanics is only needed when we describe the microscopic realm (see a blog post by me where I discuss Carroll's argument). Incidentally, Carroll is aware of this point as he states here. However, it seems to me he fails to fully understand it as he seems to think psi, or indeed a causally efficacious consciousness, would represent a radical contravening of our current physical laws rather than merely a minuscule change confined to brains. His position is akin to a 19th-century physicist objecting to the possibility of quantum tunnelling due to it contravening very well-established physical laws. But quantum tunnelling has no direct measurable impact on our familiar macroscopic world. So, Carroll is attacking a straw man.
 
Both of the above points seem to me to definitively establish that Lewis' claim that dualism would entail that our modern technology wouldn't work is sheer nonsense. Furthermore, there are two further points to consider that demonstrate that current laws simply cannot be a full characterisation of reality.

Hence, thirdly, and regardless of whether one subscribes to an afterlife or not, it needs to be pointed out that we immediately experience our own causal efficacy whenever we make any voluntary movement, or even when we entertain a chain of thought. And in case people don't find that convincing, I argue in this blog post in the first two sections that it is simply incoherent to suppose consciousness has no causal impact and, furthermore, that this causal impact necessarily has to be over and above physical causation. 

Fourthly, our current physics leaves out the existence of consciousness in its description of reality (see the hard problem of consciousness) and a fortiori, it also leaves out any causal role that consciousness plays. So, this entails our current theories simply cannot be completely accurate, at least when applied to living brains.

Ralph Lewis seems very certain of himself in the dismissal of an afterlife. But, at least in this article, it does not seem to me that he has brought up anything particularly problematic regarding either interactive substance dualism or an afterlife.

Monday, 16 January 2023

A chat with ChatGPT about the possibility of an Afterlife


There's a new AI chatbot called ChatGPT that seems to be vastly superior in its responses to any other chatbot I have attempted to converse with. The following is my 2nd ever conversation with ChatGPT. I will make some comments at the end. I will add a little formatting to make it more clear. I have also slightly edited one sentence of mine to aid clarity.

Ian
How likely do you think it is that there is an afterlife?
ChatGPT
As a machine learning model, I don't have personal beliefs or opinions. The concept of an afterlife is a matter of faith and not something that can be proven or disproven by scientific means. Different people have different beliefs and opinions on the subject.
Ian
What reasons can be given both for and against an afterlife?
ChatGPT
There are several arguments that can be made for and against the existence of an afterlife.
Arguments for the existence of an afterlife often include religious or spiritual beliefs, near-death experiences, and the concept of consciousness being separate from the physical body. Some people believe that the soul or spirit continues to exist after death, and that there is a realm or plane of existence where the soul goes.
Arguments against the existence of an afterlife include scientific evidence that the brain and consciousness are closely tied to physical processes, and the lack of concrete evidence for an afterlife. Some people argue that death is simply the end of consciousness and that there is no afterlife. Others suggest that the idea of an afterlife is simply a human construct, created to help people cope with the fear of death.
Ultimately, whether or not an afterlife exists is a matter of personal belief and faith, and there is no scientific proof one way or the other.
Ian
How do such brain/consciousness correlations provide evidence that there is no afterlife?
ChatGPT
The correlation between brain activity and consciousness suggests that consciousness is a product of the physical brain and its functioning. This is the basis of the argument that consciousness is not separate from the physical body and that there is no soul or spirit that can continue to exist after death.
Research in neuroscience has shown that specific areas of the brain are associated with different cognitive functions, such as memory, emotion, and perception. Damage to these areas can lead to corresponding deficits in cognitive function. This correlation between brain activity and cognitive function is seen as evidence that the brain is the source of consciousness.
Additionally, the study of near-death experiences, which are often cited as evidence for the existence of an afterlife, have been explained by medical and neuroscientific explanations, such as the release of certain chemicals in the brain during life-threatening events, or the effects of oxygen deprivation on the brain.
It's important to note that this is an ongoing discussion and many neuroscientists and philosophers are still researching on the relationship between brain, consciousness and the afterlife. There is no certain conclusion yet, and it is still a matter of debate.
Ian
How do correlations between brain activity and consciousness suggest that consciousness is a product of the physical brain and its functioning? Why do these correlations suggest a causal link from brains to consciousness? Why is it not equally (if not more) possible that brains merely affect consciousness rather than producing it?

Incidentally, near-death experiences have not been explained. For one thing, such "explanations" assume upfront that the brain produces consciousness and that this hypothesis is wholly unproblematic. This is in spite of the "hard problem" of consciousness. For another thing, such explanations are purely speculative. And for yet a third thing, they do not explain anything like the full range of phenomena and feelings associated with near-death experiences, least of all the other anomalous phenomena that people experience close to death.

ChatGPT
The correlation between brain activity and consciousness is seen as evidence for a causal link from the brain to consciousness, because when specific areas of the brain are damaged, there are corresponding deficits in cognitive function. This suggests that the brain is the source of consciousness, rather than the brain simply affecting consciousness.
It's important to note that this is an ongoing discussion in the field of philosophy of mind and neuroscience, and there is no consensus on the relationship between brain and consciousness. Some theories propose that consciousness is a product of the brain's information processing and that the brain creates a sort of "virtual reality" that we experience as consciousness. Other theories propose that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe, and that the brain is a sort of filter or receiver of consciousness.
Regarding near-death experiences, it's true that these experiences have not been fully explained by neuroscience and that there is ongoing research on the topic. The explanations that have been proposed are based on current understanding of brain function and are not meant to be definitive. It's also true that there are many aspects of near-death experiences that are yet to be understood and that some people experience anomalous phenomena. It is also important to note that many of the proposed explanations for near-death experiences are based on the assumption that consciousness is produced by the brain, and this is a subject of ongoing debate.
It's important to note that these are complex issues and there is ongoing research and debate in the field of neuroscience, philosophy, and consciousness studies. There is no definite answer yet and different people have different perspectives on this subject.
Ian
Is it the case that whenever X affects Y that this suggests that X creates Y rather than X merely affecting Y?

Near-death experiences don't have any explanation at all. Indeed, there is no explanation for any consciousness at all. And if any such alleged explanations of near-death experiences assume upfront that brains create consciousness, then this is a form of question-begging.

[a long pause before it responds!]
ChatGPT
No, it is not the case that whenever X affects Y, this suggests that X creates Y rather than X merely affecting Y. The relationship between cause and effect is complex and can be difficult to determine. It is possible for X to affect Y without X being the direct cause of Y, or for there to be multiple causes for a single effect.
You are correct that there is currently no widely accepted explanation for the phenomenon of consciousness and the relationship between brain activity and consciousness is still a subject of ongoing research and debate. Theories such as the idea that the brain creates a "virtual reality" that we experience as consciousness or the idea that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe are still being explored. It's also correct that some proposed explanations for near-death experiences assume that consciousness is produced by the brain, which is a subject of ongoing debate and discussion, and this assumption can be seen as a form of question-begging.
Ian
So is it possible that the mind-brain correlations can be explained by the brain merely affecting the mind or consciousness rather than creating it?
ChatGPT
It is possible that the correlations between brain activity and consciousness can be explained by the brain merely affecting the mind or consciousness, rather than creating it. This is one of the perspectives that is being considered within the field of philosophy of mind and neuroscience.
One theory, called "panpsychism", postulates that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe, and that the brain is a sort of filter or receiver of consciousness. In this perspective, the brain would not create consciousness, but rather modulate it.
Another perspective is that consciousness is an emergent property of complex systems, like the brain. In this view, the brain doesn't create consciousness but it allows for it to emerge from the interactions between its neural networks.
It's also important to note that even if it is determined that the brain does not create consciousness, it would still play a crucial role in shaping and modulating it, and that the correlations between brain activity and consciousness would still be an important area of study in order to understand this relationship.
In any case, it's important to keep in mind that the relationship between brain and consciousness is an ongoing discussion and there is no definite answer yet.
Ian
Is it more likely that the mind-brain correlations are explained by the brain creating consciousness rather than the brain merely changing, modulating, and attenuating consciousness? If so, then why?
ChatGPT
The question of whether the mind-brain correlations are explained by the brain creating consciousness, rather than the brain merely changing, modulating, and attenuating consciousness, is a matter of ongoing debate and research in the field of philosophy of mind and neuroscience.
Some scientists and philosophers argue that the correlation between brain activity and cognitive function, as well as the effects of brain damage on cognitive function, suggest that the brain is the source of consciousness. They argue that the brain's information processing creates a sort of "virtual reality" that we experience as consciousness.
Others argue that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe, and that the brain is a sort of filter or receiver of consciousness, or that consciousness is an emergent property of complex systems, like the brain. In these perspectives, the brain does not create consciousness, but modulates it, or allows for it to emerge from the interactions between its neural networks.
It's important to note that there is no consensus on the relationship between brain and consciousness and different people have different perspectives on this subject. Some researchers and philosophers argue that the weight of evidence supports one view over the other, but ultimately, the question of whether the brain creates consciousness or modulates it remains an open question in the field.
Ian
What are these arguments that
scientists and philosophers make which they regard as suggesting that the correlations between brain activity and cognitive function and the effects of brain damage on cognitive function, are best explained by supposing brains create consciousness?
ChatGPT
Scientists and philosophers who argue that the correlations between brain activity and cognitive function, as well as the effects of brain damage on cognitive function, suggest that the brain is the source of consciousness, typically cite several pieces of evidence in support of their position. Some of these arguments include:
  1. Neural Correlates of Consciousness: The discovery of specific areas of the brain that are associated with different cognitive functions, such as memory, emotion, and perception, and the fact that damage to these areas can lead to corresponding deficits in cognitive function, is seen as evidence that the brain is the source of consciousness.
  2. Near-death experiences: Some researchers point out that near-death experiences can be explained by medical and neuroscientific explanations, such as the release of certain chemicals in the brain during life-threatening events, or the effects of oxygen deprivation on the brain.
  3. Brain plasticity: The brain's ability to adapt and change in response to different experiences is seen as evidence that consciousness arises from the brain's information processing.
  4. Evolutionary explanations: Some researchers argue that consciousness is an adaptation that evolved to help organisms navigate and survive in their environment, and that the brain is the organ that enables this adaptation.
  5. Artificial Intelligence and brain simulation: As technology advances and we are able to create more sophisticated artificial intelligence and brain simulations, the idea that consciousness could be artificially created or replicated is gaining ground.
It's important to note that these are ongoing debates and different scientists and philosophers have different perspectives on the relationship between brain and consciousness. Some may find these arguments more convincing than others, but ultimately, the question of whether the brain creates consciousness or modulates it remains an open question in the field.
Ian
Let's take these highlighted reasons one by one.
  1. Neural Correlates of Consciousness: As I have already suggested, this is not a reason unless they explain why these correlations are best explained by brains creating consciousness rather than the brain merely changing, modulating, and attenuating consciousness.
  2. Near-death experiences: You're repeating yourself (as well as with 1). I refer you to my previous response on near-death experiences. Also, even if no-one ever had a near-death experiences, this wouldn't entail the brain creates consciousness.
  3. Brain plasticity: If the brain merely changes, modulates, and attenuates consciousness -- and it will presumably have this function in order to allow us to interface with this physical world -- then it is entirely unclear how such plasticity favours the hypothesis that brains create consciousness as opposed to the alternative.
  4. Evolutionary explanations: This assumes that consciousness has causal powers over and above what the neural correlates of consciousness are doing. But mainstream academic opinion is overwhelmingly of the conviction that the physical world is closed. In fact, what these researchers are doing is assuming materialism UPFRONT, which is, of course, transparent question-begging. In other words, this cannot be an argument for the thesis that brains create consciousness as opposed to merely changing, modulating, and attenuating consciousness.
  5. Artificial Intelligence and brain simulation: Computers merely follow instructions. Why would this connote consciousness?

OK, at this point it is clear that I'm not going to get an answer to why it is deemed more likely that brains create consciousness rather than merely changing, modulating, and attenuating it. So thanks for the conversation and goodbye.
ChatGPT
I apologize if my previous response was not clear enough. You are correct that the arguments I provided do not necessarily prove that the brain creates consciousness, rather than modulating it. The relationship between brain activity and consciousness is a complex and ongoing debate within the field of philosophy of mind and neuroscience, and there is no consensus on the subject.
It is important to note that the arguments I provided are the ones that some scientists and philosophers use to support their position that the brain creates consciousness. However, as you have pointed out, there are alternative explanations and perspectives that are also being considered.
In any case, I apologize if I did not provide a satisfactory answer to your question. My goal is to provide accurate and useful information, and I understand that this can be a complex and nuanced subject. If you have any other questions or concerns, please feel free to ask.

My thoughts on the conversation

When asking skeptics why they are so convinced that there is no afterlife, they almost invariably mention the fact that dysfunctional or damaged brains lead to impaired cognitive abilities and/or a change in personality, and hence the unavoidable conclusion is that brains, somehow or other, must give rise to minds or consciousness. Indeed, I have been reading skeptical sources on this subject for decades, and this is virtually the only reason given. 

But, as many of you who have read my other blog posts will be aware, I am not impressed by this argument. As I have pointed out in many places elsewhere, for example in The Mind-Brain Correlations, there is a close correlation between the acuity of our vision and the state of the lenses in the eyeglasses that we wear -- for example, if both the lenses were fogged up, our vision would be very much compromised. Yet, of course, we can all perfectly understand that such correlations do not entail the eyeglasses create our vision, they merely alter it.

(As an aside, I was wondering if I should have introduced this eyeglasses example to ChatGPT, but I suspected that if it has no understanding of anything whatsoever -- and I am personally convinced it doesn't -- then it wouldn't address the relevancy of this point and likely go off on a tangent talking about the opticians and 20:20 vision or whatever! And besides, it ought to be able to understand that x affecting y needn't entail that x produces y without the use of examples.)

Now, of course, skeptics might well claim that the mind-body relationship is utterly unlike that of eyeglasses and vision. But the crucial point here is that the correlations between brain states and mind states are insufficient in and of themselves to establish that brains create minds, or even that this is more likely than brains merely affecting our minds. Arguments need to be advanced in an attempt to show that in this instance, brains creating minds is a more reasonable interpretation of the correlations than the notion of mere alteration. As many of you will know, I come down on the side of alteration, which I won't go into here, but my reasons can be found under Part 5: Dysfunctional brains lead to impaired minds in my review of the soul fallacy.  
 
Unfortunately, despite for many years scouring the Internet and various books, I have never been able to find out why people are so convinced that such brain-mind correlations strongly suggests the former creates the latter*. That is bizarre in itself, but not something I wish to address here. The point here is that this is an absolutely crucial pivotal question. After all, the question of whether there is an afterlife or not is surely of intense interest to the vast majority of us. And this point, that damaged brains result in damaged minds hence there is no afterlife, is constantly wheeled out by skeptics as if it is the very last definitive word on the subject. It is a skeptical prism through which all the purported evidence for an afterlife are viewed. This has the effect of rendering such evidence as near-death experiences as being "extraordinary claims".

So this was why I was very keen to see what ChatGPT had to say on this issue and continually pressed it in the hope of eliciting an actual answer. I hasten to add that I didn't have any expectations that it would advance any such reasons. For where would it get those reasons from?  I have never been able to find any. Of course, if it really is conscious, is sentient, then it is a non-human consciousness, an alien consciousness so to speak, and would be expected to advance its own thoughts on why the mind-brain correlations are best interpreted as the brain creating the mind. But, as I fully expected, it didn't.  It answered like a politician does when asked a question; namely avoided answering it and simply continually repeated the point about the mind being impacted by the brain.

What do I think of ChatGPT?


So what do I think of
ChatGPT? I think it is absolutely incredible, extraordinarily impressive. But I do not think it is conscious. I do not think it is doing anything miraculous. If it were providing its own thoughts, it wouldn't parallel the mainstream academic opinion that is already out there. It's more like a glorified encyclopedia that is trawling the net and other sources, and regurgitating information out there even though it is often paraphrasing that information.

Frequently, that regurgitated information is irrelevant. For example, I ask in my penultimate comment what are the scientists and philosophers arguments that they believe demonstrate that the effects of brain damage on cognitive function are best explained by supposing brains create consciousness. In context, I was clearing asking why they considered that the mind- brain correlations are best explained by the brains create consciousness hypothesis rather than the brains merely affecting consciousness hypothesis. But then ChatGPT proceeded to give me a bulleted list of arguments for naturalism that can be easily found on the web and elsewhere, and which do not address my question (I responded anyway, but at that point I gave up on getting an answer).  
 
More generally, there's a lot of extraneous information ChatGPT is providing (and, incidentally, not all of it correct) that is tangential to the question I was asking it.  And a great deal of repetition. If I were conversing with a person, he might say in an exasperated tone, "I've given you my reasons for why we should suppose the brain produces consciousness, why do you keep repeating the question?"  Then I might point out that he's already conceded that the fact that changes in X precipitate changes in Y certain't needn't imply that X creates Y.  And maybe the conversation might develop from that, and even become a meaningful exchange.  But ChatGPT comes across as more resembling an intellectual poseur similar to those endemic on the net, who doesn't really grasp what I'm saying, and simply regurgitates lots of tangential information he's absorbed from other sources so as to give a favourable impression to onlookers. 

Incidentally, I said at the beginning that this was my second conversation with ChatGPT.  For those interested in my first conversation, I put it on my other blog.  
 
 
 
*Of course, I get the feeling. If a beloved relative is suffering from Alzheimer's, then it seems that that person is no longer there, has irrevocably gone, has ceased to exist. But this is a feeling, not an argument. If someone were to wear eyeglasses the entirety of her life, and her vision slowly became poorer and poorer as the lenses became dirtier and dirtier, she might feel that she's slowly becoming blind and nothing can reverse that process. And yet, her vision becomes vastly better on taking the eyeglasses off. And, in fact, with a phenomenon labelled terminal lucidity (sometimes called paradoxical lucidity), which occurs close to death, there is a brief return of mental clarity that might possibly be explained by a soul or self disengaging from one's body and hence no longer having one's consciousness modulated and changed (deleteriously in the case of Alzheimer's) by one's brain.

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