Thursday, 24 August 2023

Do colours, sounds and odours as we experience them exist out there in the external world? I think so.


1. Introduction

Common sense holds that what has been labelled the secondary qualities, such as colours, sounds and odours, exist out there in the world independently of us. For example, grass really is green regardless of whether anyone is looking at it or not – that is, it is an objective feature of the world. In stark contrast, academics and the scientifically educated overwhelmingly reject this view. They hold that colours, sounds, odours and the other secondary qualities do not exist out there in the world at all, rather they only exist as an experience produced by the brain. This is in contrast to their position on the primary qualities, such as shape and size, which, like common sense, they regard as existing out there.

To explicate this academic view regarding the secondary qualities, let's consider the example of colours. Briefly, the story goes like this: objects reflect particular wavelengths of light, this light then enters the eyes and precipitates a chain of physical processes in the brain, finally, the brain somehow crafts the experience of a colour from these signals it receives. In this story, it should be stressed that the light itself is not considered to be coloured at all, the colour only comes into existence at the end of the causal chain. Watch this video for a simplified scientific story of what happens.

I find it hard to convey how utterly radical this conception of the world is. A world that is entirely bereft of any colours, sounds or odours is a deeply alien one, and arguably unimaginable. It is a bare skeletal outline of reality denuded of the flesh of the qualitative. Roses are not really red, violets are not really blue. And an unpleasant odour is not literally out there in the world, rather allegedly it's a fabrication created by our own brains! 

So given the radical nature of the claim, one would expect a lot of pushback. But, curiously, it seems almost entirely absent. Even those who typically believe in psi and an afterlife and constantly question mainstream academic positions, accept the arguments advanced for this conception of reality. Indeed, these very same people have, at times, been quite trenchant and dismissive of my own belief that the world is more or less as we perceive it to be. On this issue, I seem to be virtually a lone voice. So I thought I would set the record straight and explain why I remain intransigent on this matter.

Here's how I intend to proceed. The next part, part 2, will be devoted to advancing arguments for this thesis that the secondary qualities do not exist out there. Part 3 will be devoted to questioning these arguments with part 3(i) mostly addressing the perceptual illusion argument and part 3(ii) addressing the causal story argument. Part 4 will be devoted to articulating an alternative to this causal story. In Part 5 I will give my concluding thoughts.

Throughout this essay, I will largely be focussing on colours. However, it can be assumed that, in the main, similar arguments are equally applicable to the other secondary qualities. I will also, contrary to my own views, follow the standard practice of referring to the brain rather than the mind as playing a pivotal role in shaping the contents of our sensory perceptions.

2. The arguments for the claim that colours, sounds and smells as we experience them do not exist out there

To recapitulate, the commonsensical view is that colours, sounds, smells and the other secondary qualities exist out there, and we just passively perceive them as they are in themselves. But such a view is rejected by the vast majority of scientists and philosophers, and indeed has been labelled naïve realism. Why naïve? In the main, it's because perceptual illusions seemingly demonstrate that such a view is untenable.

Let's first of all consider illusions involving vision. The two most impressive ones I've ever encountered are the shadow-checker illusion and that famous dress. In the former, the squares A and B appear to have very different colours. However, if we remove most of the picture leaving just the squares A and B, then, much to our astonishment, we will see that they are actually the very same colour.

With the dress, it is either perceived 
as being white and gold, or alternatively as being black and blue. If that were not astonishing enough, the very same individual might initially see it as being coloured one way, but then at a later date are only able to see it as being coloured the other way. Indeed, this actually happened to me. Initially, I could only see the dress as being white and gold, but ever since that first day I can now only see it as being black and blue. It now seems baffling to me that I ever saw it as being white and gold!
 
Perceptual illusions also apply to our other senses. Take a look at this video that demonstrates that what we see can quite literally shape and change what we hear. And, contrary to what most of us might suppose, perceptual illusions even apply to what we smell and taste. For example, we might naïvely suppose that the taste of our food and drink won't literally be affected by its appearance. A tasteless colour additive will surely just make it look more pleasing to the eye. So any perceived difference in the taste of the food or drink might just be assumed to be imaginary. But, apparently, it does quite literally change the taste. A fact that should be borne in mind should anyone ever offer you apple juice in a clean bedpan! (3rd paragraph under the subheading "the power of disgust"). We should also bear in mind that smell is closely related to taste. Hence, since the appearance of food changes the taste, we can be confident it changes the smell too.

It is of vital importance to understand that perceptual illusions are not outliers in how we perceive the world. They are not tricks. Rather they underscore the way that we always sense the world. Indeed, everything we ever perceive could, in a sense, be considered to be an illusion. 
 
Let's illustrate this fact by considering vision. We typically see objects under a variety of different lighting conditions. Sometimes objects are in shadow, sometimes they're not. Sometimes we see objects in the sunlight, sometimes under artificial lighting. Even when we see an object outside on a cloudless day the lighting conditions constantly change. For example, when the Sun is low in the sky the sunlight has to travel through a greater quantity of air, which affects the lighting conditions.
 
These lighting conditions in turn play a role in determining which wavelengths of light are reflected off objects. But, in physics, colours are defined by wavelengths of light. Hence, since one and the same object frequently reflects differing wavelengths of light, we should expect a specific object to be constantly seeming to change its colour. Yet remarkably, under a wide variety of lighting conditions, specific objects more or less appear to be of the same colour. This phenomenon is referred to as colour constancy. For example, regardless of whether or not an object is in shadow, it looks more or less the same colour. And something like a rose will look more or less the same shade of red throughout the daylight hours, despite the different wavelengths of light being reflected off it as the day progresses.


We can infer then that we do not simply passively perceive what is out there. In the case of our vision, it's not as if we are looking out of a transparent window onto the external world just simply seeing what is out there. Rather, seeing is an active process. That is, the brain plays an active role in shaping the colours we see. What seems to be happening here is that the brain holds an unconscious implicit hypothesis about the nature of the external world. This hypothesis includes the idea that objects have intrinsic unchanging colours.
So the brain adjusts accordingly, shaping and moulding visual experiences to try and ensure that specific objects appear to retain more or less the same colour irrespective of all the differing lighting conditions and the actual wavelengths of light entering our eyes.


Furthermore, consider also that our sensory experiences will not be the same for all individuals. For example, some individuals have varying degrees of colour blindness or colour vision deficiency. It also seems that animals differ from humans in what they can sense. Some see fewer colours than we humans do, but other animals, most notably many insects, see more colours. And animals also differ significantly in their other senses too.

So naïve realism does not seem to be tenable. The secondary qualities that we experience are not just determined by objective features of the world such as wavelengths of light, they are also influenced by a perceiver's expectations and beliefs, as well as, of course, the nature and structure of a perceiver's sensory organs and brain. But if what we perceptually experience differs from what the world is like in and of itself, then how do we know colours and the other secondary qualities exist out there at all? 

None of the foregoing in this section makes it conclusive that colours and the other secondary qualities do not exist out there. But the case is arguably considerably strengthened if we also take into account the alleged fact that we have a complete scientific story for how we perceive. Crucially, this story involves only the
primary qualities as being causally efficacious – the secondary qualities are deemed to be causally impotent. So, in the case of vision, it is the wavelengths of light only, not the experienced colours associated with those wavelengths, that figure in the scientific story of how we perceive colour. And the same applies to the other secondary qualities.


I will now summarise the arguments that colours and other secondary qualities do not exist out there.

a) We do not passively perceive the world, rather the brain moulds and shapes our perceptions to make them congruent with our implicit expectations about what the world is like. Hence, a colour as perceived might be very different from the actual colour of objects. So why believe there are actual colours out there at all?
 

b) Secondly, two individuals can perceive a secondary quality very differently. Indeed, this is even the case with unimpaired senses since one's implicit expectations and beliefs play an important role in what we perceive. The dress is an excellent example that illustrates this since two individuals can see radically different colours. Indeed, even the same individual can perceive the dress as having very different colours on two separate occasions.

c) The alleged clinching argument is that we have a complete scientific story of how we perceive secondary qualities, and no reference is made to any actual secondary qualities existing out there in the world. Hence, even if they do exist, they play no role in explaining our experience of the secondary qualities.


 

3. The Pushback


(i). The argument from perceptual illusions dismantled

Let’s consider the shadow-checker illusion again. Suppose this was an actual object in front of us with the image on our retinas approximating to the 2D picture presented to us on our computer or mobile screens. Despite the wavelengths of light entering our eyes from squares A and B being identical, the way our vision works we will perceive squares A and B as having very different colours, just as in the 2D illusion. Yet we're not being fooled since if we were to approach this object, and view it from various perspectives, then we would effectively confirm that squares A and B are indeed very different colours and to the same degree as we perceive in the 2D illusion.

But what if we were to see reality as it supposedly really is with us experiencing the colours corresponding to the wavelengths of light entering our eyes? Then viewing the checkerboard 3D object from the perspective corresponding to the 2D picture, we would see squares A and B as being the same colour. The problem here is that, in reality, they are not the same colour! Moreover, perceiving them as the same colour will compromise our ability to recognise it as being a checkerboard at all. It is in consideration of these reasons that I have argued elsewhere that, properly speaking, the shadow-checker illusion shouldn't actually be considered an illusion at all. See here and here.


More generally, since differing lighting conditions influence the wavelengths of light reflected from objects, then if we were to simply experience the colours corresponding to the wavelengths of light entering our eyes, the colours of objects would appear to us to be in a constant state of change. In short, we wouldn't be seeing colours as they are in themselves out there in the world. And as with the checkerboard, it would compromise our ability to recognise objects.

If colours do exist out there in the world and objects are intrinsically coloured (they retain precisely the same colour over time), then their actual colours correlate poorly with the wavelengths of light that enter our eyes. The fact we do not see the colours corresponding to these wavelengths cannot therefore be used as an argument that we're not seeing the world as it is. On the contrary, the very fact that our brains mould and shape the colours we actually perceive by taking into account the lighting conditions, suggests that we do see the world with its colours more or less as it is in itself. Of course, it also entails that our vision is an active rather than a passive process. That is, the brain moulds and shapes and infers what the world is like. But that doesn't mean to say that what we eventually perceive, what the brain infers, cannot be normally a fairly accurate representation of what the world is like in and of itself.

 

It should be noted, though, that often this inference by the brain goes askew. The incorrect perception of the colours of the dress made by those who perceive it as being white and gold is one such example, although to be fair we are limited to viewing a 2D photograph of it, so it is easy for the brain to misinterpret the lighting conditions. Also, colour blindness or colour vision deficiency will clearly subvert our ability to correctly perceive colours. And even with unimpaired colour vision, we can only see a fraction of the colours that some other animals can. However, how is any of this more significant than the fact that some people have better visual acuity than others? Or that we can only see a fraction of what is out there in contrast to what we can see utilizing a telescope or microscope? No one suggests that from the fact our vision acuity is limited, or from the fact we have poor vision, that there is no world with a definite character out there at all!
 

The denial that the world has any secondary qualities from the consideration of perceptual illusions faces a further challenge. It is that the arguments presented in part 2 equally apply to some of the primary qualities, most notably the size and shape of objects. Consider that the perceived size of objects, just like colour, is also to a certain extent moulded and shaped by the brain. The moon, for example, looks larger near the horizon than it does when it is high up in the sky. Yet we would not generally claim that size is purely a fabrication produced by the human brain. That is, it is assumed that objects out there, such as the moon, have a real size independent of human perception. And the same applies to the shape of objects. Consider the Shepard tabletop illusion for example (I also talk about this illusion here). So just like colours and the other secondary qualities, the perceived size and shape of objects also vary depending on how the brain interprets the external world. Hence, to say that due to perceptual illusions colours, sounds and smells are not out there in the external world, yet size and shape are, seems to apply a double standard.
 
There's something else to consider, and it's arguably more important. Consider that the visual appearance of an object is distinguished from the background by its colours -- such colours essentially outline its shape. Hence, it seems incongruous to suggest the shape is out there but that its colour is somehow produced by the brain. Both the shape of an object and its colour both seem to be out there at a distance from us. Moreover, and even more importantly, they both come to us as a seemingly undifferentiated whole. Can we really subtract the colour of an object from its shape? It seems peculiar and implausible to me to imagine we can do so. Surely either both are out there, or neither are?
 
This sub-section has argued that perceptual illusions and what they imply about how we perceive, do not suffice, nor indeed even give any particular reason to doubt that colours exist out there. Similar arguments can be applied to the other secondary qualities. We now turn to the claim that only the primary qualities are required to exist to explain why we perceive the secondary qualities. 
 
 

(ii). The argument from the scientific story called into question

As previously mentioned, the scientific story goes like this. In the case of colours, objects reflect particular wavelengths of light, this light then enters the eyes and precipitates a chain of physical processes in the brain, finally, the brain somehow crafts the experience of a colour from these signals it receives. In this story, it is only the measurable aspects of reality that are deemed to have any causal efficacy. That is to say, it is purely these measurable aspects of reality that provide a full account of how we perceive both the primary and secondary qualities.
 
There is a problem here though, and it is this: we do not in fact have any such scientific story! For what we encounter here is the notorious hard problem of consciousness. The unreflective view is that consciousness is supposed to come into being as the end consequence of material chains of causes and effects. Such causes and effects are cashed out completely in the form of processes that we can measure; namely particles with physical properties such as charge, momentum, spin and so on. Each link in the chain of causality follows as a direct result of these properties. But, at the end of such causal chains terminating in the brain, we get a sudden abrupt change, a radical disconnect from these measurable processes to subjective experiences such as the greenness of grass, the warmth of love, the smell of roses and so on. These subjective experiences do not have physical properties, so we cannot, seemingly in principle, derive them from the prior physical causal chains. So the scientific story only takes us up to the end of the material chain or chains of causes and effects. We lack a causal story for how this final link in the causal chain – the activity in the brain – somehow creates, precipitates, or translates into a perceptual experience (or any other mental event). Indeed, this inability to specify a causal mechanism even rules out it being a scientific hypothesis least of all a scientific story. 
 
Reductive materialism attempts to negate this problem by holding that conscious experiences are either literally identical to certain brain processes, or alternatively, that conscious experiences are somehow entailed by brain processes, though there is a great deal of debate about the nature of such "entailment". But in the case of either identity or at least metaphysical entailment, this then meets the challenge of the last paragraph since under this assumption of materialism we now have a causal story of how we perceptually perceive.

Let's for the sake of argument, and contrary to my own view (see here and here), take for granted that a type of materialism so characterised is unproblematic. It nevertheless wouldn't be purely a scientific story of how we perceive since one would be assuming upfront the type of materialism so defined. A scientific justification for rejecting the existence of secondary qualities in the external world cannot be predicated on a certain metaphysical stance being true. That is, if we are to have a scientific justification for supposing that colours, sounds, smells and tastes are conjured up or created by the mind rather than residing in an external world, then this ought to apply under any metaphysical stance on the mind-body problem, even if it resembles something like Berkeley's immaterialism (more on immaterialism/idealism near the end).
 
However, let's for the time being waive this objection aside and see how the assumption of some suitable type of materialism fares in this causal story. With what justification do we hold that colours, sounds and smells are either identical or entailed by processes in the brain rather than being identical or entailed by the original causal triggers in the world, namely the wavelengths of light reflected off objects? For example, why can't, say, the redness we experience when looking at a strawberry be literally identical to the specific wavelength of light reflected off that strawberry under some ideal lighting condition? By this means, we could thereby conclude that colours, and the other secondary qualities, are actually out there in the world.

One response would be to point out that the role of the light wave ends when it initiates the chain of causation in one's brain. So the causal story implies that it is the last physical events in the brain that are somehow wholly responsible for our experience of colours, and indeed all other sensory experiences too (whether primary or secondary). This seems to suggest that the identity or entailment should reside in those last physical events. Hence, in a suitable sense, we might say a brain state is red, but a strawberry that one is perceiving is not literally red.
 
On the other hand, the fact that it is the final physical events in the brain that are supposed to be fully responsible for our perceptions, irrespective of whether they're primary or secondary qualities, appears to introduce a possible inconsistency. For it might be considered to be peculiar that our perception of shape and size, despite being immediately caused by brain processes, are nevertheless held to resemble the objects that are actually out there, whereas the perception of colour, odours and sounds allegedly do not. Can such a distinction be justified? One possible response is to point out that, unlike the secondary qualities, we have independent means whereby we can ascertain the shape and size of objects. For if objects are within reach, we are able to obtain a tactile confirmation of the shape and size of the object in question.

I agree that we can be confident in our supposition that shape and size are really out there. Yet this doesn't alter the fact that processes within the brain, which themselves are quite unlike shape or size, can nevertheless convey the visual experience of the correct shape and size of an object. This being so, why can't the same apply to the secondary qualities? Why can't processes within the brain, which themselves are quite unlike wavelengths of light, convey the experience of the correct wavelengths of light that reflect off the objects we perceive? And if colours are identical to, or metaphysically entailed, by specific wavelengths of light, we would then be effectively perceiving colours out there. And a similar point applies to the other secondary qualities. Of course, one might be tempted to point out that wavelengths of light are not colours! But this incredulity should be directed at materialism itself since it is surely no more plausible to declare colours and the other secondary qualities are identical to brain processes. I conclude that, even if we assume materialism is correct, under its logic we have no good reason to reject the idea that colours and the other secondary qualities, in a suitable sense, exist out in the external world itself. 
 
What of other positions apart from strict materialism, including those that still accept the brain somehow creates the mind? Since here the identification of conscious states with brain processes is being rejected then we no longer have a causal story accounting for how we perceive anything at all. Yes, we can trace the causal story from the light reflecting off an object to the physical activity at the end of the causal chain in the brain, but we are completely lacking an account of how this elicits, or translates, into a specific perceptual experience. This is regardless of whether we have in mind the secondary or primary qualities.
 
The fact is, though, that we do nevertheless have sensory experiences and, furthermore, we are here assuming that it is the physical processes in the brain that somehow creates these experiences. So we might be tempted to ask again that if our experience of the shape and size of an object somehow, by some unknown means, corresponds to that which is actually out there, then why not our experience of colours and the other secondary qualities? The answer that many will give is that something like colour can't reside in external objects as it doesn't have any causal powers, only the wavelengths of light do. So, since, unlike materialism, we're not identifying colours with wavelengths of light, nor with anything else that has causal powers, then colours cannot exist out there.

This, though, seems to me to be susceptible to the charge of subtracting the causal power of a thing from the thing itself. The waves on an ocean comprise much of the causal power of that ocean. But obviously, the body of water constituting the ocean exists, and indeed the waves are simply a property of that water. Likewise, it might be that something like the red we experience exists out there, and it has the property associated with a specific wavelength of light with this property being a manifestation of its causal power.
 
I conclude that, in addition to the argument from perceptual illusions, the alleged scientific story also fails to rule out the existence of secondary qualities existing out there in the world.


4. Are we obligated to accept the Causal Story?


As I have argued, this causal story cannot be regarded as a scientific one. This being so, why should we be obligated to accept it? Let's face it, it is wholly contrary to what seems to be the case. When we see, hear, smell, touch, and taste, it seems that we are in direct contact with the external world, that we see it in a direct sense. Yet we are being asked, instead, to believe that the processes occurring inside our skulls are the proximate cause of everything we ever perceptually experience, indeed the cause of the entirety of our conscious lives. This also has the consequence that we could, at least in principle, all be brains in a VAT (similar to within the film, The Matrix). Certainly, at the minimum, if we accept academics' belief that the secondary qualities do not exist in any manner within the external world, this means our senses are at least being partially deceived about what the external world is really like.

This is all deeply implausible. So we need compelling reasons to accept this story. Yet it seems to me that we lack any such compelling reasons. Indeed, I question whether we have any reasons at all. But are there any reasonable alternatives? M
y response is an emphatic yes. Let's see how.

In part 3(ii) I mentioned two possibilities that can be squared with this causal story; namely either a type of reductive materialism, or alternatively just accepting as a brute fact that where there are appropriate neurons firing, an experience will simply spontaneously occur. But even if we were to grant these positions are intelligible, why believe in either of them? Why believe that brain activity creates our perceptual experiences in the first place? 

This last question might elicit exasperation in some readers who might well be thinking that of course brain activity causes or creates our sensory perceptions! That we know this since disruption of particular brain activity adversely affects such perceptions. However, I am not disputing that relevant brain activity needs to occur in order for people to perceive. Compare this to the fact that having our eyes open is necessary to see. Yet having our eyes open doesn't play a causal role in creating our perceptual vision, rather it simply allows perception to take place. Likewise, although it is acknowledged that the physical causal chain of events from the light entering one's eyes until the final activity in the brain, is required to take place before we are able to perceive, we can deny that the final brain state, or indeed any of the preceding causal chain, causes or creates our perceptions.

Note that I am not claiming that the mind or brain cannot conjure up what might seem like perceptual experiences. Clearly it can, as exemplified by dreams and hallucinations. But, in the case of perceiving the external world, I suggest the brain does not proximately create what we perceive, though it does change, mould and shape those perceptual experiences.

Now, if neither brain activity nor any of the other processes along the causal chain cause our perceptual experiences, this seems to suggest that the commonsensical conception of how we perceive might be true after all. In other words, when we perceive something we are in direct contact or directly perceive that object. How, though, does the direct perception of the external world work? For although the causal chain is necessary in order for perception to take place, it nevertheless is not the medium whereby our perceptions are caused.

Perhaps to some people's consternation, it does not seem to me to be problematic to simply suppose that the capacity to perceive is innate to the self or soul. The role of the sensory organs and brain would then be to merely change, modulate, and attenuate our perceptions (this is similar to my belief regarding all of our conscious states. See part 5 of this blog post of mine where I go into more detail). I should add, though, that this hypothesis need not entail that a disembodied existence is possible. The capacity to perceive might be innate, but with our minds nevertheless dependent on a body. 

It should be clarified that in claiming we directly see the external world, this is not to claim that we are seeing external objects exactly as they are in and of themselves. For one thing, the acuity of our vision and the other senses will vary from individual to individual and from one species to the next. For another, as I said earlier, our brains mould and shape our perceptual experiences. But our brains – or, as I prefer, our minds – can be directly presented with the external world, and yet interpret what is actually being experienced. In either case, our perceptions will be direct providing the object itself is the immediate cause of our perception rather than any intermediary or intermediaries along the causal chain playing that role.

Even if one finds this commonsensical hypothesis unconvincing there are other philosophical perspectives that reject the mainstream belief. There is Berkeley's immaterialism (otherwise known as subjective idealism), as well as other types of metaphysical idealism. In addition, there is hylomorphism, occasionalism, psychophysical parallelism, and others, all of which have colours, sounds, and odours populating this external world just as much as the primary qualities do. Of course, it might be objected that many of these metaphysical positions, such as immaterialism, are fanciful and implausible. However, given the extremely implausible nature of the mainstream position, it is not clear to me that this is a decisive objection.

Note that if science had shown that the secondary qualities are fabrications conjured up by the brain and represent nothing out there, then it follows that science would have refuted these metaphysical positions. But informed people do not generally hold this. People might, for example, emphatically reject Berkeley's metaphysic, but not due to this reason.



5. Concluding Remarks


It is an extraordinary claim to suppose the external world is wholly devoid of any colours, sounds or odours, and that it is our brains that somehow fabricates these experiences. So we need very compelling reasons to suppose it is true. Yet it seems to me that not only do we lack any such compelling reasons, it's difficult to find any reasons at all! Even a more or less commonsensical conception of how we perceive doesn't appear to be overly problematic, although, admittedly, naïve realism is not, strictly speaking, tenable. Certainly, there doesn't seem to be any reasons for doubting the secondary qualities exist out there for any metaphysic resembling idealism, or any other position that holds that we perceive directly. Furthermore, even if we subscribe to the causal story of how we perceive, and even subscribe to a type of reductive materialism, it is not at all clear why the external world has to lack secondary qualities.

Personally, I think this rejection of the secondary qualities existing out there originates from a conviction that only the quantifiable or measurable aspects of reality exist. After all, this is all that science requires in order to work, and science has been stunningly successful over the past 350 years or so. Of course, the problem here is the existence of conscious experiences, which appear to involve more than mere measurements. Nevertheless, by denying that colours, sounds and odours exist out there in the external world and relegating them as being mere fabrications created by the brain, this at least means that it is only consciousness that is an anomaly, the rest of the material Universe then can be wholly explained by our physics. So somehow consciousness has got to be explained away. Hence, the attraction of deeming consciousnes as being literally identical to brain processes, or even that it doesn't literally exist at all! But all such options seem to me to be both desperate and transparently false. I cover the issues addressed in this paragraph in more detail here. 

What I find significant and very interesting is the complete conviction amongst virtually everyone, including those who subscribe to an afterlife, that the colours, sounds, and smells we sense in the world are not in fact out there at all but are a fabrication created by our brains or minds. This is a truly radical belief that is totally at odds with common-sense, and, as I hope I have demonstrated, contrary to reason too.

Sunday, 7 May 2023

Steven Novella slams the Institute Of Noetic Sciences

Steven Novella, an American clinical neurologist, is well-known in the skeptical community and is co-founder of the New England Skeptical Society. He also has a blog that he regularly contributes to. I occasionally read it, and I usually find him refreshingly level-headed and sober in his assessment of the relevant issue at hand. Indeed, in the majority of his blog posts that I happen to read, I find myself in more or less full agreement with him. I do, however, very much disagree with him both regarding the possibility of an afterlife and on the existence of psi.

Recently, Novella published a blog post called Problems with the Institute Of Noetic Sciences, and I'd like to comment on a couple of things he says in there.

Novella references a Daily Beast article. Novella complains:

The article focuses on neuroscientist Spiro Pantazatos and his collaboration with IONS, looking for brain regions that might correlate with specific paranormal phenomena. My problem with this research is that is assumes various paranormal phenomena are real, when that has not been scientifically established. In fact, as I point out in the article, we have over a century of research which has failed to demonstrate psi phenomena (ESP, clairvoyance, telekenesis, etc.) to point to. This is not some new idea that has never been explored.

I take it then that Novella favours further proof-oriented research. I have two issues with this.

1. It seems to me that further proof-oriented research will achieve nothing.

2. What IONS favours doing instead, namely "process-oriented experiments", might well pay dividends, not least of all on the issue of whether psi exists at all.

Allow me to elaborate.

There has been 140 years of parapsychological research which, according to IONS, objectively demonstrates what they label "non-local consciousness effects". Now, without getting into a debate about whether they have or not, I imagine that this is what they truly believe. But this being so, to what avail from their perspective would yet further proof-oriented research achieve? Surely precisely nothing, since they're already convinced of its existence. And the same applies to other believers in psi.

So what about skeptics of psi? Well, if 140 years of research hasn't convinced them and considering that they appear to be just as belligerently against the possibility of psi as they have ever been, it then seems scarcely likely that yet more proof-oriented research will convince them otherwise. 

Hence, from whichever perspective one looks at it -- whether from a proponent of psi or a skeptic -- further proof-oriented research might well be largely a fruitless endeavour.  

On the other hand, if psi exists, then
carrying out process-oriented experiments will hopefully reveal the factors that are most conducive to its manifestation. This in turn is clearly helpful to definitively establishing its existence. In addition, it will furnish us with knowledge about the capacities of consciousness and more general questions of how it relates to the material world.

So it seems to me a no-brainer to conclude that
process-oriented experiments in parapsychology are far more useful. And if good science connotes research that is the most helpful to promoting understanding and knowledge, it is good science too. This invites the question of why Novella and other skeptics I have read are adamant that process-oriented experiments in parapsychology are in fact "bad science". This is simply not true. 

Following on from what Novella said above, he adds:

There is also the not-insignificant factor of a complete lack of scientific plausibility. Sure, it’s always possible there is something going on beyond the known laws of physics. To be philosophically pure one should never say “impossible” in science. But if a claim does violate the known laws of physics at a fundamental level, that should give any proponent significant pause. It does raise the bar for evidence dramatically. We should not accept marginal or subjective evidence in order to overturn centuries of established physical laws. That would never be a good bet (so far skeptics have a really good track record always betting on the laws of physics).

This is a very common criticism made by skeptics. If he is referring to the largely metaphysical assumptions typically made by scientists (and I think this is what skeptics tend to have in mind), I comprehensively address these in the following blog post:

Skeptical Inquirer attempts to explain why psi could not possibly exist

I'd also like to add that there is a fundamental misunderstanding that Novella is making here. Namely, the possibility that psi could violate any specific physical laws as we currently know them. Allow me to explain.

Physical laws as we currently know them do not include consciousness in their description of reality.  Indeed, the issue of how consciousness relates to one's body is known as the Mind-Body problem and has more recently been labelled the hard problem (alternatively, see this more easily understandable Guardian article). Of course, various solutions have been proposed. There are even those who deny the very existence of consciousness! The point being here is that even though there is virtually universal agreement amongst academics that the brain does somehow or other create consciousness, how it does so generates intense disagreement and a great deal of heated debate.

Now, if we do not have a broadly accepted scientific theory explaining the very existence of consciousness, then it necessarily follows that we also do not have any scientific theory or laws explaining the existence of the properties of consciousness. But psi is an alleged ability of consciousness, that is, it is a property of consciousness. Hence, to claim that psi violates any specific physical law, or laws, fails to grasp this fact.

So what should we make of Novella's dismissive comments?

 
As I understand it, Novella's accusation that IONS are engaging in pseudoscience is due to two considerations.

Firstly, the fact they are engaging in process-oriented experiments rather than purely proof-oriented research. Secondly, that psi phenomena would violate or break the laws of physics. But, as I have argued and pointed out, neither of these accusations have any merit whatsoever.


Finally, I feel an extract from another blog post of mine -- Often it's extremely hard to decide what is the rational thing to believe -- might be appropriate here:

There is another worry with scientists. The very fact they enjoy a high level of prestige and are respected, means they are listened to and judged by most people to know what they're talking about, even when they pontificate on topics that reside outside their area of expertise. For example, when they derisively dismiss psi, an afterlife, "God", an objective morality, and other contentious issues of a philosophical nature. But, given that most of them have never studied philosophy, or perhaps even given these topics much thought, how seriously ought we take their opinions here?

The answer to that question, I hope, is obvious.

Monday, 27 March 2023

Reincarnation and its Critics, Part 4: No scientific verifiable mechanisms or empirical evidence

Two Alleged Challenges to the Reincarnation Hypothesis

 
The following blog post is someone's* summary of the research into reincarnation, which on the whole seems fair and balanced. There are two alleged challenges to the reincarnation hypothesis in there that I'd like to address. These challenges are not confined to this specific writer as I occasionally see them expressed elsewhere too. Regarding the first challenge, the author says:
One of the most significant challenges for the theory of reincarnation is the lack of any scientifically verifiable mechanism by which it could occur.
I do not consider this a challenge, least of all a significant one. We simply need to bear in mind that there is also no scientifically verifiable mechanism by which even our present bodies come to be associated with consciousness. Indeed, this is why the issue of how consciousness relates to one's body has been labelled the hard problem (also see this Guardian article). If we have no idea how our everyday embodied consciousness is related to our present bodies, indeed that no such scientific theory even seems possible, then a fortiori we could scarcely be expected to conjure up a mechanism for how reincarnation occurs.
 
Immediately after mentioning the first challenge the author presents a second challenge. He (or she, or it) says:
Moreover, there is no empirical evidence that consciousness or the soul could survive physical death, as required by the theory of reincarnation.
Obviously, there is a great deal of evidence. There are near-death experiences and the closely related phenomenon deathbed visions and other peculiar occurrences near death. There are past life memories, crisis apparitions, mediumship and other more indirect evidence. Of course, how persuasive we should consider each strand of evidence is up for debate. One might indeed argue that none of this evidence is particularly compelling (and there certainly are weaknesses, although I regard all the evidence as a collective whole to be very compelling). Nevertheless, evidence it is.

But I’m guessing that by empirical evidence the author and skeptics mean scientific evidence. More specifically that we have never been able to detect consciousness when it isn't in a body (i.e. we have never detected disembodied consciousness). That is, leaving aside apparitions, no one ever sees disembodied consciousness nor indeed have our scientific instruments ever detected any disembodied consciousness. I think the argument would then be that this strongly suggests that disembodied consciousness does not exist.

There's an immediate problem here that occurs to me. If our scientific instruments could detect disembodied consciousness, then by definition, consciousness would then be material or physical or at least have material aspects. However, this is not something that sophisticated believers in an afterlife would subscribe to. Consciousness, or the self, cannot be seen, touched or detected in any manner even when embodied.
Indeed, this is why it is concluded by many that it is immaterial. And if we cannot see or detect consciousness associated with bodies, why on earth would we have any expectation that we will be able to observe disembodied consciousness?
 

But what if Reductive Materialism is correct?

 

Typically, when I give such arguments as I have above, people will claim there is a scientifically verifiable mechanism by which bodies come to be associated with consciousness and that we can in fact detect embodied consciousness. This will be the case should consciousness quite literally be what the brain does. Or, alternatively, if consciousness doesn't really exist, and it is merely an illusion created by our brains. In other words, if some variety of reductive materialism is correct.

However, assuming some variety of reductive materialism is a clear case of question-begging since those who believe in reincarnation will reject this position on the mind-body problem; or at least they will if they have in mind some type of self or soul that reincarnates. What the skeptic needs to do, therefore, is to advance arguments for reductive materialism.  However, it seems to me that this is an insurmountable challenge. 

Other posts in this Reincarnation series:

Reincarnation and its Critics, Part 1: The Increasing Population


*I say someone, but the article seems very ChatGPT..ish to me. It's reproducing the standard arguments for and objections to reincarnation, but it all seems rather derived and soulless. It is balanced but boring, and nothing novel in the text. Exactly like ChatGPT's responses to me.  

Monday, 16 January 2023

A chat with ChatGPT about the possibility of an Afterlife


There's a new AI chatbot called ChatGPT that seems to be vastly superior in its responses to any other chatbot I have attempted to converse with. The following is my 2nd ever conversation with ChatGPT. I will make some comments at the end. I will add a little formatting to make it more clear. I have also slightly edited one sentence of mine to aid clarity.

Ian
How likely do you think it is that there is an afterlife?
ChatGPT
As a machine learning model, I don't have personal beliefs or opinions. The concept of an afterlife is a matter of faith and not something that can be proven or disproven by scientific means. Different people have different beliefs and opinions on the subject.
Ian
What reasons can be given both for and against an afterlife?
ChatGPT
There are several arguments that can be made for and against the existence of an afterlife.
Arguments for the existence of an afterlife often include religious or spiritual beliefs, near-death experiences, and the concept of consciousness being separate from the physical body. Some people believe that the soul or spirit continues to exist after death, and that there is a realm or plane of existence where the soul goes.
Arguments against the existence of an afterlife include scientific evidence that the brain and consciousness are closely tied to physical processes, and the lack of concrete evidence for an afterlife. Some people argue that death is simply the end of consciousness and that there is no afterlife. Others suggest that the idea of an afterlife is simply a human construct, created to help people cope with the fear of death.
Ultimately, whether or not an afterlife exists is a matter of personal belief and faith, and there is no scientific proof one way or the other.
Ian
How do such brain/consciousness correlations provide evidence that there is no afterlife?
ChatGPT
The correlation between brain activity and consciousness suggests that consciousness is a product of the physical brain and its functioning. This is the basis of the argument that consciousness is not separate from the physical body and that there is no soul or spirit that can continue to exist after death.
Research in neuroscience has shown that specific areas of the brain are associated with different cognitive functions, such as memory, emotion, and perception. Damage to these areas can lead to corresponding deficits in cognitive function. This correlation between brain activity and cognitive function is seen as evidence that the brain is the source of consciousness.
Additionally, the study of near-death experiences, which are often cited as evidence for the existence of an afterlife, have been explained by medical and neuroscientific explanations, such as the release of certain chemicals in the brain during life-threatening events, or the effects of oxygen deprivation on the brain.
It's important to note that this is an ongoing discussion and many neuroscientists and philosophers are still researching on the relationship between brain, consciousness and the afterlife. There is no certain conclusion yet, and it is still a matter of debate.
Ian
How do correlations between brain activity and consciousness suggest that consciousness is a product of the physical brain and its functioning? Why do these correlations suggest a causal link from brains to consciousness? Why is it not equally (if not more) possible that brains merely affect consciousness rather than producing it?

Incidentally, near-death experiences have not been explained. For one thing, such "explanations" assume upfront that the brain produces consciousness and that this hypothesis is wholly unproblematic. This is in spite of the "hard problem" of consciousness. For another thing, such explanations are purely speculative. And for yet a third thing, they do not explain anything like the full range of phenomena and feelings associated with near-death experiences, least of all the other anomalous phenomena that people experience close to death.

ChatGPT
The correlation between brain activity and consciousness is seen as evidence for a causal link from the brain to consciousness, because when specific areas of the brain are damaged, there are corresponding deficits in cognitive function. This suggests that the brain is the source of consciousness, rather than the brain simply affecting consciousness.
It's important to note that this is an ongoing discussion in the field of philosophy of mind and neuroscience, and there is no consensus on the relationship between brain and consciousness. Some theories propose that consciousness is a product of the brain's information processing and that the brain creates a sort of "virtual reality" that we experience as consciousness. Other theories propose that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe, and that the brain is a sort of filter or receiver of consciousness.
Regarding near-death experiences, it's true that these experiences have not been fully explained by neuroscience and that there is ongoing research on the topic. The explanations that have been proposed are based on current understanding of brain function and are not meant to be definitive. It's also true that there are many aspects of near-death experiences that are yet to be understood and that some people experience anomalous phenomena. It is also important to note that many of the proposed explanations for near-death experiences are based on the assumption that consciousness is produced by the brain, and this is a subject of ongoing debate.
It's important to note that these are complex issues and there is ongoing research and debate in the field of neuroscience, philosophy, and consciousness studies. There is no definite answer yet and different people have different perspectives on this subject.
Ian
Is it the case that whenever X affects Y that this suggests that X creates Y rather than X merely affecting Y?

Near-death experiences don't have any explanation at all. Indeed, there is no explanation for any consciousness at all. And if any such alleged explanations of near-death experiences assume upfront that brains create consciousness, then this is a form of question-begging.

[a long pause before it responds!]
ChatGPT
No, it is not the case that whenever X affects Y, this suggests that X creates Y rather than X merely affecting Y. The relationship between cause and effect is complex and can be difficult to determine. It is possible for X to affect Y without X being the direct cause of Y, or for there to be multiple causes for a single effect.
You are correct that there is currently no widely accepted explanation for the phenomenon of consciousness and the relationship between brain activity and consciousness is still a subject of ongoing research and debate. Theories such as the idea that the brain creates a "virtual reality" that we experience as consciousness or the idea that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe are still being explored. It's also correct that some proposed explanations for near-death experiences assume that consciousness is produced by the brain, which is a subject of ongoing debate and discussion, and this assumption can be seen as a form of question-begging.
Ian
So is it possible that the mind-brain correlations can be explained by the brain merely affecting the mind or consciousness rather than creating it?
ChatGPT
It is possible that the correlations between brain activity and consciousness can be explained by the brain merely affecting the mind or consciousness, rather than creating it. This is one of the perspectives that is being considered within the field of philosophy of mind and neuroscience.
One theory, called "panpsychism", postulates that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe, and that the brain is a sort of filter or receiver of consciousness. In this perspective, the brain would not create consciousness, but rather modulate it.
Another perspective is that consciousness is an emergent property of complex systems, like the brain. In this view, the brain doesn't create consciousness but it allows for it to emerge from the interactions between its neural networks.
It's also important to note that even if it is determined that the brain does not create consciousness, it would still play a crucial role in shaping and modulating it, and that the correlations between brain activity and consciousness would still be an important area of study in order to understand this relationship.
In any case, it's important to keep in mind that the relationship between brain and consciousness is an ongoing discussion and there is no definite answer yet.
Ian
Is it more likely that the mind-brain correlations are explained by the brain creating consciousness rather than the brain merely changing, modulating, and attenuating consciousness? If so, then why?
ChatGPT
The question of whether the mind-brain correlations are explained by the brain creating consciousness, rather than the brain merely changing, modulating, and attenuating consciousness, is a matter of ongoing debate and research in the field of philosophy of mind and neuroscience.
Some scientists and philosophers argue that the correlation between brain activity and cognitive function, as well as the effects of brain damage on cognitive function, suggest that the brain is the source of consciousness. They argue that the brain's information processing creates a sort of "virtual reality" that we experience as consciousness.
Others argue that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe, and that the brain is a sort of filter or receiver of consciousness, or that consciousness is an emergent property of complex systems, like the brain. In these perspectives, the brain does not create consciousness, but modulates it, or allows for it to emerge from the interactions between its neural networks.
It's important to note that there is no consensus on the relationship between brain and consciousness and different people have different perspectives on this subject. Some researchers and philosophers argue that the weight of evidence supports one view over the other, but ultimately, the question of whether the brain creates consciousness or modulates it remains an open question in the field.
Ian
What are these arguments that
scientists and philosophers make which they regard as suggesting that the correlations between brain activity and cognitive function and the effects of brain damage on cognitive function, are best explained by supposing brains create consciousness?
ChatGPT
Scientists and philosophers who argue that the correlations between brain activity and cognitive function, as well as the effects of brain damage on cognitive function, suggest that the brain is the source of consciousness, typically cite several pieces of evidence in support of their position. Some of these arguments include:
  1. Neural Correlates of Consciousness: The discovery of specific areas of the brain that are associated with different cognitive functions, such as memory, emotion, and perception, and the fact that damage to these areas can lead to corresponding deficits in cognitive function, is seen as evidence that the brain is the source of consciousness.
  2. Near-death experiences: Some researchers point out that near-death experiences can be explained by medical and neuroscientific explanations, such as the release of certain chemicals in the brain during life-threatening events, or the effects of oxygen deprivation on the brain.
  3. Brain plasticity: The brain's ability to adapt and change in response to different experiences is seen as evidence that consciousness arises from the brain's information processing.
  4. Evolutionary explanations: Some researchers argue that consciousness is an adaptation that evolved to help organisms navigate and survive in their environment, and that the brain is the organ that enables this adaptation.
  5. Artificial Intelligence and brain simulation: As technology advances and we are able to create more sophisticated artificial intelligence and brain simulations, the idea that consciousness could be artificially created or replicated is gaining ground.
It's important to note that these are ongoing debates and different scientists and philosophers have different perspectives on the relationship between brain and consciousness. Some may find these arguments more convincing than others, but ultimately, the question of whether the brain creates consciousness or modulates it remains an open question in the field.
Ian
Let's take these highlighted reasons one by one.
  1. Neural Correlates of Consciousness: As I have already suggested, this is not a reason unless they explain why these correlations are best explained by brains creating consciousness rather than the brain merely changing, modulating, and attenuating consciousness.
  2. Near-death experiences: You're repeating yourself (as well as with 1). I refer you to my previous response on near-death experiences. Also, even if no-one ever had a near-death experiences, this wouldn't entail the brain creates consciousness.
  3. Brain plasticity: If the brain merely changes, modulates, and attenuates consciousness -- and it will presumably have this function in order to allow us to interface with this physical world -- then it is entirely unclear how such plasticity favours the hypothesis that brains create consciousness as opposed to the alternative.
  4. Evolutionary explanations: This assumes that consciousness has causal powers over and above what the neural correlates of consciousness are doing. But mainstream academic opinion is overwhelmingly of the conviction that the physical world is closed. In fact, what these researchers are doing is assuming materialism UPFRONT, which is, of course, transparent question-begging. In other words, this cannot be an argument for the thesis that brains create consciousness as opposed to merely changing, modulating, and attenuating consciousness.
  5. Artificial Intelligence and brain simulation: Computers merely follow instructions. Why would this connote consciousness?

OK, at this point it is clear that I'm not going to get an answer to why it is deemed more likely that brains create consciousness rather than merely changing, modulating, and attenuating it. So thanks for the conversation and goodbye.
ChatGPT
I apologize if my previous response was not clear enough. You are correct that the arguments I provided do not necessarily prove that the brain creates consciousness, rather than modulating it. The relationship between brain activity and consciousness is a complex and ongoing debate within the field of philosophy of mind and neuroscience, and there is no consensus on the subject.
It is important to note that the arguments I provided are the ones that some scientists and philosophers use to support their position that the brain creates consciousness. However, as you have pointed out, there are alternative explanations and perspectives that are also being considered.
In any case, I apologize if I did not provide a satisfactory answer to your question. My goal is to provide accurate and useful information, and I understand that this can be a complex and nuanced subject. If you have any other questions or concerns, please feel free to ask.

My thoughts on the conversation

When asking skeptics why they are so convinced that there is no afterlife, they almost invariably mention the fact that dysfunctional or damaged brains lead to impaired cognitive abilities and/or a change in personality, and hence the unavoidable conclusion is that brains, somehow or other, must give rise to minds or consciousness. Indeed, I have been reading skeptical sources on this subject for decades, and this is virtually the only reason given. 

But, as many of you who have read my other blog posts will be aware, I am not impressed by this argument. As I have pointed out in many places elsewhere, for example in The Mind-Brain Correlations, there is a close correlation between the acuity of our vision and the state of the lenses in the eyeglasses that we wear -- for example, if both the lenses were fogged up, our vision would be very much compromised. Yet, of course, we can all perfectly understand that such correlations do not entail the eyeglasses create our vision, they merely alter it.

(As an aside, I was wondering if I should have introduced this eyeglasses example to ChatGPT, but I suspected that if it has no understanding of anything whatsoever -- and I am personally convinced it doesn't -- then it wouldn't address the relevancy of this point and likely go off on a tangent talking about the opticians and 20:20 vision or whatever! And besides, it ought to be able to understand that x affecting y needn't entail that x produces y without the use of examples.)

Now, of course, skeptics might well claim that the mind-body relationship is utterly unlike that of eyeglasses and vision. But the crucial point here is that the correlations between brain states and mind states are insufficient in and of themselves to establish that brains create minds, or even that this is more likely than brains merely affecting our minds. Arguments need to be advanced in an attempt to show that in this instance, brains creating minds is a more reasonable interpretation of the correlations than the notion of mere alteration. As many of you will know, I come down on the side of alteration, which I won't go into here, but my reasons can be found under Part 5: Dysfunctional brains lead to impaired minds in my review of the soul fallacy.  
 
Unfortunately, despite for many years scouring the Internet and various books, I have never been able to find out why people are so convinced that such brain-mind correlations strongly suggests the former creates the latter*. That is bizarre in itself, but not something I wish to address here. The point here is that this is an absolutely crucial pivotal question. After all, the question of whether there is an afterlife or not is surely of intense interest to the vast majority of us. And this point, that damaged brains result in damaged minds hence there is no afterlife, is constantly wheeled out by skeptics as if it is the very last definitive word on the subject. It is a skeptical prism through which all the purported evidence for an afterlife are viewed. This has the effect of rendering such evidence as near-death experiences as being "extraordinary claims".

So this was why I was very keen to see what ChatGPT had to say on this issue and continually pressed it in the hope of eliciting an actual answer. I hasten to add that I didn't have any expectations that it would advance any such reasons. For where would it get those reasons from?  I have never been able to find any. Of course, if it really is conscious, is sentient, then it is a non-human consciousness, an alien consciousness so to speak, and would be expected to advance its own thoughts on why the mind-brain correlations are best interpreted as the brain creating the mind. But, as I fully expected, it didn't.  It answered like a politician does when asked a question; namely avoided answering it and simply continually repeated the point about the mind being impacted by the brain.

What do I think of ChatGPT?


So what do I think of
ChatGPT? I think it is absolutely incredible, extraordinarily impressive. But I do not think it is conscious. I do not think it is doing anything miraculous. If it were providing its own thoughts, it wouldn't parallel the mainstream academic opinion that is already out there. It's more like a glorified encyclopedia that is trawling the net and other sources, and regurgitating information out there even though it is often paraphrasing that information.

Frequently, that regurgitated information is irrelevant. For example, I ask in my penultimate comment what are the scientists and philosophers arguments that they believe demonstrate that the effects of brain damage on cognitive function are best explained by supposing brains create consciousness. In context, I was clearing asking why they considered that the mind- brain correlations are best explained by the brains create consciousness hypothesis rather than the brains merely affecting consciousness hypothesis. But then ChatGPT proceeded to give me a bulleted list of arguments for naturalism that can be easily found on the web and elsewhere, and which do not address my question (I responded anyway, but at that point I gave up on getting an answer).  
 
More generally, there's a lot of extraneous information ChatGPT is providing (and, incidentally, not all of it correct) that is tangential to the question I was asking it.  And a great deal of repetition. If I were conversing with a person, he might say in an exasperated tone, "I've given you my reasons for why we should suppose the brain produces consciousness, why do you keep repeating the question?"  Then I might point out that he's already conceded that the fact that changes in X precipitate changes in Y certain't needn't imply that X creates Y.  And maybe the conversation might develop from that, and even become a meaningful exchange.  But ChatGPT comes across as more resembling an intellectual poseur similar to those endemic on the net, who doesn't really grasp what I'm saying, and simply regurgitates lots of tangential information he's absorbed from other sources so as to give a favourable impression to onlookers. 

Incidentally, I said at the beginning that this was my second conversation with ChatGPT.  For those interested in my first conversation, I put it on my other blog.  
 
 
 
*Of course, I get the feeling. If a beloved relative is suffering from Alzheimer's, then it seems that that person is no longer there, has irrevocably gone, has ceased to exist. But this is a feeling, not an argument. If someone were to wear eyeglasses the entirety of her life, and her vision slowly became poorer and poorer as the lenses became dirtier and dirtier, she might feel that she's slowly becoming blind and nothing can reverse that process. And yet, her vision becomes vastly better on taking the eyeglasses off. And, in fact, with a phenomenon labelled terminal lucidity (sometimes called paradoxical lucidity), which occurs close to death, there is a brief return of mental clarity that might possibly be explained by a soul or self disengaging from one's body and hence no longer having one's consciousness modulated and changed (deleteriously in the case of Alzheimer's) by one's brain.

Thursday, 5 January 2023

Is breakfast the most important meal of the day?

I frequently come across the claim that it is very important to eat a breakfast since skipping breakfast is associated with a high prevalence of obesity and being overweight.

I confess, I never eat breakfasts and have scarcely done so my entire life. I simply do not feel hungry immediately after getting up. It takes about 3 or 4 hours after getting up before I start to feel hungry.

It seems peculiar to me that for those similar to me and are averse to eating food in the morning, that they will actually lose weight or stay slim by forcing themselves to eat food, which is quite the opposite to what one might expect. Further, doesn't the body generally tend to regulate its own weight by eliciting hunger pangs when you need food? 

But what about this research? Well, at most it establishes that those who are overweight have a greater propensity to skip breakfasts. Similar to seemingly most epidemiological research claiming this, that and the other, it fails to establish a causal relationship. When ice cream sales go up so do cases of sunburn. But no-one would dream of saying that eating ice cream causes sunburn. And most people die in bed, but no-one would dream of claiming that beds are therefore dangerous.

So before concluding that one thing causes another, we need at least some possible plausible causal mechanism, and then we need to show that it is this causal mechanism that is behind the correlated pattern that we see. In addition, for the specific case of whether eating breakfasts is always wise, there needs to be a study on those who are overweight and averse to eating breakfasts, to start eating breakfasts and to see whether these people end up losing weight.

Lacking such a plausible causal mechanism, there will always be other possible explanations for such patterns. In the specific case of slimmer people regularly eating breakfasts,
very possibly there is a link between eating breakfast and people adhering to societal norms and being concerned about their well-being and health. These people will have a propensity as a whole to avoid extreme, or what is generally considered to be unwise behaviour e.g. they don't eat loads of junk food, they tend to eat lots of fruit and vegetables, and they tend to eat regular meals, including breakfasts. This then might explain why they aren't fat. In other words it has nothing to do with eating breakfast per se. Rather it is because they avoid junk food and indulge less in the risky behaviour that might have a deleterious effect on their health.

Saturday, 3 December 2022

Often it's extremely hard to decide what is the rational thing to believe.

It's extraordinarily difficult for most of us to decide what the truth is on many contentious issues. Will we witness catastrophic climate change in the coming decades? Does psi exist? Is there some type of afterlife? What policies or political system is the most favourable for promoting economic growth, and indeed should such growth necessarily be our aim? Will consuming 5 to 10 portions a day of fruit and vegetables (provided not potatoes) promote health and longevity? Does an objective morality exist, or is what we judge as praiseworthy or heinous behaviour simply a reflection of one's culture? Do we have free will?

At the outset, we should recognise in ourselves the prior propensity to favour a particular side on any given issue. Most often this results in us seeking out those sources that back up our beliefs whilst at the same time we shun those sources that contradict them. That is, we tend to read or listen to people defending what we are predisposed to believe in the first place, and to ignore, or even adopt a hostile stance, to the arguments advanced by the opposing side.

To counteract this natural propensity, it therefore might seem sensible to simply listen to both sides of an argument, then attempt to make up our own minds. But arguably this is not ideal. For is it sensible to pay equal attention and give equal time to the arguments of a lone maverick compared to the arguments of the many experts who disagree with that maverick? Perhaps instead, the best strategy is to simply trust what experts say on any particular topic?

It might seem especially wise to listen to scientists. They are, after all, supposedly informed by what the science says and might be expected to be objective and impartial. But even when it comes to scientists
there are vested interests in asserting a specific view, and vested interests by others in denying that view. There's groupthink, there's the fear of the impact on their careers for those scientists in voicing a contrarian or unfashionable view. There are positions that seem clearly false, but where no-one dares point it out, that is they are afraid to point out that the emperor has no clothes. In short, there are many pressures to conform and simply parrot the mainstream position. However, unfortunately for the mainstream position, many of the alleged discoveries in science cannot be replicated.

And frequently there are no experts as such. Or at least there are no people that are especially privileged in having superior knowledge to the rest of us, even if we are not aware of this. To give one example, the predictions of economists fare little better than flipping a coin.

There is another worry with scientists. The very fact they enjoy a high level of prestige and are respected, means they are listened to and judged by most people to know what they're talking about, even when they pontificate on topics that reside outside their area of expertise. For example, when they derisively dismiss psi, an afterlife, "God", an objective morality, and other contentious issues of a philosophical nature. But, given that most of them have never studied philosophy, or perhaps even given these topics much thought, how seriously ought we take their opinions here?

It's also worth pointing out that there are contentious issues where one personally can be confident in the correctness of a specific stance. This is so despite the fact that the opposing view to one's own might be held with a great deal of conviction and passion. Let's, for example, consider predictions regarding technological progress and, in particular, the so-called technological singularity. There are supposedly informed and respected people that worry that sentient robots will be developed that take over the world and enslave humanity. But, at least to my mind, the very notion of such a technological singularity is preposterous. For a kick-off, it rests on the implicit notion that consciousness or sentience is quite literally merely information processing. This seems to me to be straightforwardly false since information processing simply fails to connote consciousness. Apart from that, we should be very leery of such predictions involving technology since people like Elon Musk and others have vested interests in playing up the rate of technological progress and change. And let's face it, overstating the rate of change in technology is exciting, it's what people like to hear. They don't want to hear someone predicting an unimaginative prosaic future.

We can also be confident of a specific stance if we are informed by having direct experiences, or experiences reported by those whom we trust. Hence, we can witness for ourselves the peculiar weather in recent years that seems to justify our worry about climate change. And many of us have had direct experience of psi. But on other issues where the answer is not so obvious, how do we decide?

My solution?  First and foremost, think for yourself.  Do your own homework if a topic particularly interests you.  Listen to both sides, but be cynical of people claiming this, that and the other.  Don't be afraid of voicing a minority opinion, or even an opinion that might be uniquely yours.


Wednesday, 19 October 2022

Our inexplicable existence in a cold dark Universe

What is this world that we inexplicably find ourselves in? Were we placed here by some unknown intelligence for some unfathomable reason? Or is it all just a huge joke, that it's all just meaningless fortuity and happenstance that we find ourselves in existence now and having such thoughts?

If that were not enough, this world, this reality we find ourselves in, is highly strange. Consider our situation. We exist, apparently, on the surface of a small sphere that is suspended in the midst of an effective eternal, cold, dark, nothingness. An effective nothingness utterly inhospitable and even possibly entirely bereft of any complex life apart from on this one tiny planet. When we gaze up in wonder and forlorn hope seeking to understand why we're here, what it all means, what our role might be, whether there is other life out there, the stars merely gaze back down at us with cold pitiless indifference.

I find our situation to be highly peculiar. Certainly not something I thought about as a child, but the weirdness of our situation has slowly dawned on me the older and older I get. And even at my relatively advanced age, the feeling of weirdness continues to grow.

Perhaps we will eventually find out the answer to such questions in some unknown reality after we die, perhaps we won't. Personally, I feel that we will.

Claude Is Not So Smart: Disentangling the Implications of the Mind-Brain Correlations

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